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

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Contents

ARTICLES

The Limits of "International Law"
Robert H. Bork ____ 3

My Falklands War and Theirs
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick ____ 11

A Reply to My Critics
Francis Fukuyama ____ 21

Trouble on the Oriental Express
Murray Sayle ____ 29

America's Purpose: A Series
Charles Krauthammer/Nathan Tarcov ____ 46

Poland: Life in an Abnormal Country
Martin Krygier ____ 55

Will the Soviet Union Survive Until the Year 2000?
John B. Dunlop ____ 65

Mrs. Aquino and the Joe Kapp Syndrome
Alvin H. Bernstein ____ 77

Losing Control
Ethan B. Kapstein ____ 85

DEPARTMENTS

Books

The World According to Pfaff
Morton Kondracke ____ 91

Jaw-Jaw about War-War
Kenneth M. Jensen ____ 95

Reflections

But We Follow the Worse . . .
Jean-François Revel ____ 99

Correspondence

Diana Trilling/Irving Kristol ____ 104

Quarterly

Chicken George?
Gary J. Schmitt ____ 107

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The Limits of "International Law"

Robert H. Bork

ON OCTOBER 25, 1983, armed forces of the United States invaded Grenada. President Reagan at once stated that our purpose was not only to protect Americans there but to "help in the restoration of democratic institutions" in a country where "a brutal group of leftist thugs violently seized power." Both the President and Secretary of State George P. Shultz said the operation was fully consistent with international law.

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan disagreed: "I don't know that you restore democracy at the point of a bayonet." He said we had clearly violated international law. (Moynihan is the public official who most persistently invokes this law and his views deserve attention.) Soon, Harvard law professor Abram Chayes, who had served as legal adviser to the State Department in the Kennedy administration, wrote in the *New York Times* that among international law experts there existed "remarkably broad agreement that the United States' invasion was a flagrant violation of international law." On the same page, Eugene V. Rostow, a professor and former dean of the Yale Law School, wrote that "the American and allied campaign in Grenada is legitimized by classic precedents in international law, notably the Cuban missile crisis of 1962."

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The American public, to the degree that it paid any attention, must have been quite mystified. High public officials and an undefined group of "experts in international law" were bitterly divided over the legality of what the United States had done. The pattern is familiar. Whenever an American President uses or subsidizes force against another country, the halls of Congress resound and the pages of newspapers sizzle with pronouncements by his political opponents (and his allies) that he is (and is not) a lawbreaker. Some months later articles arguing both sides appear in scholarly journals. Since the public is assured that there is a law of nations but have no idea what it is, they are almost certain to come away with the impression that, according to a substantial segment of informed opinion, the United States is a habitual lawbreaker. Indeed, the U.S. appears to be a recidivist. That is no small matter. People who deliberately break known laws are immoral. So it must be with nations. Or must it? The word "law" is a capacious one and before we accept a sense of guilt it would be well to inquire further.

What, exactly, is international law? Is it law at all? What purposes does it serve?

In some of its branches, it is law in a conventional sense. If two nations dispute fishing rights in the sea under a treaty, they may submit the matter to an international tribunal and agree to abide by the decision. In addition, there are international conventions,

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some of long standing, that govern the treatment of prisoners of war, of diplomats, of the rights of neutrals, etc. But that is not the kind of international law about which politicians and scholars grow passionate.

In its grandest (or most grandiose) form, international law is about the use or support of armed force against another nation. Concerning that subject, there are a great many statements of principle that *purport* to be law. They may be found, for example, in the Charter of the United Nations, in the Charter of the Organization of American States, in any number of bilateral and multilateral treaties, and in custom. The rules of customary law, indeed, supposedly derived from the actual practices of nations, are said to be just as binding as any charter.

Most people find this rather perplexing. Nations regularly act in ways that, we are assured by politicians and scholars, constitute clear violations of international law . . . and nothing happens. No police force goes into action, no grand jury indicts, no petit jury sits, no verdict is announced by a court or, if one is, the convicted party ignores it. Articles and books gradually appear contending vociferously, and sometimes learnedly, that there was, or that there was not, a law violation. What can it mean to say that rules like that are in some sense, in any sense, "law"?

Senator Moynihan has no doubts on that subject: "International law *exists.* It is not an option. It is a fact." Others are less sure; and it is not merely laymen who feel unease. Treatises on international law commonly open by addressing the question whether the subject contains much that can properly be called "law." Most writers seem a touch defensive, but they assure the reader that there is "law" there. Yet the explanations themselves tend to be more than a trifle elusive and often romantic. A very prominent international lawyer, Philip Jessup, once offered an argument better than most:

> The layman and the common lawyer who find it difficult to fit international law into their concept of "law". . . usually are alike in asserting that there isn't any international law. They forget that law has many meanings. There is the law of gravity, the Sherman Anti-Trust law, the law of supply and demand, international law.

The passage confuses rather than clarifies. The law of gravity describes a force in the natural universe. The law of supply and demand is an observation about human behavior in markets. One who attempts levitation or tries to purchase more than anyone is willing to sell at a particular price would not be called a law violator. The Sherman Act is a rule made by a legislature with conceded political authority and is enforced by courts through damages, fines, and even imprisonment. The fact that all of these things are called "laws" demonstrates only that the word has been applied to things that have little or nothing in common.

Professor Michael Reisman of Yale notes that "Law is perforce a system of authorized coercion, and it can neither be conceived of nor operate without a supportive political system or power process. In the absence of a centralization of authoritative force and an effective monopoly over who can use it to maintain community order and values, individual actors must look to their own resources." Jessup recognized this problem but tried nonetheless to edge international law closer to the Sherman Act:

> In most cases the layman is impressed by the reality of breaches of international law and is not sufficiently aware of the reality of reliance upon it. He does not pause to wonder why foreign offices bother to maintain legal staffs, which are an expense and sometimes a hindrance to the execution of policy.

But the existence of legal staffs poring over issues of international law proves little about a law relating to international violence. Thousands of mundane commercial and political matters arise in international settings, where the meaning of "international law" is itself not a focus of controversy. But so long as there purports to be international law *about the use of force*, the most cynical and predatory

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government will employ a legal staff to engage in international "shystering" as the need arises. Jessup finally resorted to the argument that, since people called international lawyers are doing something, what they are doing must be international law:

> Impotent to restrain a great nation which has no decent respect for the opinion of mankind, failing in its severest test of serving as a substitute for war, international law plods on its way, followed automatically in routine affairs, invoked, flouted, codified, flouted again but yet again invoked. The Legal Adviser of the United States Department of State still sits at his desk . . . in Washington and his counterparts sit at Downing Street, the Quai d'Orsay and the Wilhelmstrasse. It is not their task to frame policies. But can one say that the international law with which they deal has no reality?

In January of 1940, when Jessup's article appeared, one might have been inclined to say precisely that. One might have said it scores or hundreds of times since. The Soviets used force to crush movements toward freedom in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, and to seize Afghanistan. But it is not just a great power such as the Soviet Union that is immune to the blandishments of international law. Cuba and Nicaragua have armed and supported insurgency movements attempting to destroy democratic governments in Central America. China overran Tibet, India seized the Portuguese colony of Goa. The least one can say is that, in such cases, whatever reality this wraith called international law possesses is not visible to the non-expert.

This is not to deny that the *idea* of international law has real-world effects. It does. To see what those effects are, it is helpful to examine a pair of recent instances in which actions of the United States raised issues of international law. Two of the most spectacular such examples were the invasion of Grenada and our support of contra forces fighting the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The relevant facts cannot reasonably be disputed in either case.

The Nicaraguan revolution that deposed the dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979 was made by a broad coalition, including the church, organized labor, professional and business groups, and peasants. Cuba, however, armed and advised the Marxist-Leninist Sandinistas who gradually removed democrats from positions of power, suppressed civil, political, and religious rights, and built a powerful army with arms and assistance from the Soviets and their allies. Nicaragua itself began supporting armed insurgencies designed to overthrow other democratic regimes. El Salvador was a particular target.

ALARMED, the United States began to support the Nicaraguan insurgency of the contras and to take other actions, such as the mining of harbors. Nicaragua struck back, using, among other tactics, international law. When the U.S. learned in the spring of 1984 that Nicaragua would file a claim in the International Court of Justice (or World Court), a body established by the Charter of the United Nations as the UN's "principal judicial organ" and composed of judges from various nations, our government suspended its acceptance of the ICJ's jurisdiction as to disputes with any Central American state. The Court nevertheless decided that it retained jurisdiction and the United States then announced that it would not participate further because the dispute involved "an inherently political problem that is not appropriate for judicial resolution." The U.S. then terminated its qualified 1946 acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.

This was hardly novel. At the time, only 47 of the 162 nations entitled to accept that compulsory jurisdiction did so—and nine of the fifteen judges on the ICJ came from nations that did not! The Court proceeded to hear only Nicaragua because the U.S. was absent and El Salvador's petition to intervene had been denied—although the ICJ's own statute gave El Salvador that right. At that point, it should have been obvious to anyone what the outcome of the case would be.

In the event, the fears of the United

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States were realized. The case proceeded in an odd way. Assuming that it had any jurisdiction to begin with, the ICJ clearly had none under the treaties invoked by Nicaragua—the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of the American States—because the U.S. had long before excepted issues arising under multilateral treaties unless *all* signatories were present. The Court claimed, nonetheless, that it could apply customary international law to the dispute. It found these principles binding despite their incorporation in provisions of the treaties that could not be applied. Customary international law is supposed to reflect the actual practices of nations, but the principles the Court applied were distinguished more for their continual violation by nations than for being followed. They were, moreover, principles hotly disputed among the scholars of international law. Despite these difficulties which, perhaps separately but certainly in combination, would seem to be insuperable, the Court went forward, making law as it went.

The ultimate difficulty with the ICJ's performance, however, was that the principles it fashioned turned out to be one-sided, wooden, and wholly unsuited to the realities of international conflict. The Court decided that merely arming rebels, even in combination with providing military advice and sanctuary for rebel leaders, does not constitute an "armed attack" and that only such an attack brings the issue of individual or collective self-defense into play.

Having found that Nicaragua had not engaged in an armed attack against El Salvador, according to the ICJ's definition, there was no reason whatever for the Court to go on to address the United States' claim that it was exercising the well-established right of collective self-defense. But the Court chose to do so and found this defense legally insufficient for a very odd reason:

> [I]t is the State which is the victim of an armed attack which must form and declare the view that it has been so attacked. There is no rule in customary international law permitting another State to exercise the right of collective self-defence on the basis of its own assessment of the situation.

This was an entirely new procedural requirement, and it means that, even if El Salvador was under attack by Nicaragua and the entire world knew it, if El Salvador, for understandable reasons of prudence, did not wish to make a formal declaration of that fact, the United States could not respond by doing to Nicaragua what that country was doing to El Salvador. The ruling was triply odd since El Salvador had asked the U.S. to assist in its defense, President Duarte had repeatedly mentioned the Nicaraguan attack in press conferences, and El Salvador's rejected petition to intervene in the Court's proceedings had declared the existence of an attack.

It is customary for even those scholars who have pointed out the manifold deficiencies of the ICJ's performance—in its assumption of jurisdiction, its fact-finding, and its legal argument—to deny that they see bias or incompetence. But one must wonder whether an international tribunal can ever be entirely free of the foreign policy interests of the nations whose jurists sit on the tribunal. The ICJ judges, moreover, are elected by the UN's General Assembly and Security Council, often after a highly political process. In explaining the U.S. decision to terminate our acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, Abraham D. Sofaer, the legal adviser to the State Department, said: "One reasonably may expect at least some judges to be sensitive to the impact of their decisions on their standing with the UN majority." He continued, in rampant understatement, that the UN "majority often opposes the United States on important international questions." It did so on the question of our conduct with respect to Nicaragua.

Every lawyer with a national practice knows that if his corporate client is sued by a local plaintiff in certain state courts, the client is likely to have to eat what the bar calls "home cookin'." The lawyers for the commis-

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sioner of baseball were recently reminded of that. So, it would appear, was the United States in the International Court of Justice.

But there appears to have been more to the matter than a politically-inspired but perhaps aberrational decision. As Professor Reisman points out, the

> international law-making process has itself undergone change and has subtly, but steadily, sought to change international law with regard to certain unilateral uses of force. While it has not totally succeeded, it has accomplished enough to have made expectations of who and how the law is made and what the law *is* less certain than in the past.

This has much to do with the change in the nature of the UN General Assembly as many new nations were admitted. The Assembly began to operate on the assumption that what was said there was international law or evidence of it. These were largely have-not nations and they want an international law that implements their desires. The result, as Reisman says, is the inversion of many established rules about the use of force. The decision in *Nicaragua v. United States* is a case in point.

IN ANY EVENT, the entire episode of *Nicaragua v. United States* had a distinctly odd feel for those who fall into the category of what Jessup called the "common lawyer." No court of the United States would entertain a suit challenging the legality of our actions with respect to Nicaragua. Various radical groups tried to litigate our involvement there and elsewhere in Central America, but were not successful. Our courts, under one legal rubric or another, essentially agreed that this was an inherently political dispute, not fit for judicial resolution.

As much could be said for all disputes about the use of force by one nation against another—but that is exactly my point about international law. We have not entrusted matters so gravely affecting our national interests, security, and foreign policy to American judges. Yet many argue that we should entrust such matters to a Court sitting on another continent, made up predominantly of jurists from foreign nations, and elected by an international body dominated on such issues by Communist bloc and Third World nations. Perhaps the administration's objection to the proceedings should have been couched differently: "This is an inherently political problem which we are unwilling to submit to political judgment outside the American political process."

The U.S., of course, refused to honor the judgment of the ICJ by paying damages to Nicaragua. But that does not mean that no harm was done. Even before the Court's decision, Carlos Arguello, Nicaragua's ambassador to the Netherlands who filed the case in the ICJ, announced that a decision against the United States would "be a serious political and moral blow to them." And so it proved. That was true in the U.S. as well as abroad. International law scholarship, along with the rest of the American academic community, was partially politicized and for every professor who criticized the Court's opinion another castigated the United States.

Thus, Herbert W. Briggs, an emeritus professor at Cornell, wrote in the *American Journal of International Law* that "An administration in Washington that takes satisfaction in invading Grenada, hijacking foreign planes in the Mediterranean, bombing people in Libya and attempting to overthrow foreign governments is unlikely to regard making the United States of America a fugitive from justice, dodging a Court decision, as a serious matter. In each case, the end is supposed to justify the means." The fact that the Mediterranean hijacking brought to justice in Italy PLO terrorists who had themselves hijacked the cruise ship *Achille Lauro* and murdered an American, or that the bombing of Libya was designed to (and did) deter Qaddafi's support of international terrorism—all this was deemed irrelevant. To which one can only reply that if the U.S. is a fugitive from justice for rejecting the jurisdiction of a biased court over matters vital to its security, then a large majority of the world's nations are in flight.

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Except that there was no judgment by the World Court, much the same situation arose when the United States invaded Grenada. Grenada, a recently independent small island nation, had its government overthrown in a coup by Maurice Bishop and his revolutionary party in 1979. Developments followed much the same pattern seen earlier in Cuba and later in Nicaragua: the end to elections, freedom of the press, other political freedoms, and habeas corpus. A large number of political prisoners were held and the new regime engaged in rapid and heavy militarization with the assistance of arms and advisers from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other nations of the Communist bloc. Grenada's neighbors, the other six island nations of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, were alarmed, since Grenada's military forces exceeded all of theirs combined and seemed to have no possible purpose other than to support subversion in order to overthrow their democratic governments.

Factions existed within the Grenadan ruling party, however, and on October 13, 1983, Bishop was arrested and subsequently murdered, along with three of his cabinet and certain union leaders. It is thought that this coup may have been the work of even more hard-line Marxist-Leninists, but, in any case, chaos followed as no group seemed in control. Rioting, looting, demonstrations, shootings, and a round-the-clock curfew on the civilian population, enforced by threats to shoot on sight, left the island without a real government. The other nations of the OECS expressed serious concern, and the United States was concerned as well, for there were about one thousand Americans on the island, many of them medical students. As Richard Cheney, then a member of the congressional mission that later investigated, wrote: "Cut off from the outside world, dependent on the People's Revolutionary Army for food and water, and confined to their quarters on pain of death, they were, the State Department employee [who had been trying without success to arrange their evacuation] believed, already hostages."

The OECS member nations, along with Barbados and Jamaica, met and decided to take military action, provided the United States would assist the effort, since their own military forces were meager. The U.S. agreed, and on October 25 the OECS mission, supported by Barbados and Jamaica, but consisting almost entirely of U.S. forces, invaded. When the fighting was over, a CBS News poll found that 91 percent of Grenadans were glad the U.S. troops had come. By December 15, U.S. armed forces had left the island, order had been restored, American and Grenadan lives very probably saved, and plans were underway for free elections so that the people of Grenada could choose their own government. One would have thought that outside the Communist bloc the American action would have been joyfully received.

ONE WOULD have been quite wrong. Already, early in November, the UN General Assembly voted to condemn the action as a violation of international law. The majority was larger than that which had condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan! The vote had been taken, moreover, without even allowing the nations of the OECS and the United States to present their case. Yet once more many of the U.S. international law academics responded in their own political fashion. No less than nine professors of international law, including Professor Chayes, signed a short article finding the U.S. "in egregious violation of international law" and stating that the lack of the "imprimatur" of the Organization of the American States would "raise serious doubts concerning the international legitimacy of any successor government." That the government ousted was a Communist dictatorship and that its successor would be freely chosen by the Grenadan people apparently raised no question in the professors' minds about the legitimacy of the former or the asserted doubtful legitimacy of the latter. The professors were not alone, of course. A number of politicians, along with Senator Moynihan,

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announced a U.S. violation of international law.

What are we to think about these pronouncements? Did the U.S. violate international law so that we are right to condemn the Reagan administration's international lawlessness? Are there known rules that lead reasonable people to firm conclusions about our actions in Nicaragua and Grenada? Or about Soviet and other nations' behavior around the world?

If there are such rules that lead to firm conclusions, this fact is well hidden. The *American Journal of International Law* ran separate symposia on the Grenada invasion and our support of the Nicaraguan contras. The various experts took almost every position imaginable, from the assertion that the United States is a dangerous international outlaw to the contention that everything done exemplified our devotion to the rule of law. Some arguments, such as those by Professor John Norton Moore of the University of Virginia Law School, in defense of our action, seemed to me far more persuasive than others, but I quickly realized that I was judging not on grounds that might be called "legal" but rather on political and moral considerations. The "law" itself seemed infinitely flexible and indeterminate.

This is due to a contradiction at the heart of the subject. Moynihan states the contradiction without seeming to realize that it is fatal to his idea that there is a solid body of law to which the United States must adhere:

> Manifestly, we cannot hold the rest of the world to a good many of the propositions relating to their internal conduct that we wrote into covenants and charters and declarations with such earnestness in the first half of this century. An ancient doctrine (going back at least to Grotius) is *rebus sic stantibus*, which denotes "a tacit condition, said to attach to all treaties, that they shall cease to be obligatory as soon as the state of facts and conditions upon which they were founded has substantially changed" (*Black's Law Dictionary*). For all that Chapter II of the charter of the Organization of the American States requires of members "the effective exercises of representative democracy," this is not going to be the political norm of this hemisphere or this world during the foreseeable future. It had once looked that way; it no longer does. Circumstances have changed. What has not changed—what the United States must strive to make clear has not changed—is the first rule of international law: *Pacta sunt servanda*, agreements must be kept.

But if the condition upon which the United States agreed to the OAS Charter—that the members would be democracies—has changed, why does not *rebus sic stantibus* relieve us of the obligation to keep the rest of the agreement? Moynihan's argument lacks all coherence.

THE MAJOR difficulty with international law is that it converts what are essentially problems of international morality, as defined by a particular political community, into arguments about law that are largely drained of morality. I once listened to a professor of international law defend the United States' actions in Grenada. The argument seemed tortured and artificial, the most important considerations omitted. When he had done, I asked whether three factors that most Americans deemed relevant counted in international law. (1) The Grenadan government consisted of a minority that seized control by violence and maintained it by terror. (2) It was a Marxist-Leninist regime and represented a further advance in this hemisphere of a power that threatens freedom and democracy throughout the world. (3) Finally, the people of Grenada were ecstatic at being relieved of tyranny and the ever-present threat of violence. The expert replied, somewhat sadly, that these considerations had no weight in international law.

A moment's reflection makes it clear that, in the real world, they could not. In order to be international, rules about the use of force between nations must be acceptable to regimes that operate on different—often contradictory—moral premises. The rules themselves must not express a preference for

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freedom over tyranny or for elections over domestic violence as the means of coming to power. This moral equivalence is embodied in international charters. The charters must be neutral and the easiest neutral principle is: No force. The fact that the principle will not be observed by those who simply see international law as another foreign policy instrument does not affect the matter.

But even the principle of neutrality is now being altered to the disadvantage of the United States and other democracies. The UN General Assembly, as Reisman notes, has begun to redefine the unlawful use of force so that those whom the General Assembly chooses to regard as struggling for "freedom and independence" may legally attack their own government, another nation may legally provide bases from which the attacks are launched—but the targeted state behaves illegally if it then attacks those bases! This reverses the older rule to the benefit, primarily, of Communist insurgencies supported by nations in the Communist bloc and to the detriment of the United States when it aids the nation under attack.

IT MIGHT BE said that we must accept moral equivalence in international law in order to have rules that are acceptable to, and therefore may deter, Communist bloc nations and others from the use of armed force. The notion that it is worth keeping alive this idea of law in the power relations of nations because eventually that idea may tame the drives of aggressors is a bit like preaching the ideal of the rule of law to the Medellin cartel in the hope that one day the drug lords will be worn down by the rhetoric of idealism and submit to the law of Colombia. Even if one might hope that the aspiration of international law might one day lessen the amount of aggression in the world, there is the present reality that it does not, and that it imposes costs disproportionately on liberal, democratic nations.

The major cost is that, by eliminating morality from its calculus, international law actually makes moral action appear immoral. It can hardly be doubted that, in the American view, it would be a moral act to help a people overthrow a dictatorship that had replaced a democratic government by force, and to restore democracy and freedom to such people. Yet when our leaders act for such moral reasons, they are forced into contrived explanations. The implausibility of such explanations then reverses the moral stance of the parties.

International law thus serves, both internationally and domestically, as a basis for a rhetoric of recrimination directed at the United States. Those who disapprove of a President's actions on the merits, but who fear they may prove popular, can transform the dispute from one about substance to one about legality. The President can be painted as a lawbreaker and perhaps drawn into a legalistic defense of his actions. The effect is to raise doubts and lower American morale. The Soviets and other nations have no such problem.

As currently defined, then, international law about the use of force is not even a piety; it is a net loss for Western democracies. Senator Moynihan, speaking of international relations in Woodrow Wilson's time, said, approvingly, that "the idea of law persisted, even when it did not prevail." That is precisely the problem. Since it does not prevail, the persistence of the idea that it exists can be pernicious. There can be no authentic rule of law among nations until nations have a common political morality or are under a common sovereignty. A glance at the real world suggests we have a while to wait.

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My Falklands War and Theirs

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

THE WAR OVER the Falkland Islands was one of the truly unexpected events of the post-war period. No one in either the British or U.S. government conceived that the Argentine government would move to seize the islands, yet that is what they did. And no one in the Argentine government imagined that Britain would go to war over a territory sighted by British navigator John Davis in 1592 and described by Samuel Johnson as "a bleak and gloomy solitude, an island thrown aside from human use, stormy in winter and barren in summer, an island which not even the southern savages have dignified with habitation."

Why should anyone have expected either event? For a Latin country with no experience in war to challenge Great Britain, a country which remains a major power and a cornerstone of NATO, was wholly implausible. But so was it unexpected that Britain would go to war over rocky windswept islands some 8,000 miles away. In the years after World War II, Great Britain had dismantled an empire. Only once, at Suez, did Britain's imperial impulse revive, and then (largely because of U.S. intervention) with embarrassing consequences. And as she showed throughout the difficult negotiations over disengagement in Rhodesia, Mrs. Thatcher was herself a decolonizer in a long line of decolonizers.

Even now—in retrospect—the war seems at the very least curious, a violent event unrelated to most of the violence and the major rivalries of the age. Today the task of understanding what did happen has been made easier with the appearance of Michael Charlton's *The Little Platoon*.* In it, the author makes a major contribution to understanding why Mrs. Thatcher and her key advisers concluded it was necessary to go to war to end Argentine occupation of the islands, and also why General Galtieri and his government believed they could seize the islands without serious consequences.

As he demonstrated in an earlier book called *The Eagle and the Small Birds*, Charlton is an extremely skilled interviewer who knows how to elicit interesting insights from participants in historic processes about their understanding of the events in which they took part. As an admirer of that work, and as someone with a substantial interest in the conflict that the United Nations termed "Falklands/Malvinas," I approached Charlton's new book with eager anticipation. Though I left it somewhat disappointed, this

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book is nonetheless indispensable for those interested in better understanding this unexpected war.

The reason *The Little Platoon* is not as successful as *The Eagle and the Small Birds* is probably that the Falklands War is intrinsically less interesting, because less important, than the postwar European settlement. Another problem, I think, is Charlton's own desire to make a case concerning this very recent, still controversial event. He wants to make us believe that there were interests and principles at stake so important they were worth going to war for. His view of the war is responsible for some sentimentality, some distortions, and some rather curious omissions in his account.

Charlton's skillful probing through long interviews, his careful analysis and marshaling of data, tell us more clearly than anyone to date how the participants in this conflict perceived the situation; what their goals were; and how they conceived their opponents. It also tells us that Michael Charlton himself shares the perception held by Mrs. Thatcher and a majority of the British people (as well as Al Haig and Caspar Weinberger) that the war was a heroic response to a wholly unwarranted act of aggression.

Charlton's first and last paragraphs give us a sense of his own view of the matter. He writes first:

> The war that Britain fought in the Falklands in 1982 is now installed as one of the more remarkable episodes in recent military history. To fight an unexpected war eight thousand miles away from home and win, against superior modern arms, is by any judgement a remarkable achievement.

This paragraph is very strange. It makes the Falklands War sound like a feat comparable to the Battle of Britain. There is about it an aura of sentimentality—for Great Britain is a major power, with large military experience, and very modern weapons, whose military forces have been regularly exercised with the West's crack NATO forces. Argentina, meanwhile, had not fought a war in decades, and never one against a major power. Argentina had no alliances with which to exercise, practice, or test skills. Even very good French missiles and planes in the hands of Argentines are no match for the Royal Navy. The course of war demonstrated soon enough that Charlton's portrait of Britannica facing daunting odds on the other end of the world was not realistic—even without the U.S. materiel and intelligence that were quick in coming.

The final paragraph of *The Little Platoon* complements Charlton's early characterization of this unnecessary war. "The Falklands," he concludes,

> was a national war for an international principle of the United Nations: aggression is not admissible. In upholding the rights of a tiny minority in those circumstances, Britain convinced the international community, and showed that to do right is generally the right thing to do. In going to defense of the Islanders, Britain was lit by its own hearth fire. It defended the first principle of democracy as laid down by Edmund Burke—attachment to the subdivision, the small case that cannot be overlooked, Burke's 'little platoon.'

Despite its nice rhetorical ring, much of this judgment will not bear examination. The suggestion that the war had the approval of the "international community" because it was "the right thing to do" is poppycock. As a matter of simple fact, the *war* did *not* have the approval of the "international community." There was a moment in which the brilliant diplomacy of Britain's permanent representative to the United Nations, Sir Anthony Parsons, and the long careful cultivation of Commonwealth ties produced Security Council approval for a British resolution demanding that Argentina abandon threats and use of force. That moment passed and the "international community" did not approve the British war policy.

To the contrary, in the years preceding the war the General Assembly passed resolutions in 1965, 1973, and 1976 calling for negotiations between Britain and Argentina in the framework of UN guidelines on decol-

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onization. Once the war started, moreover, Britain was forced to veto Security Council resolutions calling for an immediate ceasefire. Britain left in the veto's wake a disapproving majority convinced that the U.K. was less interested in peace than in imposing its own solution on the Argentines. And in the years since the war, Britain has largely ignored the international community's appeals for negotiation of the Falklands issue.

OF COURSE, the fact that UN majorities in the Security Council and in the General Assembly did not see the situation as the British did does not prove the British wrong. UN majorities are often capricious and will normally support a member of the nonaligned bloc over a Western nation. But the facts make it impossible to claim that Britain won the support of the "international community" or was somehow acting on behalf of the "international community," as Charlton implies when he describes the war as a "national war for an international principle of the United Nations."

The "international community" did not believe Argentina guilty of aggression. More of them believed Britain was acting as a colonial power. They did not accept Britain as a kind of surrogate of the international community supporting the principle of nonaggression. The UN majority's view on the question of whether Argentina was guilty of an illegal act of aggression was stated by Venezuela's then-president, Christian Democrat Herrara Campins, in a personal letter to President Ronald Reagan. There Campins rejected the U.S. argument that "rule of law" and "rule of force" were the issues. The British, he charged, continued to lay claim to a "colonial-title which mutilates the territorial integrity of an American state." Therefore, "it is fundamental to international peace and security that the exercise of Argentina's sovereignty over its island territories in the South Atlantic be fully guaranteed." Herrara Campins also firmly rejected the U.S. Government's view that Argentina's use of force was reprehensible and should be condemned. To condemn Argentina, he wrote, was to "totally ignore the fact that the 'legal' argument of Great Britain was intended to justify what was also a forceful seizure which it seeks to perpetuate in an unacceptable manner."

Its biases aside, Charlton's interpretation of the issues and the war is rich with the views, goals, and feelings of participants. Nor is Charlton alone in seeing the British war in the Falklands as heroic. A majority of British citizens shared this view. So did a majority of my colleagues in the cabinet of the Reagan administration.

The reaction of U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was shared by several members of the Reagan cabinet. Weinberger said:

> I think what stood out was that the recognition came immediately from Britain that this was an expedition which had to be undertaken and an aggression which had to be resisted. . . . It was a very bold, fine and decisive action, and it contrasted very much with many long years in which a great deal of the West, the United States included, had always allowed contemplation of all the things which could go *wrong* to block the course of action.

"The U.S. action," Weinberger added, was based "not on the fear that our ally would be defeated, but a fear that aggression would succeed and a resolve that the very strong, decisive and admirable action that Britain was taking should not go unrewarded."

"The whole Anglo-American relationship was at issue over the Falklands, as it had been at Suez," Charlton and his informants believed. In this view, the U.S. was the arbiter of Britain's future. Would it be Great Britain or little England? The United States' reaction, many appeared to believe, would shape the answer.

"Like light reaching us from a star that is dead but that we still steer by, these memories of the Suez affair navigated the British task force south." Thus Britain's foreign secretary, Francis Pym, described the recurrent British doubt about U.S. reaction and British power. Would the Americans oppose Brit-

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ain's effort to prove that aggression by Argentine generals against subjects of the British crown should not succeed? Would the Americans perceive the British response as an exercise in colonialism, as Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles had seen the Suez initiative? Were the Falklands a case of colonialism, or of self-determination of the islanders? The answer matters, for Americans are against colonialism but for self-determination.

THE ARGENTINES and virtually all other Latin Americans saw British claims as a residue of colonialism. For Latins, Britain is *the* historic colonial power, seeking now in the Americas to reassert an anachronistic will to empire. Latin Americans expected, and Britons feared, that the U.S. would see it that way too—as two decades earlier Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles had seen the Suez invasion as an unacceptable reassertion of colonialism.

Charlton's account makes clear that Britons and Americans alike believed the failure of the Suez venture had dramatically sapped waning British confidence. A failure of will or of mission in the case of the Falklands might definitively retire Britain to the sidelines of history. No one in the Thatcher or the Reagan administrations wanted that.

Alexander Haig told Charlton:

> I think Suez was one of the great blows to Western unity following World War II. It was a major contributor to the ultimate withdrawal of de Gaulle from the integrated aspects of the Alliance. . . . It certainly had a devastating impact on the British Empire. . . it raised doubts about a heretofore very close bond between Washington and London. In strategic terms it was one of the major bench marks after the Second World War.

To Haig, to Weinberger, and probably to Ronald Reagan as well, "Suez" was an example of what the U.S. must not do. For General Galtieri and his colleagues, Suez was exhibit A in why the U.S. would *not* enter the war on the side of Britain. After all, Britain had been divesting colonies since World War II. The U.S. had been opposing colonialism as part of its own anti-colonial heritage. Why should anyone have thought that the British would decide to make a military stand on behalf of some islands and sixteen hundred islanders 8,000 miles away? If not in Rhodesia, why in the Falklands? If not in Hong Kong, why in the Falklands?

Part of the answer surely is that the Falklands lent themselves to interpretation as a case of self-determination rather than colonialism. Another part was the intense dislike of Argentina on the part of influential persons in both the British and American governments.

I believe the Argentine government had no conception of the deep-seated hostility that existed against it in those governments. Argentina's suspected sympathies with the Axis of World War II, the thousands of "disappeared," the fact of military dictatorship, a generalized aversion to Latin America—all were present in the British and American reactions to Argentina. The invasion of the Falklands was the last straw.

Charlton's interviews provide illuminating background information on the dispute that had simmered intermittently between the time that Spain claimed them in the Treaty of Tordesilla in 1494 and the British claim filed in 1952. His informants tell us of the claims and counterclaims made and of the intermittent negotiations—especially those conducted in the 1970s by a British Labour cabinet committee.

Charlton describes the Labour government's 1978 decision not to station a permanent task force in the South Atlantic—in order to save 180 million pounds—and instead to explore a "leaseback" solution for the islands like that of Hong Kong. This arrangement would have given Argentina sovereignty with the understanding that the islands would be "leased" back to the inhabitants for some substantial number of years (as Hong Kong had been leased for 99 years). He also describes how indignant islanders and Tories blocked the deal.

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The enthusiasm for a settlement waned in the Foreign Office and the Labour Party after the "conspicuous revolution" in the Commons. Of this reaction a former minister of state in the Foreign Office, Richard Luce, commented:

> I can only say I happened to be sitting in the Chamber when Nicholas Ridley was making this statement about leaseback. I have never seen such a mauling of any of my colleagues in all my life. . . . He had a very rough ride indeed. Now that rough ride was not just from the Conservative side, it was from the Labor side, it was from the Liberals. It was absolutely united in its violent sense of opposition to the idea of leaseback.

Little wonder, then, that by 1981 Britain's policy on the Falklands had become one of neglect and delay in the face of which Argentina's interest grew.

Charlton's interviews explore the long history of contested sovereignty which was the background against which the Falkland crisis developed in 1981. They illuminate the latent passion and explosive potential of the issue and explain how Britain could go to war after Argentina's unexpected occupation. Though Charlton focuses on Britain, his informants also understood Argentina. They understood that the Argentine government was fractionated and could not make a decision to end the war.

Charlton also has a sense of the most curious aspect of this curious war: the Argentine inability to believe in the possibility of their behavior having unpleasant consequences. *They did not believe in the possibility of war or of failure.* They did not believe the British would dispatch the fleet. They did not believe the British would go to war. They did not believe the U.S. would support Britain. They did not believe the British troops that had landed and were advancing would be able to defeat the Argentine forces. They did not believe in danger and defeat. They could not make prudent decisions because they could not conceive of negative consequences.

It was an extraordinary experience to watch intelligent, sophisticated Argentine officials dismiss prospective dangers as irrelevant to their plans. It was this quixotic quality of the Argentines that made war finally inevitable. Charlton describes the generous settlement offered by the British government after the breakdown of the Haig mediation effort. His description is accurate.

Having been an active member of the Reagan cabinet, the National Security Council, and the National Security Planning Group, I was, of course, privy to the views of those colleagues who saw the war much as Charlton does: as a test of Britain's will to resist an outrage, to defend vital interests, and to play a global role. Nonetheless, though it seems to me entirely possible that I was and am mistaken, I thought that a policy of neutrality in that war made sense from the point of view of U.S. interests and would have done Britain no harm—views that offended Alexander Haig and some of the press.

I BEGAN FROM where we are—here, in the Western hemisphere, part of the Americas, with a permanent interest in good hemispheric relations. I noted, too, the nature of the Falkland Islands population: fewer than 2,000 British inhabitants and half a million sheep—administered by the Falkland Islands Company which had been granted a charter in 1852.

I desire also to make clear that I utterly disapprove of force as a means to settle disputes in general, and so disapproved of the use of force by Argentina in particular. I also regretted the British decision to go to war to settle the dispute.

There were, it seemed to me, three factors which required attention in a serious consideration of U.S. policy: the nature of the Anglo/American alliance; the U.S. permanent interest in maintaining good relations within the Western hemisphere; and Latin sensibilities.

I began from the belief that the ties between the United States and Great Britain are integral and uniquely important. Despite

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the waves of immigrants arriving on U.S. shores for more than two centuries, our basic institutions remain Anglo-Saxon. Our language, government, courts, and laws are grounded in British theories and practices. Moreover, twice in this century British needs have played a unique role in American decisions to go to war. I believe that after protecting our independence and territorial integrity, the U.S.'s most fundamental interest is in the preservation of a democratic civilization of which we are a part. Britain is a cornerstone of that civilization.

However, it is also the case—fully recognized by Great Britain—that American and British interests are distinct as well as overlapping.

One learns hard lessons inside the UN about the little solidarity available to the United States from friends and allies, even the U.K. with whom the U.S. votes more often than any nation except Israel. Even under Mrs. Thatcher, who made disagreement between the U.S. and the U.K. in the United Nations a matter for the prime minister's concern, differences in voting were commonplace. By the time the Argentines occupied the Falklands, I had been in the UN long enough to have noticed that Britain frequently did not stand with us on matters of important U.S. interests or values.

Let me be clear. Relations between the U.S. and the U.K. are close in the UN. The American and British missions work together on issues before the General Assembly and the Security Council. I enjoyed a marvelous working relationship with the British ambassador. But to work with the U.K. was to come quickly to understand that in the UN the British regularly gave higher priority to relations with the EC and the Commonwealth than to relations with the U.S.

During the 1981 General Assembly, prior to the Falklands War, foreign service officers with substantial experience in the U.S. mission had brought to my attention a disturbing pattern that revealed these British priorities in the Third Committee. Here are some excerpts from an unclassified, informal memorandum circulated within the U.S. Mission:

> During the 36th Session of the UNGA [UN General Assembly], the performance of the U.K. Delegation in the Third Committee has consistently been disappointing at best and occasionally has been quite unhelpful. In general, the U.K.'s performance can be described as alternating between nonfeasance and malfeasance, with the U.K. frequently disregarding and sometimes actually working against U.S. interests and initiatives. This state of affairs is not entirely new in the Third Committee, but the situation is worse than in past years. The U.K.'s desire to maintain EC–10 solidarity is the new element this year and, due to the U.K.'s chairmanship of the EC–10, is understandably far more pronounced than previously.
>
> As a result, the USDEL [U.S. Delegation] position on a given issue appears to be irrelevant or unimportant to the U.K., whose obvious priority is to remain in the company of the EC–10 on each item. The U.K.'s refusal to speak or vote apart from the EC–10, even on matters of principle, has repeatedly left the USDEL isolated in the general debate and in voting. As indicated above, the U.K. has rarely shown any interest in ascertaining the USDEL position on a given question or in attempting to reconcile differences between the two delegations. Moreover, the U.K. Representative has yet to show any willingness to consider voting differently from the EC–10 or to use his considerable powers of persuasion to move the EC–10 closer to U.S. positions. Not surprisingly, therefore, consultation with the USDEL often appears to be an afterthought by the U.K., since EC–10 unity is the first priority. The USDEL is normally presented with the decision of the EC–10. . . .
>
> In the decision concerning the Abu Eain case, for example, the EC–10 had decided to abstain before even hearing the U.S. side of the case either informally or in committee debate. When U.K. and USDEL have the same position on an issue, it is purely a matter of coincidence. In short, the U.K. approach is no different from other EC–10 members (with the exception

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of the FRG); i.e., the U.S. position on an item is not a significant factor in determining their positions.

Other foreign service officers reported similar experiences, prompting a discussion of "the British problem" at the U.S. Mission. The British got wind of it and their ambassador, my close colleague Tony Parsons, proposed a meeting of responsible officers in both missions to talk over problems.

The root cause, we all agreed, was the new British habit of giving priority to a common position with the European Community. In 1981 Britain was president of the EC at the UN and engaged in "building Europe" and new EC institutions at the UN. Whatever the reason, the effect on the U.S. was the same. Our historic best friend frequently ignored our opinions, and, more serious, our interests, and then did not consult with us until after decisions had been made—at which point we were not consulted but informed.

In light of that pattern of behavior, it was by no means clear to me that the U.S. should rally automatically to the U.K.'s side in a situation where we were not bound by treaty and our interests stood to suffer by doing so. Needing U.K. support and not getting it had reminded me of the British support that was needed and not forthcoming in Vietnam and in Central America. These experiences—later repeated in the British response to the U.S. landing in Grenada—left me wondering why the U.S. should necessarily stand with the U.K. on matters outside the area of NATO.

As for the Falklands, I believed that the U.K., Argentina, and especially the U.S. had a powerful national as well as humanitarian interest in preventing a war in the South Atlantic. I thought the U.S. should attempt mediation. If the mediation failed, then U.S. interest, I thought, dictated that we should remain neutral: because the U.S. had a continuing interest in good relations with Latin America as well as with the U.K.; because Britain herself made clear that she saw the NATO commitment as limited to the NATO area, and because Britain did not stand with the U.S. elsewhere; and finally, because under existing arrangements, the British already enjoyed the tangible benefits that the U.S. would in any case make available: we shared intelligence and weapons with the U.K.

And, I may as well say it, although I deplored the use of force by Argentina, I believed one could make a reasonable case that the Falklands pose a colonial issue. I did not at all believe this justified the use of force by Argentina. I did believe this aspect of the question needed to be taken into account. The Falkland Islands lie just off the coast of Argentina, 8,000 miles from Great Britain. It is true that the inhabitants are of British descent, and desire a continuing association with Britain. But it is also true that the islands are largely uninhabited and that Britain has prevented immigration from Argentina and elsewhere in Latin America.

In sum, I thought Argentina was wrong in its unilateral action, but I also did not understand why in this era of decolonization Britain desired so ardently to retain these islands and protect them against population growth from Argentina. And I could not conceive that the British Government—which gives so much evidence of having lost the taste for empire and war—would or should go to war over the Falkland Islands.

THAT SEEMED to me almost as strange as the Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands. Right down to the time the British sunk the Argentine cruiser, the *General Belgrano*, killing 368 of the 1,000 men aboard, I did not believe there would be war. I understood that Mrs. Thatcher and the British Government felt there was a matter of principle involved. But I also knew that British governments had swallowed a good many violations of principle without going to war. Britain had swallowed violation of the Yalta Agreement, the repression of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and most recently, of Solidarity in Poland. Britain had swallowed an agreement on Rhodesia to which no one expected Mrs. Thatcher to agree.

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I was wrong in thinking Britain would not go to war. Mediation failed. War came. The Argentines felt the British had started it. After all, they said to all and sundry, no one had been killed until the British sank the *Belgrano*. Obviously the distinction between force and violence was more meaningful in Buenos Aires than in Washington or London.

I dreaded the impact of war on U.S.-Latin American relations. Those relations were strained at the end of the Carter years. That administration had dramatically reduced U.S. economic aid to the region with the "basic needs" principle of allocation. U.S. military aid had nearly disappeared and we were a less important trading partner for Latin America than we had ever been.

One consequence of Carter policies was that Latin sensibilities—always prickly—were especially sensitive now. Latin Americans tend to reproach the U.S. for indifference to the hemisphere, for caring only about Europe. Any situation which forced the U.S. to choose Britain over a Latin American nation would exacerbate these feelings. Latin American nations, having more recent experience as colonies, were especially sensitive to matters involving colonialism. For the U.S. to support—or seem to support—a colonial power in this hemisphere would, I knew, be especially resented. I therefore believed that U.S. support of Britain would stoke latent anti-Yankee feelings throughout Latin America.

We had worked hard in the Reagan administration and at the United Nations to establish better relations with Latin nations at the UN, and we had made some progress. But when the Falklands War loomed, Latin American diplomats became very excited. The issue touched raw nerves. Britain is the historic adversary for Spanish America, colonialism the traditional evil. With the single exception of Chile, which has special ties to Britain and special problems with Argentina, Latin leaders—democratic and non-democratic—saw the Falklands issue as colonialism with Britain as the colonial power. Hemispheric solidarity was the expected and, in their view, the only appropriate response.

It was extraordinary to watch the rapid rallying of almost all Latin American nations around the Argentines, to hear nations usually divided among themselves suddenly speak passionately of "Latin Americans" as though they were of one mind, one heart, one will, one country. There has not been, in recent memory, a festival of Latin unity to equal that during the UN Security Council's consideration of the Falklands question. Argentines embraced Mexicans (for whom they often express low regard), Venezuelans clasped hands with Sandinistas (for whom they have still lower regard), communists and rightists, democracies and dictatorships—all affirmed bonds of "Latinidad."

The foreign ministers of Venezuela, Panama, and Nicaragua joined Argentina in a common declaration of May 24 expressing the revulsion of Latin America at Britain's "aggressive war against the South American continent" and protesting Britain's notification to the Government of Uruguay of an intention to extend the war to the Rio de la Plata, thus violating (they claimed) the territory of Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay. They protested the EC decision to impose "sanctions" against Argentina.

President Royo of Panama released to the press a stirring letter to President Reagan that reproached the U.S. for abandoning the commitment to decolonization reflected in the Panama Canal Treaties. For Latin Americans, Royo emphasized, the cause of the conflict was Britain's "occupation of the Malvinas." Like Herrara Campins and others, Royo saw Argentina as acting "in the legitimate defense of its historic rights." Now, Royo wrote, Britain was to be doubly condemned for its "unaccustomed mobilization of force," for the "excessive use of force," and for its lack of interest in a diplomatic solution.

The U.S. did not escape Royo's censure. "We Latin Americans have had to lament that our friends in the United States. . . [support] the violence which the British are carrying out against Argentina." U.S. responsibility was heavy in Royo's views: "If [American]

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decisive support had not been given, it would have been more feasible [for Britain] to achieve a negotiated agreement for the peaceful solution of that dispute." How unfortunate that the U.S. had abandoned the "doctrine of President Monroe enunciated a century and a half ago. . . [which] was the bulwark for democracy and for the unity of the peoples of the new world against the expansionist designs of extra-continental powers. . . . "

Herrara Campins admonished the U.S. that it was "renouncing the legal, historic, and geographical ties between our nations."

> These events are leading to the growth of anti-U.S. feeling that will doubtless have serious repercussions on relations between our nations. . . . I also trust that you will not fail to weigh the dramatic and lasting effect resulting from the use of arms that should be serving freedom to attach a member country of the Latin American community in the name of an unacceptable cause, colonialism.

He appealed to Ronald Reagan to reconsider the support of Britain, emphasizing that "regardless of indifference in political systems, the entire Latin American community stands beside Argentina" and against the United States. There were the feelings that prompted Thomas Enders, then assistant secretary for Latin American Affairs, to tell Charlton:

> When the [war] did occur, it would be hard to say that British interests throughout Latin America, which were not large, were damaged. It was *American* interests that were damaged.

More than 1,000 persons died by the time the war ended with the defeat and surrender of Argentina. Some people, including Alexander Haig, found it a gallant war. Even in retrospect, he would write in his memoir *Caveat* that, "In the Falklands, the West was given a great victory by Great Britain. . . . The will of the West was tested and found to be equal to the task. . . . " Caspar Weinberger spoke to Michael Charlton in the same vein.

I did not find it a great little war. I found it a miserable example of unnecessary carnage and an unnecessary squandering of Western resources, efforts, and lives. The war, it seemed to me, marked one more failure in a series of failed efforts to mediate a conflict that is hundreds of years old—one more failed attempt to substitute reason for force, negotiation for violence, words for bombs and bullets. Yet the fact must be faced that the Falklands War enjoyed enormous popular support. In Argentina, where nationalist feelings are strong and the opportunities for their satisfaction are few, excitement and enthusiasm were manifest by tens of thousands in the streets day after day. Britain, too, was swept up by the unexpected challenge. The nation responded as Mrs. Thatcher responded to a war that made sense to most.

ONE OF THE MOST curious aspects of the whole affair was the way that it was molded to fit the journalists' fantasy about an ongoing war in the administration between "hard liners," of which I was said to be one, and "pragmatists" in the State Department. John Goshko, a reporter for the *Washington Post*, perennially purveyed this line—presumably fed to him by sources he considered reliable.

On June 2, 1982, for example, Goshko wrote:

> The dispute over the Falklands underscored anew the tensions between foreign policy pragmatists and ideological hard liners. . . . That involves the gulf between the relatively moderate and pragmatic approach to foreign affairs advocated by the Haig led State Department and the Administration's more hawkish element symbolized increasingly by Kirkpatrick, that wants a militant and consistent anticommunism at the core of all policy decisions.

How silly.

The fact is that the Falklands War did not fit any East-West categories. It fit other categories that dealt with the new world and the old, the Americas and Europe, the Monroe Doctrine rather than the Reagan Doc-

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trine. It was a political light opera in two acts. In Act One, the Argentines occupy the Falkland Islands. In Act Two, the British reoccupy them.

Act Three has not been written yet. When it is, I hope Michael Charlton interviews the author and participants and explains to us how they finally came to solve the problem.

I believe Britain emerged from the Falklands War stronger, her reputation enhanced. The U.S. emerged from the Falklands War weakened in the hemisphere, and no stronger in Europe.

I came away from the experience convinced again that we Americans are not very good at thinking and acting coolly in support of our interests as the British and French regularly do.

When the time came that Ronald Reagan dispatched troops to deal with the threat to Americans in Grenada, Mrs. Thatcher was besieged by recommendations from the Commonwealth bureaucracy that she take account of Commonwealth sensibilities and criticize the U.S. action.

She did. I rested my case.

The Little Platoon

To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed toward a love to our country and to mankind. The interest of that portion of social arrangement is a trust in the hands of all those who compose it; and as none but bad men would justify it in abuse, none but traitors would barter it away for their own personal advantage.

Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*

English History

Those events which furnish the best themes for pathetic or indignant eloquence are not always those which most affect the happiness of the great body of the people.

Lord Macaulay, *The History of England*

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A Reply to My Critics

Francis Fukuyama

AFTER SEEING the gallons of ink that have been spilled over "The End of History?," I have come to realize that my real accomplishment has been to produce a uniquely universal consensus, not on the current status of liberalism, but on the fact that I was wrong and that history has not in fact ended. This consensus is all the more remarkable since it extends from Margaret Thatcher, William F. Buckley, and the *Wall Street Journal* on the right to the *Nation*, André Fontaine, Marion Dönhoff, and other leading liberal lights in Europe and America on the left. Who was the last American politician to have done that? There is no inconsistency between the interest in declinism one year and endism the next, since few have been persuaded by the latter. Nonetheless, as the Berlin Greens say, *Wahrheit statt Mehrheit*! ("truth rather than the majority"). None of the objections that have been raised to my thesis strike me as decisive, and the ones that might have been decisive were never raised.

Much of the criticism results from simple misunderstanding.[1] It may seem a bit ungracious to begin my reply by complaining that I have been misunderstood, and I would normally try to make a self-deprecating remark to the effect that I had not been clear enough in my original exposition. But in the case of "The End of History?" it is quite obvious that many commentators have not bothered to read the article itself, only one of the condensations of it. Now, one could perhaps understand how some of those who saw fit to comment on Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind* or Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* failed to work their way through those entire books, since the former was very profound and the latter very long. But not to have found the time to read to the end of a sixteen page article! One is at a loss for words when, after having written quite clearly that much of the Third World remains "mired in history," one is criticized for not recognizing that this or that Third World country is still stuck there. So, it will be necessary to peel through several layers of misunderstanding before getting to those who not only understood what I was trying to say but appreciated the spirit in which I said it.

The first and most common misunderstanding has been the persistent failure to comprehend or accept Hegel's use of the word "history." Many people become upset when one fails to employ the conventional definition of history as a random sequence of events, in which there is no inherent hierar-

Francis Fukuyama is the author of "The End of History?" which appeared in our Summer 1989 issue (Number 16).

[1]Not on the part of *The National Interest*, however, which consistently provided the most serious forum for discussion of my ideas.

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chy or attempt to distinguish between the more and less important.

The notion that history can come to an end should surprise only those unfamiliar with the Hegelian-Marxist tradition. "History," for Hegel, can be understood in the narrower sense of the "history of ideology," or the history of thought about first principles, including those governing political and social organization. The end of history then means not the end of worldly events but the end of the evolution of human thought about such first principles. This apparent narrowing of the definition of history is in fact an attempt to make it deeper, to distinguish between the essential and the contingent in human affairs. From the perspective of Hegelian idealism the motor of history is the idea—that is, human consciousness thinking about itself and finally becoming self-conscious. The idea is expressed not just in the philosophic discourse of thinkers, but eventually comes to be embodied in concrete social and political institutions—for the young Hegel, the revolutionary Napoleonic state, and for the older Hegel, the Prussian monarchy of the 1820s.

READERS OF MY article were not the first to be astonished at the notion of the end of history. Hegel himself provoked considerable outcry by his own declaration of the end of history in the early nineteenth century, in particular on the part of the young Karl Marx who felt that the manifest injustices of the society of his time belied Hegel's confident assertion that "everything that is real is rational." Indeed, he spent his career trying to show that Hegel was wrong—not about the possibility of an end of history, but rather in his declaration that the end had already arrived. We are still living with the consequences of Marx's attempt to confront Hegel: in the decaying communist regimes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, in the vast armies of bureaucrats that still hold arbitrary sway over the lives of millions of people in the Soviet Union and China, in the guerrillas in the jungles of Cambodia awaiting their return to power. The total and manifest failure of communism forces us to ask whether Marx's entire experiment was not a 150-year detour and whether we need to reconsider whether Hegel was not in fact right in seeing the end of history in the liberal-democratic states of the French and American revolutions.

What goes for communism is true for other ideologies as well. At the core of my argument is the observation that a remarkable consensus has developed in the world concerning the legitimacy and viability of liberal democracy. This ideological consensus is neither fully universal nor automatic, but exists to an arguably higher degree than at any time in the past century.

In order to refute my hypothesis, then, it is not sufficient to suggest that the future holds in store large and momentous events. One would have to show that these events were driven by a systematic idea of political and social justice that claimed to supersede liberalism. A nuclear war between India and Pakistan—horrible as that would be for those countries—does not qualify, unless it somehow forced us to reconsider the basic principles underlying our social order.

No one, of course, is obliged to use a Hegelian definition of history. On the other hand, no one else is entitled to an exclusive right to the term, least of all professional historians who frequently feel a proprietary interest in the word. A professional historian can tell us something about causality in history; *qua* historian, however, he or she cannot tell us whether a given historical event was good or bad, important or unimportant—whether the society of the Aztecs with its human sacrifice was higher or lower than that of the ancient Athenians, or whether we ought to pay more attention to the works of Schiller or Beethoven on the one hand or the peasant culture of sixteenth-century Vietnam on the other. Individual historians and different schools of historiography do in fact quarrel about such issues, but on the basis of considerations—most often simple political prejudices—external to their discipline.

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While so-called "value" questions can be informed by the study of history, they are finally accessible only through the architectonic science: philosophy. And the first philosopher to understand both the importance of history to philosophy and the importance of philosophy in history was Hegel.

Irving Kristol was certainly right when he said that most of us are, without knowing it, Hegelians—that is, believers in the historical relativity of truth. We owe to Hegel our modern understanding of history as an evolution from primitive to modern, through a succession of stages of "false consciousness" during which men believed in the legitimacy of such things as chattel slavery and the divine right of kings. There is hardly an educated person alive who does not have a slightly patronizing view of those great thinkers of the past who were "advanced for their times," but whose views have subsequently been superseded by more modern, less parochial ones. Among "sophisticated" people, there is hardly anyone willing to assert that the views of Aristotle, or of Aquinas, or of Locke, are true absolutely and forever.

ANYONE who accepts the historicist premise—that is, that truth is historically relative—faces the question of the end of history even if he is not aware of it. For unless one posits something like an end of history, it is philosophically impossible to prevent historicism from degenerating into simple relativism, or from undermining any notion of progress. Anyone who believes that earlier thinkers were simply "products of their time" must, if he is honest and consistent, ask whether he and his own historicism are not also products of their times. The present-day feminist who looks with condescension and disdain at the antiquated views of her grandparents regarding the role of women must ask whether her views are "absolute," or whether there are yet more progressive views that will render them just as quaint in the eyes of her granddaughter. And if that is so, why devote one ounce of effort, why argue passionately in favor of today's cause?

For historicists, there are two ways out of this conundrum.[2] The first is the path chosen by Hegel, to declare that history had come to an end. Hegel accepted the historical relativity of thought, but argued that in his system opinion finally reached the status of truth and ideology turned into philosophy. Hegel's system also represented the end of philosophy, because it would henceforth be impossible to state a philosophical proposition that was both true and new. Hegel understood with full philosophical clarity that the end of history was a necessary support for the modern state, for otherwise its underlying concepts of right would have no basis in truth. The other path was the one chosen by Nietzsche and his twentieth-century followers like Heidegger, who accepted fully the consequences of radical historicism and realized that it makes impossible any sort of conventional ethics or morality. (This is in contrast to the easygoing historicists we see all around us, who are almost never able to rise above the conventional moralism of their times—be it concerning homelessness, Third World poverty, or smoking in public places.) Let me simply suggest that the attempt to work out the political implications of historicism without a concept of an end of history leads to consequences (fascism and the glorification of war) which few of us would be willing to stomach.

The second layer of misunderstanding of my article has to do with the way in which it was somehow related to the current policies of the Bush administration. It is perhaps not sufficient to note that the article was conceived and written well before I had any intention of joining the State Department, or that I am a relatively junior official with little impact on policy, or that my article has not been read by many of my superiors. I am constantly amazed at the parochialism of the political class in Washington (particularly those in the media), who cannot understand that there are more important and interesting issues than a given administration's foreign

[2]Of course, one need not be a historicist; one can simply believe in a doctrine of natural right.

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policy agenda, consequential as that may seem at the time. The more fundamental problem I was trying to address was the truth and adequacy of liberalism as such, a question which I am quite confident will survive the Bush administration and, indeed, most succeeding ones.

A related misunderstanding concerns my view of the relationship between developments in the realm of ideas and those in the real world. I have been accused of complacency in believing that recent gains for liberal democracy are permanent, of providing a justification for the alleged "timidity" or inaction of the Bush administration, and (in France) of signaling an impending American isolationism on the grounds that the Cold War has been won and that America can come home from Europe.

Here I admit I could have been clearer. When I said that "the ideal will govern the material world in the long run," I did not mean to imply that the process would be an easy or automatic one, or one which would take place without the active intervention of governments and individuals. Obviously, the democratic revolution is far from complete in the world and will, in Hegelian terms, require considerable work and struggle to implement more fully. The enormity of the tasks facing the reforming governments in the Soviet bloc is daunting and success is far from assured. The tasks facing U.S. foreign policy as it helps guide Europe through this transition are similarly great. It is absurd to think that either process will occur without setbacks and defeats along the way. Communism may indeed fight a rearguard action that will, as Jean-François Revel predicts, consume an entire generation. The long run of which I spoke could last several generations, if not centuries. Recall that the end of history was originally declared in 1806. I, following Kojève, believe in the essential correctness of this proposition insofar as the vanguard of human history arrived at the end on that date.[3] But there has certainly been plenty of what is more conventionally known as history to preoccupy chancellories and foreign ministries in the years since.

But we have to recognize that an important revolution is underway in the world, and that in that revolution, ideas count. It must be of some consequence to us when the general secretary of the Soviet Communist party announces that the essence of socialism is for the weak to get out of the way of those who are strong and productive, or when he says that his Party has no monopoly on the truth. Events of our century have understandably traumatized us and made us highly cynical about the possibility of progress. We have to be careful that this cynicism does not exceed the bounds of simple prudence and blind us to reality. For at some point, to deny that important changes are going on in the communist world is to fail to comprehend the enormous moral weaknesses in communism that the last few years have revealed. To assert that things cannot get better is to undercut the hopes for better lives of the people who actually live in those countries.

A FINAL WORD about the Third World, which I have been accused of disparaging. My remarks about Albania and Burkina Faso were not meant to denigrate the importance of these countries or of the Third World more generally, but simply to register the self-evident fact that the major ideologies around which the world frames its political choices seem to flow primarily from the First World to the Third, and not the reverse. I do not know why this should be so, but it is nonetheless remarkable how persistently Third World revolutionaries continue to study the works of long-dead white male philosophers and polemicists.

Those readers who correctly understood my argument have posited several sources of ideological competition to modern liberalism:

[3]Needless to say, even that vanguard—the Prussian state that emerged after its defeat by Napoleon at Jena-Auerstadt—was itself subject to considerable backsliding in the succeeding two hundred years.

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communism itself, Islamic fundamentalism, nationalism, and some new ideology of which we are not yet aware. Let me consider these in order.

The most common criticism of my article has been that I have been very premature in writing off communism, either as a force in the real world or as an idea. In support of this charge various writers have pointed to the incompleteness and fragility of the reform processes in the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe, and the continuing vigor of hardline communists, most notably evident in the Tiananmen Square crackdown that occurred after my article had been written.

I would be the first to admit that the reform processes underway in the communist world are incomplete and fragile. The tragic repression that occurred in Beijing in June 1989 set back the cause of liberalization in that country many years, and one would be foolish to assert that such a reversal could not occur in any one of the countries currently undergoing reform. This includes the Soviet Union where, as many Soviets now fear, some combination of military, police, and Party conservatives may ultimately conspire to bring down Gorbachev, or where Gorbachev himself may suddenly take a turn toward repression.

Nonetheless, I question whether such a reversal could ever fully bring back the Soviet Union that we knew and feared. For the traditional Soviet threat arose not only out of the military power and material resources of the USSR, but out of the fact that it claimed to embody a universalistic idea that was inimical to our own way of life. It is the latter that drove the Soviet Union, even in its declining years, to far-flung involvements around the world. But it is precisely that messianic sense of mission that seems the least likely to be resurrected.[4] Reciting the number of times that imperial Russia intervened militarily in European affairs is beside the point: so did imperial Britain and imperial France, but the classical age of great powers has been over in Europe for some time now. Indeed the very notion of great power status is being steadily redefined in the postwar period, and now it has much more of an economic than a military content.

While a conservative reaction remains quite thinkable, the likelihood that it could simply set the clock back to the Brezhnev years diminishes with every passing day. It is hard for me to understand how David Satter, for example, can maintain that the Soviet Union remains a totalitarian regime claiming to be the sole "source of morality and arbiter of truth." Gorbachev has succeeded spectacularly in undermining the moral basis of the Soviet Communist party's continued right to rule by airing the Party's historical dirty linen in public and by creating a new elective Supreme Soviet, which now functions as a competing source of legitimacy to the CPSU.[5] Gorbachev would certainly like to use glasnost and reform as tools for his own power-political purposes as Khrushchev used de-Stalinization before him, but in doing so he has undermined authority as such[6] and is manifestly losing control of political forces within the country (most evidently within the Union's republics).

A new conservative leadership in the USSR could use the traditional instruments of repression—the police and army—to restore order, but it will be very difficult to resurrect old Marxist-Leninist nostrums to

[4]I am fully aware, of course, that the Soviet Union remains to this day heavily involved in a worldwide network of client states inherited from earlier years, and seems quite determined to hang on to them. Whether they are interested in acquiring more such expensive commitments, however, is a more questionable proposition.

[5]Up to a certain point one would have said that criticism of the Soviet past came out of the liberal intelligentsia and not the regime itself, but even this is changing, as in the case of Shevardnadze's remarkable address to the Supreme Soviet in October 1989.

[6]One significant indicator of this is the rapid growth of ordinary crime in the Soviet Union in the past four years.

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repair the Party's moral authority or fix the abiding problems of the economy. When General Jaruzelski declared martial law in Poland in 1981, he found that the Polish army could not compel people to work harder, to innovate or take risks or do any of the things required to create a successful post-industrial economy. General Jaruzelski, moreover, did not have to preside over an internal empire eager to spin out of the center's control. And it is very hard to see how ideological decay will not have an impact on Soviet foreign policy. The half- or quarter-reformed Soviet economy is in some respects in worse shape than under Brezhnev—so much so that conservatives like Ligachev have admitted that the military will have to be starved for resources if reform is to succeed. When the counterrevolution occurs in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we might see the emergence of a series of communist Pinochets and Stroessners, dictatorships devoid of larger ideas and lacking external dynamism.

THE BEST EXAMPLE of this is post-Tiananmen Square China. What was remarkable about the events in the PRC in 1989 was not that a group of octogenarian Party leaders and generals succeeded in ordering the army to shoot unarmed students, but rather the protests that led to the crisis in the first place. Until this spring, it was common in the West to say that the impulse behind the Chinese reform was economic rather than political, that the Chinese people were primarily interested in color television sets and not in political democracy as we understand it. But events in the spring of 1989 proved that liberal political ideas have a life and an appeal of their own, however heterogenous the views of the students who occupied the square. And the crackdown has not brought a restoration of Maoism: For all of its archaic vocabulary of "bourgeois liberalization" and "counterrevolution," the current leadership seems to understand that it can neither abandon reform nor return to the isolation of the 1950s. The old men governing China today, realizing that they are sitting on top of a society for which Marxism-Leninism has lost all relevance, are fearful for their personal authority and for that of their discredited Party. Altogether, Chinese events confirm rather than deny my thesis.

Islamic fundamentalism is not only a competitor to liberalism in the Islamic world, it has won a clear-cut victory over liberalism in many countries. And yet, for all of Islam's pretensions of being a universal religion, fundamentalism has had virtually no appeal outside of communities that were not Muslim to begin with. It threatens the liberalism of the West only insofar as countries like France and West Germany have to deal with difficult-to-assimilate immigrant populations, or when those countries clash with Islamic groups on a national or subnational level (i.e., terrorism). Islam's total failure to attract adherents among, say, the young people of the United States or Japan is suggestive; and a plausible interpretation of the strength of fundamentalism is as a reaction to the powerful appeal of liberalism in its initial encounter with the Islamic world. Though the Islamic *umma* is rather large, with nearly a billion adherents, the present clash between the Islamic and liberal worlds seems something less than an even match.

One is inclined to take the threat of nationalism much more seriously, since national feeling is plainly evident in the post-historical world. As communism recedes from Eastern Europe, it is fascinating to watch the recrudescence of longstanding nationalist conflicts like that between Hungary and Romania over the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. The big test of the relative durability of liberalism and nationalism will come in Germany, which is why so many Europeans are looking at the prospect of German reunification with misgiving. Nationalist conflict will increase on that continent in the next decade or two. It is not too farfetched to imagine the return of military confrontations in Europe over national rather than ideological issues.

While this suggests that the post-historical era will not be free of significant

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conflict, we still have to put that conflict in perspective. Before a nationalist confrontation reaches the scale of the major ideological wars of history or becomes a serious threat to world order, several conditions must be met. First, it must turn into imperialism—that is, become systematized and universalistic, justifying not just the liberation of co-ethnics trapped on the other side of a border but the outright domination of other peoples. And it must take place in a relatively big, powerful, and capable country. In the absence of these conditions, nationalist extremism can wreak havoc on the citizens of the country in which it occurs and their immediate neighbors. But conflicts between Hungary and Romania, or Bulgaria and Turkey, or Armenia and Azerbaijan, tragic as they may become, simply do not begin to reach the scale of the big, continent-wide war between superpowers armed with nuclear weapons that we have been fearing and planning against these past forty years.

Local nationalisms may also spark conflict in a world in which the great powers are already in a highly competitive relationship with each other. Thus the endless national disputes in the Balkans served to draw the major European powers into World War I. But we are not now living in such a world, for the character of European nationalism has changed tremendously since 1914. Absent the central East-West rivalry, which of the major European powers today would seek to jump into the Hungarian-Romanian dispute to carve out a sphere of influence for itself? Human rights lobbies in France or the United States might call on their governments to intervene, but that would hardly lead to a Sarajevo-style process of escalation.

Allan Bloom has suggested that such a virulent nationalism could still arise even in the heart of Europe as an outgrowth of one of the existing right-wing anti-immigrant parties in France or Germany. Others have suggested that the Green movement has similar authoritarian potential. This is all possible, though I don't see any of these extremist parties upsetting their political systems in the near future. Actually, the country where fascism may have the greatest potential is perhaps the Soviet Union itself. The Slavophile authors who write for Soviet journals like *Nash Sovremennik* or *Molodaya Gvardiya* speak a language unheard in Europe for many years, and are uncomfortably close to the Soviet mainstream. If post-Tito Yugoslavia in some sense represents the Soviet Union's future, one should worry whether there is not some Russian Milosevic waiting in the wings—a Party apparatchik who one day blossoms into a fascist demagogue, rousing the dominant nationality to reassert its "rights" against all the others. This possibility is real, and we will have to watch for it.

The final competitor to liberalism is what could be called the "X-factor"—Gertrude Himmelfarb's new, less benign America waiting just over the horizon with an ideology undreamt of today. Such developments are of course possible. Hegel himself did not envision the appearance of either fascism or communism in 1806, and while Kojève after the fact could explain them through the "cunning of reason," they delayed the arrival of the universal homogeneous state by a couple hundred years.

Hegel, however, raises the following larger question. He is the first major modern philosopher to deny that there is "being": human nature (indeed, nature more generally) is neither permanent nor universal; it is rather self-created by man in the course of his historical evolution. This process of self-creation is not a random or aimless one, however, but follows a clear directionality dictated by the unfolding of reason. It is also a very long process. The worldwide democratic revolution and the belief in egalitarianism on which it is based was not a product of the 1980s, or even of the period since the French Revolution. As Tocqueville noted when writing *Democracy in America* in the last century, progress toward democratic egalitarianism seems to be an inevitable historical process that has been underway for many centuries and which no one in the long run can resist. Human nature, in other words,

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has changed over the past couple of millennia: our modern democratic-egalitarian consciousness is in some sense a permanent acquisition, as much a part of our fundamental "natures" as our need for sleep or our fear of death.

WE ALL AGREE that the democratic-egalitarian trend can be resisted and even reversed on a local level (i.e., in large groups of countries) for considerable periods of time (i.e., for generations). The larger Hegelian question is whether the long progress toward modern democratic-egalitarian consciousness since at least the beginning of the Christian era in Europe can itself be regarded as a "blip" or accident in history that is itself completely reversible, or whether our underlying natures in this respect have changed. Is it conceivable that in another hundred years or so we will be living in a world in which the legitimacy of slavery will be generally accepted, or that we could pass through a cycle of monarchies and aristocracies whose moral foundations are as broadly secure as those of present-day democracies? Was Nietzsche right that our belief in human equality is a big fraud foisted upon us by Christianity, which a new generation of moralists will debunk? Will a future global cataclysm—either nuclear or environmental—wipe the slate clean, so to speak, and start the historical process over again? Or will we pick ourselves up from where we left off and rebuild our democratic-egalitarian world as it was before the crash, continuing our current arguments over the rights of women and minorities or worrying about the erosion of the First Amendment? I simply pose these questions without hopes of answering them.

A final word about the last paragraph of my article, which was so often quoted. The idea that one should be anything other than unconditionally happy about the victory of liberalism, or that one could be bored in a society that offered perfect security and material well-being, is one that has caused a certain amount of indignation, particularly among the space-travel lobby. Some of the more literal-minded of my readers have not recognized that one can be a supporter of liberalism, believe passionately in the superiority of liberal democracy over any alternative system, and yet be aware of certain fundamental tensions and weaknesses in liberalism. In this I am not referring to the continuing social problems of liberal societies underlined by leftist critics, which arise less from liberal principles than from their incomplete implementation. I am referring rather to the fact that liberal states do not refer their citizens to higher aims beyond the responsibilities of general civic-mindedness. Rather, they leave them to do as they please, and in fact discourage differentiation through their emphasis on equality and consensus. This failure to address the question of the content of the good life is of course why liberalism works, but it also means that the vacuum that constitutes our freedom can be filled with anything: sloth and self-indulgence as well as moderation and courage, desire for wealth and preoccupation with commercial gain as well as love of reflection and pursuit of beauty, banality alongside spirituality. Even the security that liberal societies bring is a two-edged sword, since there is a side of man that despises a riskless life, that seeks danger and heroism and sacrifice. The critique of liberalism from the Right, which was alluded to in the commentaries by Bloom and Hassner, has a long and respectable philosophical lineage.[7] It is also politically dangerous, because it points to continuing "contradictions" in the Hegelian sense that liberal societies have not completely resolved, and which could yet result in their undoing. These problems are perennial and deserve to be studied by every generation that enjoys the benefits of our modern democratic-egalitarian society. But that is yet another story.

[7]This Right has (fortunately) never been represented in American political life, the right wing of which remains firmly committed to liberal democracy.

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Trouble on the Oriental Express

The Crises in China and Japan

Murray Sayle

ONE OF THE disadvantages, or possibly advantages, of working as a foreign correspondent is the frequent need to follow more than one complicated situation at the same time. This past summer, for instance, I was simultaneously busy with the political crisis in Tokyo and the violent events in Beijing; one day writing about bureaucrats' bribes and politicians' mistresses and the next covering gunfire, riot, and the hunt for student and other members of a supposed counter-revolutionary conspiracy.

The disadvantages of this division of labor are self-evident: the need for two sets of notes and a split frame of reference; the chalk kept well away from the cheese. The advantages are more subtle. After awhile unexpected patterns emerge, chords begin to sound. China and Japan, for instance, seem at first incompatible universes. One country—as Elyot in Noel Coward's *Private Lives* pointed out—is very big, the other quite small. One is enviably rich, the other wretchedly poor. China was reported as high tragedy, Japan as low comedy. Apart from their ancient cultural contacts and the fact that both presently have strained relations with the United States, the only link seemed to be in reporters' notebooks. Interesting, then, to observe that *the two stories have much the same plot*: the failure of obsolete systems of government to respond to changing economic and social conditions, the reflexive application of old remedies which have made the maladies worse. This diagnosis depends on a reading of two case histories which are complex and widely contested. Some valiant simplification, with apologies to specialists, may help make the parallel clearer.

China and Japan, both fearful of colonization by technologically superior Europeans and Americans in the last century, set out on a long search for modernization without sacrificing their national essence or identity, a search still far from complete in either country. Both recognized the capitalist trading system as both the likeliest mechanism of modernization and the greatest of all threats to the basic integrity—or harmony, in the Confucian term—of their societies. Both sought to use Western ideas, suitably modified, to defend themselves against the overwhelming Western threat.

Here their ways parted. China experimented with the introduction of Western technology under the direction of Western capitalists, an experience which produced both the great city of Shanghai and, in reaction, the Chinese Communist party. Japan, which began with a state and bureaucracy far more powerful and resolute than China's,

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made great progress as a fledgling member of the maritime trading system—in its own right and as ally of its favorite hegemon, Great Britain—only to be virtually excluded again during the Great Depression. Japan then turned to autarky in a projected quasi-empire, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This led to war, total defeat, and Japan's forcible reincorporation into the world trading system by the system's new hegemon, the United States.

Mao and Deng

THE SAME WAR made possible the conquest of all China, minus Hong Kong, Macao, and the province of Taiwan, by the Chinese Communist party (CCP), after a very long march indeed from its birthplace in Shanghai. Its leader, Mao Zedong, rejected out of hand any cooperation with the world trading system and instead turned for a model to the Soviet Union. Mao copied much of the Soviet system, from the "dictatorship of the proletariat"—that is, rule by CCP functionaries—to Stalin's architectural tastes and the red scarves worn by indoctrinated schoolchildren, but returned China to autarky when the Soviet refusal to give him atomic weapons made it clear that China could never be an equal or independent member of any system run by Moscow.

Mao then experimented with the Great Leap Forward, a calamitous stab at technological progress through faith alone. Diagnosing that this had foundered on the inertia of the CCP itself, as a last forlorn hope Mao tried the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a blend of adolescent gullibility and mob violence. Only Mao's eventual infirmity and death rescued China from one of the greatest calamities in all its long history.

It is generally agreed that China was saved from disintegration by two wily survivors: the courtly Zhou Enlai, who somehow kept the country afloat through the last chaotic years of Mao, and Zhou's friend and successor Deng Xiaoping, everyone's favorite communist, a cuddly, bridge-playing, garden-gnome symbol of eternal Chinese resilience.

After the Mao madness, Deng was welcomed by the West as a "pragmatist," the nice word for opportunist, with a line of Khrushchev-like homely saws of which the most famous—"it doesn't matter whether the cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice"—could be read in many ways, one of them being the possibility that he really was one of the "top capitalist roaders inside the Party," as Mao's lieutenants, the Gang of Four, had charged. Certainly, capitalists had little to complain about in the first decade of Deng's paramountcy. The Hilton, McDonald's, and Kentucky Fried Chicken became familiar landmarks to the residents of Red China's big cities. Communist Chinese shops honored American Express, Visa, and Mastercard. The Pepsi-Cola board met in the Great Hall of the People.

In the countryside Deng's dismantling of the Maoist social order was just as refreshing. Mao's communes were closed (their crumbling buildings with appropriately faded red stars can be seen all over rural China), and a new system whereby farmers grow grain for the state on contract and sell any surplus on the open market soon transformed rural economics, doubling the output of wheat and other grains. Some 14.5 million private enterprises have been set up, many of them run by villages and even by families, like the "Mao Family Restaurant" opened by a distant relative of the chairman (and local Party stalwart). Of these enterprises some 365,000 are joint ventures with foreign capitalists, two-thirds of them Hong Kong and other overseas Chinese, with Americans second and the rest mostly Japanese. The communist partners include the municipalities of towns and villages, the Beijing police (who own a harborside hotel in Hong Kong, for instance), and the People's Liberation Army, part-owners with Filipino-Chinese interests of the sumptuous, marble-clad Palace Hotel in Beijing where gold-trimmed Rolls Royces wait to whisk guests to the Great Wall.

Basic raw materials and intermediate

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products like coal, steel, and electrical components are still, however, state-produced and sold at low, government-set prices. Their transfer to privately-owned manufacturing enterprises is immensely profitable, a jungle of hoarding, speculation, influence-peddling, and tax evasion. Mainly *dirigiste*, only partly market-shaped, the cumbersome Chinese economy has been unable to absorb the flood of imported capital by expanding domestic production, and the inevitable result has been galloping price inflation.

The West of Both Worlds

CHINA'S PARTIAL opening to the world trading system has thus produced a blend of the ugliest aspects of capitalism and socialism. The closing down of the communes and the introduction of partially free markets in the countryside has broken Mao's "iron rice bowl" of guaranteed subsistence and driven millions into the cities to look for work. The private enterprises don't want, and can't afford, these people, and state concerns throughout China are reckoned to be at least 20 percent overmanned already because of constant shortages of raw materials. Disappointed jobseekers by the million drift around China, obliged to find other ways of survival (thousands have recently turned up in Japan, posing as Vietnamese boat people). China thus has the mass unemployment and gross cheek-by-jowl inequalities of primitive capitalism (small traders, often operating in street markets, can make as much in a day as the teacher or factory worker is paid in a month—about 100 yuan, or $27), alongside the organizational rigidity and limitation of individual choice characteristic of socialist systems, the very worst of both worlds.

One result has been an enormous increase in economic crime. Privatized burglary, embezzlement, shoplifting, prostitution, pimping, drug dealing, and even purse-snatching were all unknown or rare in Mao's day. Now they all exist in abundance. Outside every police station in China's cities are displayed photographs of accused offenders, their alleged swag, as often as not, stacked in front of them—the same television sets, ghetto-blasters, and knob-decked transistor radios the underprivileged rioters of our affluent West love to loot. A curt note usually gives the crime, date of trial, and sentence, regularly death by shooting.

There has been no shortage of accurate knowledge about the cruelties and contradictions of Deng's China, or of witnesses well able to inform those who wanted to know. For a country both communist and Oriental, news coverage has been reasonably open, a goldfish bowl in comparison with Vietnam or North Korea. Nevertheless, we have practiced both *commercia* and *commensia* with China without requiring them to renounce Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought and practice. The British government has gone further and negotiated a momentous agreement with the PRC over Hong Kong, while self-servingly praising Chinese good faith. In short, for a decade we allowed and even encouraged Deng and his colleagues to believe that we accepted their "peculiar institution," approved of the steps they were supposedly taking to bring their society more in line with ours, and were prepared to be patient about their leisurely pace. Who, in those placid years, was deceiving whom?

In all this contradiction nothing has been more contradictory than the role of the Chinese Communist party. Party membership, dangerous when Mao's freelance Red Guards were "bombarding the headquarters," has been steadily rising under Deng to the current 49 million, making the CCP at the same time the world's biggest political organization and mixed business conglomerate. Officially, the CCP still espouses Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought, and the Party is no more likely to renounce these doctrines that justify its power and privileges than scoutmasters are to recommend unpreparedness.

The venerated Communist trinity had, however, little understanding of the process of economic growth, and Mao's guerrilla economics were plain wrong. As a result of the

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Great Helmsman's criminal promotion of childbearing, China's population is now approaching 1.2 billion, having more than doubled since 1949, and economic growth is the only alternative to endless poverty. Berthold Brecht's advice, "grub first, then ethics," certainly makes a point for post-Mao China. Moreover, while China was away a-Maoing, the world economy started a new spurt of technological advance, driven mainly by the information explosion. Like others, the present "pragmatic" Chinese leadership has realized that to be left behind in the race means permanent backwardness and increasing marginalization from the world stage.

The Japanese Model

CHINA IS therefore smashing its Soviet economic mold in the imperative, life-or-death search for Western-style economic growth and our closely related technological great leap forward. The new model is not, despite some twilight attempts at canonization, a product of Deng Xiaoping thought. Nor yet is it American capitalism. Instead, the model—closer to hand, dazzlingly successful, even cautiously ready to cooperate with China—is Japan. The key elements are a diligent and as far as possible educated labor force enrolled in "free" enterprises, but with access to capital and raw materials held under bureaucratic control; manufacturing primarily for export, accepting the discipline of the world market on quality and cost and using the resulting foreign exchange to bring in more technology and capital goods; and, eventually and gradually, the modernization of the non-export parts of the economy as well.

This Japanese-style development strategy has many difficulties for China, not least the doubt that even the world market is big enough to absorb cheap Chinese goods in the required quantities. It comes, however, with one enormous recommendation: it has worked stunningly for Japan and, in a modified form, for South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, all satellites in China's ancient cultural orbit—and *nothing else has*.

Given the limitless human capacity for profitable self-deception, there is no reason why the normal CCP meeting should not open with a chorus of *The East is Red* and go on to discuss portfolio investment and Hong Kong real estate prices. Most of the world's most corrupt regimes describe themselves as truly liberal, reformist, and democratic, and the CCP need be no different. The job of reconciling rhetoric and reality falls to the secretary general of the Party, which makes it a rather hot seat. The CCP secretary general in Deng's China is currently in charge of introducing "capitalism," if that is to be our term of choice for the Japanese-style, export-led strategy of economic growth. But as CEO of the Party he is also expected to preach a rousing Marxist-Maoist sermon as occasion demands, explaining how the eternal truths are to be applied to the concerns of the day, castigating backsliders and keeping the faith pure. In a party that looks upward, not downward, for its inspiration, this combination of tasks has made the secretary general's job an oriental Mission Impossible. (But, it should be noted, it did not touch off a single tut-tut in the West until trouble broke out.)

But some 1,151,000,000 Chinese do not belong to the CCP. Of these, the prudent majority follows where the vanguard leads, although it tends to do so half-heartedly, turning out razorblades that won't shave, soap that won't wash, and universal apathy. Two other groups, however, present more serious problems. Preaching Marx and practicing Mitsubishi troubles intellectuals, as it would, and Party membership was fading fast in Chinese universities before June 4, 1989. Then there are the jobless, the hungry and hopeless, the drifters—a rapidly growing group in a society violently dislocated by rapid change. These stumble along to the beat of an altogether different drum, or no drum at all. Marx himself called these troubling anomalies the *lumpenproletariat*. The preferred Chinese terms are hooligan, criminal element, or, if they take to rioting,

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counter-revolutionary, class enemy, and tool of the bourgeoisie. As long as the Party maintains its monopoly on political organization these disaffected people cannot do much to upset the established order. But should official vigilance blink they can ascend with little warning from the lower depths. Some such shapeless bubble of violence burst upwards in Beijing in the early days of June 1989.

Knowing the sequel, it is instructive and even sad to glance through the report of *The First Session of the Seventh National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1988). Deng Xiaoping himself, wearing a surely superfluous red ID card on his Mao jacket, waves cheerily from the cover. Inside Yao Yilin, minister in charge of the State Planning Commission, reports—without recourse to a single Marxist or Maoist phrase—that up to last year everything was going swimmingly: GNP 9.4 percent up from the previous year, domestic market brisk, controls on the market for raw materials ready to be relaxed. On foreign trade, Yao sounds a Thatcherite note: "The basic aims of this reform are to enable enterprises engaged in foreign trade to assume responsibility for their own profits and losses and operate without restrictions, to combine increased production with foreign trade and to introduce a system of agents so as to do away with the egalitarianism under which the state is responsible for all profits and losses" (p. 99). Or, as they say on Wall Street, to each according to the trend of the market.

But, reported Minister Yao, while "the present economic and political situation in our country is excellent, and the international environment is also favorable to us," there were one or two clouds on the horizon. An "excessive rise in commodity prices" (then up only 7.3 percent!) had "even lowered the living standards of some urban residents," partly due to "overissue of currency in the past few years"—monetarism gone East—and the "wages of intellectuals, which are notably irrational" needed improvement. Here, in hindsight, we see all the omens of the impending disaster: the underpaid "intellectuals"—by which Yao means disgruntled teachers, scientists, and other academics; the lucky or dishonest few getting richer while the urban majority get poorer; investment money pouring in—$3.5 billion from the U.S. alone—which the economy could not absorb. In fact GNP growth touched 17 percent, while inflation tripled and then quadrupled.

In the autumn of 1988 Yao and his alarmed colleagues decided to cut back GNP growth to 8 percent for the next two years, cancelling public works and factory building and freezing new employment. The immediate effect was a wrenching slow-down in the economy, a surge in unemployment, and widespread unrest, all poorly reported back to the leadership through the self-satisfied Party machinery. Unsold consumer goods, serviceable television sets, and washing machines jammed the department stores because few people had the spare money to buy them.

What Happened Next

CHINA, in short, was in an economic crisis by last spring. Its cities were simmering with discontent, with a potential student/unemployed or, in Chinese terms, intellectual/hooligan alliance ready to coalesce, when Zhao's predecessor as secretary general, Hu Yaobang, died last April 15. Like Zhao after him, Hu had tripped over the impossible requirements of his job, the need to make Japanese-style capitalism sound and behave like purest Marx, and had been dismissed in January 1987 for failing to contain six weeks of student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.

The official Chinese account of what happened next is in the 20,000-word *Report on putting down the anti-government riot* by the Mayor of Beijing, Chen Xitong, carried in *China Daily* on July 7, last, and as far as I know still, unpublished outside China. Mayor Chen is of course an obedient Communist and the meat of his report needs to be

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trimmed of Marxist gristle. That done, what remains is a sad but not uninformative document, a justification and confession of incompetence by a regime whose modest successes aroused passions it had no idea how to handle, until it was too late and deadly force was the only option left.

A week before Hu died, reports Mayor Chen, a big-character poster was pasted up at the Beijing University asking "whether there is any rationale now for socialism to exist and whether Marxist-Leninism fits the realities of China after all?" This questioning of socialism itself, says Chen, both "deviated from the orbit of democracy and legality" and "showed that we were not confronted with student unrest in its normal sense." But Mayor Chen and the government did nothing about it, which strongly suggests that, at the time, they saw no more than such normal student unrest and were more or less expecting it. (In China, students, funerals, and Tiananmen Square itself all benefit from a certain traditional permissiveness.)

Certainly this was the optimistic view of Hu's successor, the new Party secretary general Zhao Ziyang, also handpicked by Deng Xiaoping, the scapegoat on whom Chen's report heaps most of the blame. By April 22, when Hu's obsequies ended, the students had occupied the enormous square and were busy setting up makeshift shelters on its ninety-seven acres of concrete. The next day when members of the CCP central committee suggested that the student problem should be discussed, Zhao, according to Mayor Chen, said there was nothing to worry about and went off for a game of golf. (The new Beijing links and the very idea of a communist boss playing golf are more evidence of the enormous distance China has marched since Mao.)

On April 26 an editorial in the Party newspaper *People's Daily*, apparently not written by Deng himself, accused the students of fomenting "turmoil" and urged them to return to their classrooms. The Chinese expression *dai luan* does not really translate as "turmoil" but something much more serious in the Confucian tradition, more like its literal reading "big chaos" in which all authority breaks down, rice goes unplanted, the canals silt up, and the people die.

By this time the students were beginning to formulate demands which all commentators have described as "vague." One was for the withdrawal of the April 26 editorial accusing them of anti-socialist sympathies. Other demands were for free speech (which they were themselves at the time exercising), "democracy" (never defined), freedom of the press, political reform, an end to nepotism, bureaucracy, and privilege, vigilance against foreign financial domination, and the punishment of corruption—demands which, as Mayor Chen's report says, are "identical with the aspirations of the Party and government," or, put more brutally, normal communist pieties. Nepotism, money politics, and the invasion of foreign capital are, of course, well-known aspects of market economies, and the students' complaints could easily have been read as those of idealistic, if outspoken, communists.

THE "VAGUENESS" of the students' demands, which also bears on the validity of their democratic credentials, resulted not so much from the demands themselves, which were clear enough if contradictory and hard to satisfy, but from the fact that they resist easy classification. In particular, the students' attitude to Maoism defied simple analysis. Some waved the Little Red Book and exhibited pictures of Mao long treasured at home, and when a young schoolteacher and two accomplices splashed paint on Mao's giant portrait overlooking the square, they were apprehended and handed over to the police by students. The sit-in itself belongs to a long Chinese tradition of youth undertaking deliberate hardship to rebuke a society gone corrupt and degenerate.

Although Americans were led by the media and the styrofoam "Goddess of Liberty" statue—inspired by an advertising poster for Kentucky Fried Chicken, which has an outlet on Tiananmen—to believe that the

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students were demanding for China some version of the American Way, they were not demanding either a free market or a role for China in the world economic order. After the event, Mayor Chen argued that placards like "Supporting Socialism" and "Supporting the Leadership of the Communist Party" exhibited by the students after the April 26 editorial were part of a plot to conceal aims that were really counter-revolutionary. If so, the plot was clearly successful, and the students' slogans go far to explain the initial tolerance extended to them, an aspect of the affair that has puzzled almost all observers. But if successful duplicity is one explanation, the less cynical one is that the students meant what their placards said, and that a good part of their mixed slate of demands was for the harsh "purity" and egalitarianism associated with the Mao years, made by those too young to have experienced them.

On May 13, with Gorbachev's visit imminent, the students began a hunger strike in seven-day relays. How did the regime react? The People's Liberation Army sent one thousand quilts; the Chinese Red Cross brought water, salt, and sugar for the hunger-strikers; and Chen's own Beijing municipality set up portable toilets. Students were taken to state-owned hospitals for treatment, unhindered by the authorities, and none died.

This official leniency gave many, perhaps most, Chinese to believe that the student movement was not only being tolerated but was winning in its aim of making China a better place, by means never specified. Students and sympathizers were arriving by train from all over China, many allowed to travel free by the railway staffs. The students' movement was fully and sympathetically reported by the Chinese state television and the very same *People's Daily* that later carried Chen's report. The numbers involved grew enormous—according to Chen, 200,000 students from other parts of China and "several hundred thousand other people" joined in the Beijing demonstrations. All of this was favorably reported in the West and no one, as far as I know, warned the Deng regime that it was playing with fire, although we have our own Kent State, Paris '68, and Londonderry to remind us that soldiers and demonstrators make a dangerous mixture.

At this point Mayor Chen makes a damning admission. "For a time," says his report, "it looked as if refusal to join in the demonstrations meant 'unpatriotic' and refusal to show support was equivalent to 'indifferent to the survival of the students.' Under such circumstances, the fasting students were put to ride the tiger and found it difficult to get off." Chen here concedes the basic guilt of the Deng regime: it allowed the students and the rest of the Chinese people to believe that demonstrating and hunger-striking were now permissible political tactics, and that the students had official toleration and even backing for their campaign.

The students must take some blame for convincing themselves that sit-ins and hunger-strikes, fashionable imports from the more pliable West, were appropriate methods to use in extracting concessions from, let alone transforming, an embattled authoritarian regime with a record of ruthlessness in suppressing dissent. But there is something to be said for the students beyond youth and inexperience. Unpopular rulers had not long before been toppled in South Korea, Burma, and the Philippines by popular demonstrations. On more mature examination, however, these cases were very different from China's; in each the army, the ultimate prop of all governments, supported the incomers, and none of the three has changed the basic status quo ante. Overturning the government of China with its three million active army and forty-nine million organized Communists is an altogether different proposition—unlikely if non-violent, hopeless if violent. But a sense of proportion is not to be expected from adolescents in student dormitories.

Back in the square, the students set up an "autonomous self-governing region" administered from a hundred commandeered buses (Mayor Chen says seventy-eight were sent by the municipality as a gesture of goodwill), a couple married on the Monument to the

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People's Heroes, and the Goddess of Liberty arrived in segments from the Central Academy of Arts as a focus for impromptu dancing and concerts. Our own giddy 1960s, the politics of fantasy, had finally reached China.

On May 20 martial law was declared in Beijing, although the leadership still dithered about using force. On May 22 an army Gazelle helicopter dropped leaflets over Tiananmen Square warning that force would be used if the square was not evacuated—the Chinese equivalent of reading the Riot Act. Thousands of non-students—variously described either as citizens, workers, or China's answer to the Hell's Angels—and some students as well responded by building roadblocks and laying in supplies of knives, iron bars, sharpened bamboos, gasoline, and empty bottles in preparation for resisting the expected "invasion" of central Beijing by the Chinese army. Mayor Chen, after the event, labeled these protestors part of a gigantic counter-revolutionary conspiracy, but we can see them more simply as the dissatisfied, unemployed, and drifters, people marginalized by Deng's economics for whom neither the state nor private enterprise had any use—in short, those alienated by the partial transition to capitalism. It is clear from the television films that many of the non-students had had military training, particularly in the disabling of tanks and other armored vehicles with makeshift weapons, as taught to Chinese militiamen. Certainly, by accepting their "protection" the student movement forfeited its non-violent status, a point which seems to have troubled some of the more responsible student leadership. The exiled lecturer Yan Jiaqi claims that the Chinese state had first lost its legitimacy by resorting to force, a flimsy argument which if generally applied would make government impossible.

Clearing the Square

IN ANY EVENT there were undoubtedly riots in the approaches to Tiananmen on June 3 when the government finally moved to clear the square by force. The first blood drawn seems to have been the army's, that of soldiers dragged out of trucks, buses, and armored personnel carriers and beaten up, some fatally. Mayor Chen claims that 1,280 army, police, and civilian vehicles were burnt, 6,000 soldiers and police injured and "several dozens" killed. Rumors, of course, travel as fast among soldiers as they do among civilians, so it is likely that the PLA troops were given highly exaggerated accounts of what they were up against.

On the night of June 3 a battalion of soldiers—unarmed and wearing civilian T-shirts—marched into Tiananmen, were instantly recognized and beaten up, some badly, by demonstrators. This strange maneuver must have been a kind of unarmed reconnaissance, a last desperate attempt to resolve the debate in the leadership about whether the demonstrations were really non-violent. From 1:30 a.m. the following morning, the demonstrators were warned by bullhorns to leave the square. Three hours of negotiations followed. By 3:30 a.m. most of the students had agreed to leave peacefully, and did so. At 4 a.m. the lights in the square were switched off and the remaining demonstrators lit prepared fires. An armored vehicle moved to clear the square and there was some resistance and fighting by die-hards, probably not students, which we saw in television reports. On close examination, most of the shooting in the square was, by angle of the tracer rounds, clearly into the air. Mayor Chen says that the troops who entered the square had instructions to use minimum force and the experienced eyewitnesses I have consulted confirm this impression. There was a lot of violence and a few deaths, less than a dozen, but nothing that could reasonably be called a massacre in Tiananmen Square itself. For what it is worth, on this point the Chinese government is right and the Western media generally sloppy or wrong.

The story was different in the wide streets around the square and in other parts of the city where troops used force to break through the roadblocks. People who disobeyed army instructions or resisted armored

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vehicles were shot down, and some bystanders were probably shot in a spirit of revenge or on the unsupported suspicion that they were armed. Amnesty International says that "at least 1300 were killed" in Beijing. From accounts I have heard or studied I put the figure closer to 700. Few of the dead were, in fact, students; Mayor Chen gives the figure of 36, and 87 students were reported missing from Beijing University, although many of these are known to have fled the country, some before the final showdown.

No doubt central Beijing could have been secured with less bloodshed, especially if the army commanders had been prepared to move more slowly and accept more casualties among their own troops. It is equally clear that by June 4, as Mayor Chen says, "the turmoil. . . had spread to the whole of society and to all parts of China." The government was facing something like a spontaneous, unorganized general insurrection and had no realistic option but force to restore its authority. China had no alternative government waiting in the wings, and there was certainly none standing by in the dormitories of Beijing University. The regime's real culpability lies not so much in using force at the end, but in letting itself drift into such a situation. Deng Xiaoping's wistful remark on June 8, "it was bound to happen and was independent of man's will," can only be read as a pathetic confession of political failure.

The Failure of a Regime

BY WHAT SET of blunders, then, did the regime arrive at the need to shoot down hundreds of demonstrators in the streets? Why, we might ask, should the process of rejoining the world system be so traumatic?

The Chinese government owes its troubles to its initial naive economic liberalism, its hasty attempts to rejoin the international trading system after the long isolation of the Mao years, in both of which errors it had our full encouragement. The interest of Deng and his Party in the world, or if you prefer the capitalist trading system, was in its products and technology, not at all in the ideas that inevitably come with them. In this they had almost certainly read Chinese mass aspirations correctly. But consumer products come with ideas, often no doubt, sloganized, half-baked, and inapplicable. They also come with people, and in particular the representatives of the Western media, themselves part of the trading system, whose mixture of mendacity, superficiality, ignorance, commercial rivalry, and earnest search for difficult truth is understood by few of their own Western audience, let alone by monoglot Marxist Chinese.

The consequence has been all too predictable. Now the Chinese leadership, badly scared, has reverted to tried-and-true remedies—indoctrination has been stepped up, radical students weeded out (although Li Peng has said that ideological offenders, as opposed to those charged with destroying state property, will be re-educated, not executed, and so far this seems to hold). The government, however, continues its efforts to join the world trading system, demonstrating that it no more believes the truth of the Marxist-Leninist ideology that justifies its existence than the rebellious students do.

The events of the spring of 1989 have a significance far beyond China. Most other communist governments are now facing, or are shortly destined to face, the same essential predicament as the Chinese: how to effect a fundamental reform of their decrepit economies while clinging to a legitimizing myth that is simultaneously indispensable and utterly hollow. As attempts at headlong modernization proceed, we can expect many repetitions of Tiananmen, or something along the same lines, followed by similar frightened retreats into repression and the enforcement of official dogmas. It is a dialectical process that is both implicit in the situation and ironically fitting to the actions and circumstances. Regimes can, of course, last a long time on the basis of ideologies no one believes, but only in conditions of comparative stability and not, one suspects, in the face of

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the sweeping social and demographic changes that are the unavoidable consequences of a serious commitment to breakneck economic transformation.

With all this in mind, it would be a mistake to treat the events in Tiananmen Square as simply an aberration on the part of a rattled gerontocracy, or to attempt to interpret them in purely Chinese terms, or to think of Manila or Seoul as providing the appropriate analogues. Instead, we should consider whether such episodes are likely to be a distinguishing feature—perhaps *the* distinguishing feature—of communist regimes in their next phase of disintegration, and to try to understand their inner dynamics. Then, perhaps, we might be able to respond to future episodes with something better than our own embarrassing version of the dialectic: naive euphoria, giving way rapidly to shrill outrage.

Returning with a bulging notebook from shabby China and its mountainous problems to rich, self-satisfied Japan seems at first like crossing to another planet. The two great East Asian nations seem to share almost nothing. Only on close examination does a common pattern, faint at first, begin to show.

Japan and the Recruit Scandal

THE CIRCUMSTANCES of the current Japanese crises are well-known and need only a brief recapitulation here. It all began with a short newspaper report on June 18, 1988, that the deputy mayor of Kawasaki—a grimy industrial city on Tokyo Bay—was under investigation for taking a bribe from an information and real estate conglomerate named Recruit. The subject of the alleged payoff was a commonplace of municipal corruption, the rezoning of a site near the local railway station which would have greatly increased its value. What was unusual was the method of payment. The deputy mayor had been allotted a parcel of shares in a real estate subsidiary of Recruit—the company lending him the funds to buy them—and had then resold the shares when the flotation went public for a profit of 100 million yen ($700,000). Within a fortnight, the respected newspaper, *Asahi Shimbun*, discovered that three senior national politicians of the Liberal Democratic party had also been lent money by Recruit to buy pre-flotation shares.

Early in November 1988 the affair took a sensational turn when Nippon Television Network broadcast a film, clandestinely shot three days earlier in the hostel provided for members of the Japanese Parliament, showing a Recruit executive trying to bribe Yanosuke Narazaki, a veteran politician and member of the four-man United Social Democratic party. This began a drumfire of disclosures which went on for the next six months. It emerged that Recruit in 1984 had sold 1,256,000 of its shares to 76 politicians, bureaucrats, and journalists, lending the purchase money to the buyers, and had repeated the maneuver in 1986. All had immediately resold for big profits, transactions which were on the public record. Among the buyers, either in their own names or through aides or relatives, were every senior politician of the ruling Liberal Democratic party, prominent figures in the opposition Komeito ("Clean Government") and Democratic Socialist parties, and a minor number of the Socialist party. Only members of the Japanese Communist party had not been offered any shares.

After a nine-month investigation, limited to the 1986 share offering, two politicians and three senior officials were indicted for taking bribes from Recruit. Details of the investigation were leaked from the prosecutors' office on virtually a daily basis, treating the Japanese public to tantalizing glimpses of a web of connections cemented by heavy cash flows between the worlds of politics, business, and bureaucracy. In the event, however, the bag of defendants seemed to many Japanese to be disappointingly, even suspiciously, small.

While it is clearly the biggest Japanese political scandal of modern times, Recruit might soon have faded from public view had it not been accompanied by, and intertwined

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with, a fiscal crisis of equal or greater dimensions. Although Japan as a nation is prosperous, indeed the world's biggest creditor, the Japanese government is deeply in debt as the result of growing welfare spending and borrowing for pump-priming public works undertaken during the various oil crises. The Japanese financial bureaucracy has long been pushing for some form of commodity tax to straighten out the public finances. Two previous prime ministers, Ohira and Nakasone, had already come to grief on attempts to introduce such a tax, but Nakasone's successor, Noboru Takeshita, incautiously made a third try in November 1988, just as the Recruit scandal was beginning to monopolize the news headlines.

With his party holding majorities in both houses of the Japanese parliament, Takeshita also headed the biggest faction in the Liberal Democratic party. He assumed that his faction and party were both in sound enough shape for one more heroic push to pass the tax and survive the inevitable clash with the opposition that would follow. There were ugly scenes in the Diet when the party used its majority to force through the budget, including the tax, in the face of noisy opposition protest and abstention.

Ever since, the Liberal Democrats have been showing, in the phrase of a Japanese Socialist party member (JSP), distinct signs of metal fatigue. The tax, introduced on April 1 this year, is collected on retail sales, so that housewives are irritated by it every time they pass through a supermarket checkout. Its introduction coincided with more Recruit revelations, in which Takeshita himself first denied, then admitted, that he had accepted Recruit largesse, whereupon his aide in charge of fund-raising loyally killed himself. Public confidence in the Takeshita cabinet fell to 14 percent, the lowest that had, up to that time, been recorded in opinion polls. Seven weeks after the retail tax was introduced Takeshita resigned, to be succeeded by his foreign minister, Sosuke Uno, whose principal recommendation was the distinction that, not being a faction leader or a politician with any known prospects, he had collected nothing from Recruit.

Six days after his election Uno was accused by a geisha of having hired her as his mistress, and of having then behaved in a callous and unfeeling manner unworthy of a Japanese prime minister. Snubbed by François Mitterrand and others at the intervening Paris economic summit, Uno got much the same treatment from his party as it prepared for the partial election to the Japanese Upper House, held on July 23. The LDP suffered a disastrous defeat, winning only 36 of the 126 seats contested and 27 percent of the popular vote, compared with the 46 seats and 35 percent scored by the Japan Socialist party under its first woman leader, the formidable Ms. Takako Doi.

With this stunning reverse the LDP lost control of the Upper House of the Japanese parliament for the first time since its founding in 1955. Uno resigned to be succeeded by Toshiki Kaifu, an inoffensive fellow whose credentials are entirely negative. A former education minister with no faction following or previous political importance, he had neither been offered nor accepted a substantial gift from Recruit.

A general election must be held before July 1990 and neither the prospects of the Kaifu cabinet nor those of the LDP look bright. Kaifu's first foreign policy initiative—a trip to Washington to confer with President Bush—led only to a reprimand by Bush on Japan's trade surplus with the U.S., currently running at $50 billion a year, and a warning by Kaifu that Japan could set no timetable for improvement—a tacit admission on both sides that the trade friction between the U.S. and Japan is serious and steadily getting worse.

The Liberal Democratic party thus stands exposed before the electors as corrupt, inept, and without a single leader of international or national stature who is not involved in dishonest or questionable dealings. Two questions come to mind: How have these people managed to stay in office since 1955—a record for the non-communist world—and

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how much longer can such a blundering crew continue in power in a country renowned for its taut, ruthless efficiency? Some answers emerge from a glance back at the circumstance of the party's foundation.

Japan did not, of course, take up its present democratic politics by choice, but had them imposed by the American occupation after Japan's surrender in August 1945. The 1920s, the period remembered in Japan as the "Taisho democracy" (after the present emperor's grandfather), did indeed see the beginnings of a two-party system, with the emergence of two conservative, pro-business parties (financed respectively by Mitsui and Mitsubishi) offering a real, if narrow, choice of policies. Eight members of the self-styled "proletarian" parties were also elected and peaceably seated in the Diet in 1928. Japanese historians called this period "normal constitutional government," a term they have significantly never used about the rule of the LDP.

Japan's tentative evolution toward democracy was cut short by the great depression of 1929. In November 1930, Prime Minister Osachi Hamaguchi was mortally wounded by a right-wing fanatic, ushering in the period of government by assassination, Japan's invasion of China, the steady usurpation of political power by the military, and the eclipse of the old political parties. In August 1940, all the political parties were dissolved and two months later a new one, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA), was launched under military auspices as Japan's only legal political organization. Apart from the communists—in exile or in jail—most politicians, including the socialists, worked enthusiastically with the IRAA.

The Japanese military presented themselves as staunch patriots purifying not just Japan but all East Asia of degenerate Western ideas, of which our notions of democracy were high on the list. By long habit these ideas seem to us simple and non-controversial—or even, as some of their better-known exponents have claimed, self-evident. To the formidable family of nations whose notions of statecraft come originally from China, ideas like legitimate organized opposition seem, in contrast, to be seditious, if not downright blasphemous and destructive of the social order.

Claiming to restore true Japanese values, the IRAA was thus a political party on the Confucian pattern, offered as a model to the rest of China-influenced East Asia ("one script, one mind" in the propaganda of the time). The IRAA contested one wartime election, in 1942, and won overwhelmingly. The real rulers of Japan at the time were the military and under them the civil bureaucracy, who achieved miracles of production, breaking down the old craft guilds, making serviceable tanks and aircraft with the labors of farmers, housewives, and schoolchildren, adapting a nominally capitalist economy to the needs of total war, and generally outfitting the first Asian nation to have fought the West with its own weapons.

The IRAA disappeared along with the old Imperial Army and Navy in the wreckage of 1945. The wartime bureaucracy, however, flourished under its new American masters. The wartime Munitions Ministry became the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and then the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the dreaded MITI, with authority both over imports and exports, in which potent form it is with us to this day. By governing through the Japanese bureaucracy and treating the Japanese parliament as a rubber stamp, the Occupation put the final seal on the power of Japanese officialdom, by far the most potent in the non-communist world.

Postwar Politics

JAPAN MADE A shakier start in democracy under the Occupation. In the early postwar years, nearly all Japanese politicians of influence and standing were compromised by their earlier association with the IRAA and their support for the war. Though the conservatives held office for all but a year in the first postwar decade, both

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the Left and the Right were divided and political life was faction-ridden and chaotic. Things were further complicated by the change in American policy as the Cold War got underway, causing the image of Japan as an enemy to be punished and reformed to be displaced quite abruptly by one of it as a valuable ally to be courted in the coming world struggle against communism. The dominant figure in Japanese politics during these years was Shigeru Yoshida, who was prime minister five times between 1946 and 1953. A retired diplomat who spoke English, Yoshida had the great advantage of not having been involved with the IRAA and of having been luke-warm about the war (he had been arrested shortly before it ended for advocating an early peace). In office, he followed a prescient policy of cooperation with the Americans so the Japan could "win by diplomacy even though it had lost the war."

The contemporary pattern of Japanese politics was really set in November 1955 when, responding to a unification move on the part of the hitherto doctrinally divided socialists, two conservative parties and various splinter groups merged to form the Liberal Democratic party. Opposing it was the city-based, anti-military, and neutralist Japanese Socialist party, and a Communist party thoroughly marginalized by the Cold War.

The LDP was, in fact, assembled so hastily from an assortment of individual political bosses and their personal followers that it has never had coherent policies over a broad range of issues, a diversity papered over by glib double-talk and vague pronouncements. Essentially it was a revival of the IRAA, aimed, as one of its founders, Takeo Miki, put it, at "perpetual conservative rule." The party inherited from its wartime forerunner its network of rural notables and the need for money to maintain their loyalty—not crudely to buy their votes, but to enable LDP politicians to play the role of lords bountiful and earn appropriate gratitude—a need which grew with the years as Japanese industry prospered and voters migrated to the cities, there to fall under the influence of the "reform" parties, as the Japanese opposition are generally called. It inherited the IRAA's claim to be the party of the whole, united nation, with the implication that the opposition are subversives or at best represent only a sectional interest, the urban working class, misled by the non-Japanese doctrine of socialism. It inherited in particular the IRAA's close, deferential relationship with the wartime production bureaucracy of which Nobosuke Kishi—the wartime munitions minister, now chief of the "mainstream" faction of the LDP and soon to be prime minister—had actually been the boss, Japan's own Albert Speer. The LDP has been nicknamed the "Bureaucratic Rule Assistance Association," as over the next three decades it faithfully seconded the bureaucracy in its masterly exploitation of the unmatched opportunity the Americans were offering Japan.

Although some Americans were uneasy about the implications of this one-party rule, the American establishment believed that it had found a loyal lieutenant in the LDP and proceeded to shower Japan with rewards. The American market, the world's biggest, was thrown open to Japanese products without any matching requirement of opening the Japanese market. Technology was transferred free or at giveaway prices (Sony bought rights to the transistor for $20,000), and George Meany of the UAW, staunchly anti-communist, facilitated the export of the first Japanese cars to the United States. The Mutual Security Treaty, as renegotiated by Kishi in 1960, gave Japan, alone among America's allies, a unilateral guarantee of defense, Japan being obligated only to furnish bases from which the Americans could carry out their one-sided end of the bargain.

The Japanese bureaucracy certainly made the most of the dazzling opportunity offered by the Cold War and the unilaterally wide-open American market, and in doing so established the model all the other modernizing Asian states are now following. Still armed with their augmented wartime powers, the bureaucrats as early as the 1950s decided that Japan needed the home-based,

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all-Japanese owned multinational companies which are now world-wide names. They selected electronics as a suitable industry for development and stage-managed the research and basic component manufacture which three decades later have given Japan something like a world monopoly.

Meanwhile, what were the LDP politicians doing? Fighting each other to get elected, a more than full-time job. Japanese legislation is drawn up by the bureaucracy, spending is negotiated between officials, with cabinet meetings typically lasting twenty minutes or so—time enough for ministers to okay the agenda drawn up, with the figures already set by the regular meeting of the permanent heads of their departments the day before. These career civil servants are not, however, the just and wise philosopher kings of Plato. The different departments are jealous as snakes of each other's prerogatives, and there is no central power to adjudicate. The result has been the formation of what the Japanese call *zoko giin*, parliamentary tribes; informal triangular groupings of bureaucrats, the businessmen whose activities they are supposed to regulate, and politicians who are financed by the same businessmen and intercede with the bureaucrats on their behalf. These arrangements are semi-secret and, of course, wide open to corruption, which has regularly come to light on the technological frontier as new men and industries have sought to buy advantages over their rivals: shipbuilding in the 1950s, transport and aircraft in the 1970s, information processing in the 1980s. The Recruit scandal is a textbook example: its brilliant founder, the self-made Hiromasu Ezoe, was simply trying to set up his own tribe of politicians and bureaucrats able to give his company the inside running in the fields of education and information, in which he was pioneering new, profitable techniques.

The system has seemed, from the outside, to be super-stable, and some foreign writers have even described it as unalterable. Since 1955 Japanese elections have not been debates over policy but plebiscites, in which the voters have been asked whether or not they endorse the system which has multiplied Japanese real wages twenty times in conditions of relative equality unmatched in other industrial societies, with low inflation and close to zero unemployment. Not surprisingly they have voted yes, particularly as the opposition parties (except the Communists) long ago became domesticated parts of the system, accepting smaller but substantial contributions from business (the established split is 70 percent for the LDP, 30 percent for the opposition), participating as members of the "tribes," and being flatteringly consulted by the party in power on forthcoming legislation. The tribal wall-to-wall politics of the wartime IRAA remained in place. The LDP inevitably became a corrupt, self-satisfied racket—rather like the CCP.

The Liabilities of Success

WHAT, THEN, has gone wrong? In one word, success. Japan is no longer the timid American ward of 1955, and the world has moved a long way from the Cold War rigidities of that time. The enormous export earnings of Japanese corporations have partly returned to Japan in the form of real estate investment, which with the current stimulation of domestic demand in the form of industrial expansion and public works have combined to push land prices to astronomic heights—up 3200 percent in Tokyo since 1955. Land prices have in turn created a new, parasitic class, the *tochi-richi*, or "land rich," and have split the middle class into a pro-LDP minority who benefit from the real estate bonanza and those who are suffering hardship in consequence of it. Few Japanese still believe that it is only the LDP's favored status with the Americans that is saving them from Chinese or Russian occupation. Being the self-proclaimed party of the American connection, so useful in the past, is now becoming a liability, as Americans demand that Japanese beef "ranchers" (average herd: 2.8 beasts), orange growers, and even rice farmers should be exposed to interna-

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tional competition and so surely wiped out. Carla Hills's brand of crowbar salesmanship, in short, is forcing open a gap between the LDP and its hardest-core, dearest-bought supporters.

Soaring inequality, the stirrings of consumer protest, a simple desire to be consulted by their rulers—these are all sure signs that Japan is at last being invaded by the ideas of the liberal capitalist world, that the transitional regime which undertook the reconstruction of a ruined Japan after the defeat of 1945 has more than fulfilled its mandate and is now widely seen as pursuing, not Japan's interests, but those of illicit private coalitions among business, the bureaucracy, and politicians. The more perceptive business leaders have long feared the instability and constant risk of scandal inherent in the LDP's semi-legal system and resented its endless demands for money. As far back as 1975, after the Lockheed scandal, the chairman of the Japanese national business federation *Keidanren*, Toshiwo Doko, tried to get his organization out of political fund-raising altogether. The result has been predictably ironic; politicians have simply turned to richer and riskier sources of funds, like the farcical fund-raising "parties" in which a hundred tickets are sold for every guest who turns up, or the dubious share-buying scheme of the outsider Ezoe.

Far from heeding the warning signs that their system is in terminal decline, the LDP politicians have, again like those of the CCP, redoubled their efforts along the old established lines. The parties and factions reported contributions totalling $1.2 billion for 1988, an all-time record; but as the LDP declared receipts less than those of the Communist party, which gets nothing from business, the real total was undoubtedly closer to $10 billion, making politics one of Japan's mightiest growth industries. The same report gave examples of what the recipients did with the money: One LDP politician escorted parties of constituents, 300 at a time, to Tokyo's Disneyland; another took supporters to the National Theater in batches of 150; flourishing agencies exist for the bulk buying of football tickets, pianos for elementary schools, wreaths for funerals, French perfume, etc. to distribute to their followers. Naturally, the politicos are generous with each other, and a whole section of Tokyo nightlife is composed of elegant restaurants patronized by politicians, businessmen, and bureaucrats with typical minimum charges of $700 per head and up, where the realities of Japanese policy are brokered. These are not the politics of citizenship, but of infantile dependence. The Japanese Diet is not a deliberative body but a bazaar of influence-peddling. While Japan was single-mindedly pursuing the American offer that no defeated nation could possibly have refused, these politics might be excused, might even be presented as an Oriental version of democracy. Now that Japan has become the capitalist world's indispensable source of savings, the inadequacies of its politics, both internal and external, are beginning to grate against a harsher reality.

INTERNALLY, the runaway victory of Ms. Doi and the Japan Socialist party in the upper house elections was not so much a vote for her personally, or for her ramshackle party, as a vote of no-confidence in the 1955 system, the first nationwide plebiscite the LDP has ever lost. Most of those who turned to the JSP were, in fact, disaffected farmers and the urban lower middle class of small shopkeepers and tradesmen, the very groups who used to be the LDP's most reliable core of support, but who now fear that Japan's growing two-way involvement in the capitalist world order will leave them marginalized and marked for extinction. Although Doi herself is idealistic and honest—rather like a grown-up Chinese student, in fact—and her gender is a guarantee that the JSP'S policies are not brokered in geisha houses, the rest of her party is mired in the debates of the 1950s over Japanese neutralism and the Korean War, and no one seriously suggests that "socialism" has much to offer the world's most successful *dirigiste* economy. The JSP alone has no hope of a parliamentary majority and so is attempting

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a coalition with other opposition parties, themselves integral parts of the LDP's system (and all recipients of Recruit largesse).

A Cloudy Forecast

NOTHING STABLE can readily emerge from this major shift in Japanese politics. More likely is a mild chaos, analogous to that of the early 1950s, the confused years before the creation of the LDP. It is easy for a sympathetic non-Japanese to specify that the new Japanese politics should balance the interests of producers and consumers, give women a greatly increased voice in public affairs, curb the arrogance of the bureaucracy, invoke the new duties of citizenship rather than the traditional Japanese gratitude for handouts, and bring the formation of public policy out of smoke-filled rooms and into the comparatively clear light of mass media, notably television. But how Japan gets from here to there, pioneering a path no Asian nation has yet trodden, is far from clear, and menacing economic clouds are gathering outside, particularly from across the Pacific.

It is, again, easy for us to see that our trade negotiations with Japan will never go well until the Japanese consumer is enfranchised and other nations get a chance to earn his, and even more importantly her, yen—instead of, as we now do, transferring some $70 billion a year, compounded, of our assets to Japanese owners, thus helping to build a commercial empire that Japan does not need, cannot defend, is divisive of Japanese society, and of little benefit to the other Japanese toiling away at home. Economies run by cliques of producers and bureaucrats and those dominated by consumers at the ballot box may at first seem to be benignly complimentary, until we reflect that the first must inevitably wind up owning the second. Such arrangements are really more like *folies à deux* from which neither can escape without the cooperation of the other, unlikely to be given until roughly similar interests are engaged on both sides.

China and Japan can thus be seen as being in the same, or at least related, boats—although one is a glossy liner and the other a decrepit wreck. The difference has been, in part, luck: Japan had already been organized by war (which is, viewed economically, mostly exports) for massive feats of production, and then had the good fortune to be defeated by the operators of the world's biggest market who were looking for an ally with Japan's geographical position; while China suffered the calamity of being for the brief time in favor with the Soviet Union, and got little out of its alliance except obsolete technology, isolation from the world market, and a cumbersome, unresponsive system of government.

One grew rich, the other even poorer, but both have been stuck with well-entrenched elites operating their respective systems for their own advantage. Both see their future as part of the world trading system and, with their disciplined and diligent populations, both are well placed to find important roles within it. Neither, however, has managed to fit in harmoniously: China because its politics are unacceptable, Japan because of its solipsistic economics.

The Chinese academic Yan Jiaqi has said that China will never be stable until it has achieved democracy. This has a tautological ring, but if he means that China will not be free of major internal and external tensions until it has consumers who can compel attention to their interests, he is right. And as it happens he is even more right if his remark is applied to Japan. There is no necessary connection between political freedoms and the early stages of economic growth, and indeed most developing industrial economies have been less than democratic, including the first, Britain's. When industrial maturity is in sight, however, then open democracy among all partners seems the only way in which an internationally harmonious, unmanaged balance of investments and consumption, import and export can be achieved—that is, unless mass democracy itself does not dangerously overrepresent the interests of consumers, a

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risk we in the West are in the process of exploring now.

The process of democratization is not inevitable, however, particularly in Asia, and the Asian economies have many political barriers to overcome. As long-established inhabitants of the capitalist world order and speakers of its working language, we should cautiously do what we can to welcome them, with the hope that—after millennia of stifling Confucian rule and enormous detours through war and dictatorship, fascism and communism—the real histories of the great East Asian civilizations are just beginning.

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America's Purpose

Since the 1940s the central purpose of the foreign policy of the United States has been the global containment of communism. If the Cold War is now ending, or even changing its character in radical ways, the question arises: What should America's purpose be in the conditions likely to prevail during the rest of this century? Over the next year, *The National Interest* will invite commentators to give their answers to this question.

Universal Dominion: Toward a Unipolar World

Charles Krauthammer

ALL DISCUSSIONS of American purpose in the post-Cold War world must begin with the proviso that first we get to post. The primary task of American diplomacy—its task for, say, the next decade—is to win the Cold War. Ending the Cold War on Western terms, now for the first time within reach, means the Finlandization of Stalin's inner empire (Eastern Europe); the decolonization of Brezhnev's outer empire (the Third World satrapies in Africa, Asia, and Central America); and the continued liberalization of the center (the politics and economy) of the Soviet Union itself.

Since my purpose here is to discuss what comes after, I will not dwell on how stage one is to be pursued, except to say that since it was containment and competition, military *and* economic, that ultimately prevailed in the Cold War, it would be historic folly to relax our grip just when success is in sight. In some ways, we are in a position analogous to that of the allies after the Normandy invasion. Victory is inevitable, so long as we don't stop.

Most interesting now, as then, is the problem of two-tiered thinking: how to win the current war while at the same time preparing for the postwar world. America did not do very good two-tiered thinking on the road to Berlin. The subsequent Cold War was, in part, a consequence of that poor thinking. It is particularly important, therefore, on the road to Moscow, as it were, to think about what comes after.

Assuming the Cold War is carried through to a successful conclusion, what then? Before asking what do we do, we must ask what the world will look like. It seems fairly clear that what will emerge is a multipolar system that retains some elements of bipolarity. The U.S. (certainly) and the USSR (probably) will remain qualitatively superior powers as nuclear-armed, continental states with the ability to project power to almost any place on earth. China, Japan, and some kind of confederated Western Europe will constitute the other major players (though a reunified Germany could well emerge in the next century as an independent actor). With ideology bleached from the system, it will resemble the balance-of-power world of the late nineteenth century (or, as Owen Harries insists, the eighteenth).

What purpose have we in such a world?

One can already see the lines of argument developing. Indeed, the debate has broken out with some fury, perhaps a decade before the fact, in conservative ranks, where the

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ancient pull of classical isolationism remains strong and is just beginning to declare itself publicly. What purpose have we in a world without communism? None, beyond the narrowest defense of our national security, say the paleoconservatives. In his notorious Heritage Foundation speech of October 1988, Russell Kirk pointed the way, denouncing neoconservative "cultural and economic imperialists" bent on "pursuing a fanciful democratic globalism rather than the national interest of the United States." With characteristic candor, Pat Buchanan followed with a recent newspaper column that said bluntly: "[W]hen this Cold War is over, America should come home."

At the other pole are indeed some neoconservative thinkers who would urge upon the U.S. a return to an updated Wilsonianism: With the decline of communism, the advancement of democracy should become the touchstone of a new ideological American foreign policy. Whether it is National Endowment for Democracy money for Solidarity printing presses or American troops to redeem a stolen Panamanian election, American purpose is the democratic crusade. What purpose have we in a world without communism? Same as before, say the neoconservatives, only more so. Communism may be dead, but the work of democracy is never done.

There will soon be a similar split among liberals though they are not yet aware of it. Some will continue the post-Vietnam McGovern tradition of frank "Come Home America" isolationism. Ultimately they will find themselves on the same side of the fence as the conservative isolationists, much as Norman Thomas and Robert Taft were de facto foreign policy allies in the 1930s.

The other strain of post-Vietnam liberalism is internationalist. Its ideal is the worldwide human rights campaign as envisioned by Jimmy Carter. These liberal internationalists, like the neoconservatives, think America has a mission beyond narrowly-defined national interest. Neoconservatives call that mission democracy. Liberals call it human rights.

There will soon be less to this argument than meets the eye. Under Carter, liberals tried to promote human rights in the abstract, as an end in itself. Conservatives argued that democracy is the indispensable structural condition for the success of human rights. There is, however, no longer a great gulf between the two camps on the issue because conservatives have won the argument. Liberals, particularly since the experience of Poland and Hungary, are beginning to agree that true progress on human rights requires a democratic structure and that unless institutions are liberalized, human rights victories—the release of some political prisoners, the relaxation of certain oppressive measures—are likely to be ephemeral.

Moreover, another factor that heretofore aggravated the fight between conservative and liberal internationalists—the preoccupation of the former with communist tyrannies and the latter with the "authoritarian" type—will wane. In a post-Cold War world where communism is a spent force, there will be little to divide these adversaries. Left and Right internationalists will find common cause as they did in the early postwar years.

The result will be startling. The Left-Right debate of today will gradually transform itself into the isolationist-internationalist debate of yesterday. The alliances will be a crazy quilt. In the end, however, neither the isolationist nor the internationalist positions will satisfy.

I have been closely associated with the pro-democracy internationalist school during the 1980s. I have some doubts, however, whether in the radically changed post-communist world that we are postulating, the democratic crusade should be the central plank of an American foreign policy.

Why should it make a difference for the promotion of democracy whether we are in a Cold War or post-Cold War world? It makes a great difference. During the Cold War the United States has been involved in a struggle to preserve a *structure* of freedom in the world. The necessary condition for what JFK called the "success of liberty" was the defeat of those great forces—fascism and communism—which threatened the very idea of freedom and had the

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power and will to execute the threat. By winning these victories, the U.S. has, literally, made the world safe for democracy.

Both for reasons of American interests and American values, the responsibility to make democracy possible was a historical absolute. The responsibility to enact the next stage—to make democracy actual in every corner of the globe—is less controlling.

A great power undertakes great battles, because no one else can. But with the great battle won, the question of whether to engage in the mop-up work is a very different one. A communist Nicaragua in isolation is far different from a communist Nicaragua as an outpost of the Soviet empire or as an outpost of communism as an armed creed. Assuming that the center of the empire, the metropolis, either changes or withers (which is how Gorbachev frames the choices now facing the Soviet Union), then the strategic meaning of the outer empire is radically altered—it becomes far less of a threat to American security narrowly defined and even less of a threat to the cause of freedom broadly defined.

Connection makes all the difference. If the connection is severed—if the Cold War is won—then the islands of tyranny in the world, isolated and unsupported by a massive imperial center, become not only less threatening, but more likely to wither, in isolation, from their own contradictions. We should do what we can to encourage that withering. But, unlike containment, that process of encouragement does not rise to the rank of defining purpose of American foreign policy.

The isolationist position, on the other hand, is more easily dismissed. Today, as in the 1930s or 1950s, there is no safety in isolationism. True, American disengagement in a post-Cold War world would not have the immediate consequences that it would have had, say, in Stalin's time. But what the isolationist Left and Right fail to understand—they remember 1939 but forget 1914—is how fragile is the structure of peace even in the absence of ideological conflict. They ignore the indispensable role that the deployment of American power plays in the maintenance of global stability. There is nothing that would more destabilize Asia, for example, than the withdrawal of American troops from Japan. No country from South Korea to China to Thailand to Australia—not even Vietnam—fears the deployment of American troops. What they do fear is American withdrawal. Not that they expect immediate Japanese rearmament. But in absence of Pax Americana there would be enough nervousness about ultimate Japanese intentions and capabilities to spark a local arms race and create instability and tension of a kind that has not been seen in Asia for decades.

ISOLATIONISM AND Wilsonian internationalism are not, however, the only alternatives open to the United States in a post-Cold War world. One alternative is classical realpolitik: to act as Britain did a century ago as the great balancer of power. America, an island continent and dominant naval power, is geographically suited and militarily equipped for the role. Unfortunately, it is entirely unfit psychologically. There is no stomach and very little tolerance in the U.S. for a foreign policy of realpolitik. The strain of American moralism—whether it energizes an expansive internationalism or a self-righteous isolationism—is simply too powerful. (Anyone who doubts that should think only of the reaction when our premier realpolitician, Henry Kissinger, wrote of Tiananmen Square in terms too mildly critical of Deng.)

What then? I would propose yet another alternative, an entirely blue-sky idea: After having doubly defeated totalitarianism, America's purpose should be to steer the world away from its coming multipolar future toward a qualitatively new outcome—a unipolar world whose center is a confederated West.

In a sense, I am proposing the politics of the fiber optic cable. As the industrialized democracies become increasingly economically, culturally, and technologically linked, they should begin to think about laying the foundations for increasingly binding political connections. This would require the conscious

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depreciation not only of American sovereignty, but of the notion of sovereignty in general. This is not as outrageous an idea as it sounds. In Europe today some of the greatest world powers of the last half millennium—Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Spain, and Portugal—are involved in what Robert Hormats correctly calls the single greatest voluntary transfer of sovereignty in world history.

Europe '92 would be the model for the larger integration of the new Europe with North America and democratic Asia. Nothing as dramatic as Europe '92 could be expected from non-contiguous states so divided by race and culture and language. Nevertheless, we can already see the embryonic mechanisms of the new super-sovereignty, mechanisms such as the G-7 and the G-5 which are beginning to act as a finance committee for the West.

How would this arrangement bring about unipolarity in the international system? Such a confederation could have no rival. Around it would radiate in concentric circles, first, the Second World, the decommunizing states, dependent on the West for technology and finance. As they liberalize economically and politically, they would become individually eligible for status as associate members of the unipolar center. The outer ring, even more dependent on the center, would consist of the developing states. Its graduates too (say, Korea, Brazil, Israel) might also eventually attach themselves to the center.

The goal, one might say, is the world as described by Francis Fukuyama. Fukuyama's provocation was to assume that the end—what he calls the common marketization of the world—is either here or inevitably dawning. It is neither. The West has to make it happen, and for that, the United States has to wish it. It has to wish and work for a super-sovereign West economically, culturally, and politically hegemonic in the world.

How is this vision different from the naive nonsense of earlier one-world visions? The old universalism (c. 1945) of the United Nations variety was based on the fallacy that structure begets community: that once we established the parliament of man, a world community would begin to emerge from it. The new universalism is based on the contrary notion that community begets structure: that if one begins with community, the smaller community of Western democratic nations, out of it will emerge the universal structure to which others can attach themselves over time.

The other great fallacy of the old universalism was the belief that one could have a universal community with common purpose in the presence of fundamental ideological conflict. Only in a world where the totalitarian challenge has been abolished, where the contention of nations has replaced the clash of armed doctrines, is universal community even conceivable.

In its spirit and ultimate goal, this idea of a super-sovereign West is not far from that of the pro-democracy crusade. But its approach is radically different. It focuses on the center, not the periphery. It is based on the assumption that unification of the industrial West is the major goal of the democratic crusade, rather than the conversion, one by one, of the Third World states. It is based on the further assumption that the centripetal forces generated by continued Western success at the center will, as in the 1980s, lead inexorably to the spread of democracy to the second and third worlds. And that, therefore, out there is not the place to start as America searches for its new role in the world.

I have no idea whether this goal is achievable. I tend to think not, although perhaps it is no more unlikely than the unification of the French duchies might have seemed in the fifteenth century, or of the Italian city-states in the early nineteenth, or of Western Europe in 1939. Moreover, it is perhaps as unlikely that Americans are psychologically prepared to subsume their sovereignty in some kind of great Western confederation as they are to adopt nineteenth-century realpolitik. But we are dealing here with goals, not reality. If the new age dawns and some new national purpose is to be offered to a skeptical American people, I suggest that we go all the way and stop at nothing short of universal dominion.

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If This Long War is Over

Nathan Tarcov

IF THE SOVIET UNION were to disintegrate or to turn inward and devote its energy and resources overwhelmingly to internal reform; *if* it were to radically reduce and alter its nuclear forces so as not to threaten the United States; *if* it were to reduce, withdraw, or drastically alter its conventional forces so as not to threaten our allies; *if* it were to terminate its support for client states whose armed forces threaten our friends; *if* it were to abandon its efforts and its support for the efforts of its clients to destabilize governments friendly to us; *if* it were to allow full independence to all the nations it has occupied; *if* it were to liberalize and democratize its own polity so as to allow public debate over its foreign and defense policy; *if* it were to cease anti-Western propaganda and disinformation both among its own people and abroad; in short, if the Soviet Union were no longer to pose a significant threat to the United States and its friends and allies, then meeting that threat could no longer be considered the central purpose of American foreign policy. What then would that purpose be?

It is helpful to approach this question by posing the following radical alternative: Would the United States try to claim victory in a competition the Soviet Union had forfeited or would it regard the competition as cancelled? Would the United States attempt to exercise a then practically uncontested world leadership or would it too turn inward and at best devote its energy and resources overwhelmingly to internal reform?

Answering this question seems to depend less on whether one considers the Cold War an ideological as well as a geopolitical contest than on whether one understands the United States to have had essentially positive or essentially negative aims in the contest. American ideological aims in the Cold War have been susceptible of either positive (spreading democracy) or negative (containing communism or preventing aggression) conceptions. American geopolitical concern could similarly be conceived as an effort either to tilt the balance of power as far as possible in our favor or merely to maintain an already favorable balance against Soviet attempts to tilt it in their favor. One's expectations for American policy in the event of Soviet collapse, withdrawal, or conversion seem to depend, in other words, on whether one understands the United States to have been a status quo power with merely defensive aims as opposed to the Soviet Union understood as a revolutionary power with offensive aims.

The view of American aims in the Cold War as negative or defensive is plausible since

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the initial underlying balance of power, measured in resources for potential military strength rather than current troop levels, was favorable to the United States. The United States, with its Western European allies and their colonial empires, occupying western Germany and almost all of Japan, far exceeded in this respect the Soviet Union and the territories it managed to occupy at the end of World War II. Whereas the Soviet Union had to change the underlying balance to enjoy a securely favorable correlation of forces, the United States had only to preserve that balance or at most develop its potential. Nevertheless, Soviet open intention and apparent capability to alter that initial balance would have made it imperative even for an originally defensive United States to attempt to alter the situation further in its favor.

AMERICAN COLD WAR aims appeared negative or defensive also because of our explicit emphasis on containment, on preventing or thwarting acts of aggression or subversion, and our public aversion to committing such acts ourselves. The Soviet Union was much more comfortable with openly calling for and assisting changes of regime in other countries.

The United States, however, remains explicitly founded on universal principles of human equality, individual rights, government by consent, and the right of peoples to alter or abolish their governments when destructive of these ends. This founding has always made the United States a revolutionary power with positive, potentially global, aims, albeit ones that limit the means of their own actualization by dictating respect for the consent of other peoples. American statesmen from the start have urged the American people to consider the effects of their conduct and example on the fate of the whole human race (*Federalist* No. 1 and No. 14); they have sought to recommend our form of government to the esteem and adoption of mankind (No. 10); and they have hoped to vindicate the honor of the human race by teaching moderation to powers that extend their dominion by force and fraud (No. 11).

The myth of early American "isolationism" obscures the unlimited or revolutionary aims that were pursued by limited and prudent means and on the basis of meager and precarious resources. Universal principles were understood by early American statesmen to require prudence for their application. The need for circumstantial judgments of costs, dangers, and opportunities, for sober attention to the facts of power and geography, did not detract, however, from their sense of the universality of the principles animating American foreign and domestic policy. Despite our growing distance from the revolutionary past, our lengthening experience with post-revolutionary dictatorship, and our increasing stakes in the stability of the status quo, many Americans have retained a propensity to welcome and support revolutions, from those against the French ancien régime and the Spanish-American empire even to those against Batista, the Shah, and Somoza.

The doctrines of the Cold War therefore moved with an historic logic from the Truman Doctrine's policy of supporting free peoples resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures to the Reagan Doctrine's policy of active support for resistance forces fighting communist tyranny. The tendency of negative or defensive formulations of American Cold War aims to become positive or offensive could already be seen in NSC 68, the most comprehensive statement of American objectives in our competition with the Soviet Union. That document (prepared in February and March 1950 by an inter-departmental study group headed by Paul Nitze, then director of the Policy Planning Staff, and approved by Truman on September 30, 1950) insisted, in accordance with a liberalism emphasizing tolerance and diversity, that "in relations between nations, the prime reliance of the free society is on the strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all

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societies into conformity with it."[1] This contrasted with NSC 68's account of the fundamental design of the Kremlin's oligarchy to subvert or destroy the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world. It was this implacable purpose which was supposed to have placed the two great powers at opposite poles and to have given their polarization the quality of crisis. This contrast between offensive Soviet aims and non-offensive American aims, however, was paradoxically derived from an opposite contrast: The idea of freedom—"the most contagious idea in history"—is "peculiarly and intolerably subversive of the idea of slavery" whereas "the converse is not true." For NSC 68, it was the intrinsically offensive or subversive character of the American idea of freedom that made that idea "a permanent and continuous threat" to the foundations of Soviet society and that lay at the root of Soviet expansion. Thus ultimately it seemed to be the subversive character of American freedom that indirectly compelled the United States, despite our supposedly lacking a felt need to bring other societies into conformity with us, to adopt as an official aim "to foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system," albeit in the first place by negatively frustrating the design of the Soviet Union. So intimately connected were negative and positive formulations of American objectives.

The Cold War was not the first time that the United States revealed a tendency to think of its existence, success, and power as a threat subversive of despotism elsewhere and to expect to be so perceived by both despots and their subjects. In the era of the Holy Alliance, Americans also expected powerful despotic societies to regard us as a threat and therefore to become a threat to us by seeking to eliminate our dangerous example. It would almost be an insult if such societies did not so regard us and validate our self-understanding. With greater power and vulnerability than in earlier eras, the American superpower could aim to eliminate powerful despotisms before they could eliminate us.

If the Soviet Union should now or at some point in the near future be regarded "essentially as another great power like other great powers," as George Kennan recently recommended, it does not necessarily follow that the *United States* should be regarded essentially as another great power like other great powers.[2] It would no longer be one of two superpowers animated by antagonistic universal principles and its behavior would alter accordingly. Countering the Soviet threat would no longer be the central purpose of its foreign policy, but fulfilling the American promise could then become that central purpose.

REMAINING FAITHFUL to the positive and global character of American objectives after the Cold War should not involve doctrinaire crusading or reckless disregard for the value of American resources, the costs and risks of particular policies, and the choices of other peoples. Even and perhaps especially an unprecedented opportunity for world leadership would require prudence for its safe and successful exercise. Still we should not, for example, regard the relative rise in power of our allies as cancelling the relative decline of our antagonist. It implies only that we must often claim the fruits of victory by exercising leadership rather than through unilateral action, just as we often must do so through formal or informal agreement with a retreating antagonist. Precisely the universality of our inspiration should make it easy to share a victory that can be understood at least as

[1] NSC 68 in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, ed., *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 387–89.

[2] George F. Kennan, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations: Overview*, April 4, 1989, as quoted by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *The National Interest*, No. 16 (Summer 1989), p. 32.

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much as that of the peoples of the Soviet empire as it is of all those who have followed our lead.

For the United States to become essentially another great power like other great powers, presumably focusing exclusively on its own economic and security interests, it would have to lose its dedication to its universal founding principles much as the Soviet Union seems to be doing with Marxism-Leninism. Such a conversion from universalism to particularism is not imminent, but neither is it inconceivable. Diverse segments of our intellectual and academic opinion-makers seek to generate or at least would welcome such a transformation, whether for reasons of foreign or domestic policy or from theoretical perspectives that hold our claim to rational universalism to be only the most domineering irrational particularism.

The prospect of shedding our universalist claims and superpower responsibilities tempts us with a relaxing concentration on our domestic comforts and corruptions. But the Soviet example suggests troubling dimensions of that prospect. Losing the universalist convictions that held it together may bring the disintegration of such an entity into its particularist ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractions. In the American case, those fractions do not coincide with our federated governments and neither pose the secessionist dangers nor generate the countervailing centralism that mark the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If the United States were to abandon the univeralist principles of its founding, it could not easily become an ordinary, tribal country constituted by blood, language, and religion, as Russia could perhaps revert to a Pan-Slavic Orthodox empire. But the United States could in the absence of such principles become a cacophony of contending ethnic, linguist, and religious groups—blacks, hispanics, and Christian fundamentalists among others. And on the level of international relations, while it is difficult to wax nostalgic over the order and stability brought to certain regions by the waning superpower role of the Soviet Union, it is easy to foresee anarchic dangers incident to any American retreat from leadership.

The fulfillment of the list of hypothetical conditions at the start of this essay may well postpone indefinitely the stark alternative posed here. Meanwhile, elements of competition with the Soviet Union are likely to accompany either alternative. Soviet military power is likely to constrain either American victory or American withdrawal, just as it constrained containment, with the imperative to avoid war between the superpowers. While doing our best to navigate a complicated and contradictory period of transition, it should nonetheless be helpful to contemplate the ultimate alternatives.

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

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Poland: Life in an Abnormal Country

Martin Krygier

IN THE PAST few months, long-voiceless peoples in Central and Eastern Europe have, as the Poles say, reclaimed ownership over their throats. Like victory in war, this is rightly a reason for joy; indeed elation. But as at the end of a war, these societies now face new and harsh challenges.

Of no country is this more true than Poland, where the process began and where it has progressed farthest. The war the Poles won was protracted and their victory momentous. Yet the damage has been great, casualties considerable, and the task of reconstruction has only begun. It is not an easy task.

Poland, as any Pole will tell you, is not a normal country. The Polish economy is a surreal shambles; everyday life is hard, drab, and exhausting; queues are everywhere for everything; wages are low, prices high, and inflation galloping. Not only is life nasty, horrible, and brutish, but everything takes such a long time. And the whole country needs a coat of paint.

In outline these facts are well known. Countless newspaper articles inform Westerners that Polish shelves are usually empty, that what little is on them is rarely attractive or appetizing, and that nevertheless people queue for it. Even a brief visit is enough to expose one to the shabby peeling monochrome of Polish cities; the huge and dilapidated housing estates at the edges of town; the random operations of hot water and phones; the absurd joke in the title of Warsaw's Hotel Grand; the tiredness, and at times hopelessness, of the best and—perhaps more surprising—the worst of the people one meets. And these obvious facts have contexts, consequences, and social meanings which are less familiar—indeed astonishingly hard to imagine—outside Poland; in normal countries. All Poles, on the other hand, are experts on them. Yet their expertise is rarely articulated, and Poles find it frustrating to try and explain to foreigners. Where to start?

Let us try to imagine how and how long the inhabitant of a normal country, deposited in Poland with just the local median salary to live on, might survive. Let him be an academic, since I am one and know them best, and let us be generous and not schedule his visit for winter. How, in other words, would a *normal* person negotiate Polish reality on a Polish salary? First he would find that salary pitifully small. An American colleague, for example, is shortly going to lecture in Poland for three months. He is to be paid fifteen dollars a day, the equivalent of a full professor's monthly salary. While dollar equivalents are not the whole story, they are not irrelevant to our visitor's problems. If he

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wanted virtually anything foreign or anything good—salami, coffee, chocolate, electrical goods, often even vodka—he would need dollars to pay at hard currency shops (*pewex*), for he would get these goods nowhere else. If he needed foreign books: dollars again. If he stayed in a hotel, he would have to pay in dollars or pay at the official rate of exchange, which is vastly (in mid-1989 some seven times) more than the state-acknowledged and exchanged free-market rate. If he needed and knew how to bribe, he would need dollars. If he had anything left to save, it would be pointless to leave it in zlotys with inflation running at several hundred percent. He should do as countless Poles do and change it whenever possible into green gold, even at a bad rate, because the currency will catch up. If he enjoyed the life so much that he wanted to stay and buy an apartment, he would have to become a zloty multimillionaire—and pay in dollars.

If, for a treat, he were allowed to revert to his Western salary, without any additional income or capital, he would immediately become a local millionaire. That would make life easier, of course, but he might find his newfound wealth frustrating and not always pleasant. Frustrating, for if awesome wealth was a new experience for him, the difficulty of finding something to spend it on might dull some of its lustre. Worse still, he might become afflicted by the feeling that he had done *nothing* to deserve his instant wealth. Spending time with people he admired, perhaps some whom he loved, he might feel the awful injustice of his easy profligacy and their practiced care. Seeking to be generous, he might just demonstrate himself as vulgar.

But let us return our visitor to Polish conditions. If he has found somewhere to stay, for he cannot now afford a hotel, and if he has bought what he can, he will have little to show for it, no money left, and not much time to spare. Let us hope that he has the patience of Methuselah or 38 million Poles, for otherwise he will not eat meat for a long time. If he wants to make a local call, he will find the experience excruciating; an international one, unbearable. For the latter, one can wait days. Most Westerners in Poland find routine queueing intolerable after the first hour's novelty wears off. Poles too find the endlessness of everyday waiting infuriating and enervating, but it must be endured—particularly if they have children.

What if something breaks in our visitor's apartment—his washing machine, stove, or toilet? Our visitor is unlikely to be the Renaissance figure found in every Polish academic family: the scholarly repairer of stoves, the beautiful and sophisticated expert on toilets. Naively he might think of going to a nearby shop and buying a replacement part; or calling—perhaps even complaining to—the manufacturer's representative. He should not voice those thoughts, lest his friends find him uproariously comical.

Imagine his surprise, then, when eventually he visits friends, academics earning the same salary as he, for a party. He may well be bewildered to find delicacies, even kinds of meat, which he has never seen in any shop. His hosts might have second jobs, relatives in the West, or have recently been on a fellowship not a cent of which would have been squandered. Or they may have had something that they were able to sell abroad, like the streams of Poles who never visit West Germany empty-handed and hope either not to return or at least to return with hard currency. (One sage drunk stopped me in the street a few months ago thinking I was a Pole who, because of my camera, must have been in Germany. "Earn there, spend here," he advised repeatedly. "But, whatever you do, don't get it mixed up!") Whether they have any of these necessary luxuries, they will all know a great deal that he doesn't: the Byzantine operations, known affectionately as *zalatwianie spraw*.[1] Since the regular, public

[1]In Polish this phrase, translated literally, means "arranging matters," or "settling things." Neither of these, however, conveys anything of the layers of common social understanding contained in the Polish. This is a concept with a host of familiar social practices encoded and

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sources of supply are so impoverished, what Poles have that the outsider lacks is a vast array of talents and networks for finding things and fixing things. These skills can be impressive, but they are only developed because normality has broken down, and they don't come cheap, either in time or effort.

Think what *everyone* needs to know in Poland before he or she can deal with anything else. What pervasive training and experience in the maintenance of skills that are useless in normal societies, indispensable there. And the time. The endless string of procedures necessary to prepare the ground, exploit opportunities, stock up reserves—toilet paper, matches, flour, sugar, and other scarce luxuries—find replacements, think of alternatives, make do. The cultivation of contacts; the maintenance of reciprocities; the courting of useful beings. The searching and searching for sources of supply. And still the hours waiting for bread, meat, sugar, flour, petrol; the months for electric appliances or furniture; the years upon years for apartments. And then the many things which cannot be gotten, however long one waits.

A colleague has a child with asthma. The child was required to have twenty weekly injections. But medical supplies are catastrophic in Poland. Among countless other deficiencies it is very difficult to get single-use syringes, and impossible to rely on them being there twenty weeks in a row. The solution? Bribe a nurse (with a packet of coffee) and get the syringes in advance. My colleague had been in Britain on a fellowship for three months. He lived hard there, to be able to save the princely sum of £150. This treasure was laid aside for other necessities to do with his child.

So on special occasions, for special purposes, remarkable things can be done in Poland, in ordinary life as in politics. Our visitor will likely be struck by some qualities of character that the hardship often elicits. On the one hand, one can see a sort of demeaning adjustment to the necessities of material success by those who aspire to be dollar, or at least zloty, rich. This has a hucksterish sleaziness to it, of which many Poles are ashamed. On the other hand, he will find among an extraordinary number of colleagues a level of serious, admirable *engagement* with matters of consequence which is hard to find in more pampered circumstances. Fewer top-of-the-line specialists, perhaps; many more truly engaged intellectuals who, unlike himself and most of his peers, have been genuinely tested.

In ways that no one is likely to have planned or wanted, Poland has come to instantiate some of Marx's better known prophecies. This is not a common view in the West. Often it is argued that contemporary communist states are travesties of Marxism, or at least that—whatever the consequences of his thought—Marx never envisaged or advocated anything like them. Yet credit where credit is due.

MARX LOATHED the alienating power of money over human lives. If one restricts oneself to Polish money, that problem has been solved: the currency is worthless. In *The Critique of the Gotha Program*, he looked forward to a time when "the narrow horizon of bourgeois right" would be "left behind," and so it has been. Far behind. He prophesied what Engels called the "withering away" of state and law, and notwithstanding the best efforts of the Polish United Workers' party, that almost occurred before their resignation from (some of) the commanding political heights.

Above all, recall Marx on the division of labor. As he and Engels famously explained in *The German Ideology*:

> as soon as the distribution of labor comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want

signalled. For a well-informed and accessible attempt to evoke some of these layers, see Janine Wedel, "The Private Poland," *Facts on File*, New York, 1986.

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> to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have in mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.

Polish communism not only makes it possible to do "one thing today and another tomorrow," it makes it necessary. Poles are hunting for something or other much of every day; they fish rarely, it is true—for the major rivers are dead (and their water, and thus tapwater, undrinkable), poisoned by industrial waste—but they criticize all the time. And they exercise a variety of other finely-honed talents—their genius for repair, for example—which Marx doesn't mention.

In sum, this is an industrial society which, perhaps for the first time in modern history, has managed to transcend the division of labor. It has produced a nation of Renaissance men, and especially women, who can make something out of nothing and commonly have to. It has achieved what Marx predicted would occur "in a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of individuals under division of labor, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labor, has vanished." These are achievements too rarely noticed or applauded by Marxists. The one small thing remaining is for society to "inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!" But where to buy banners?

The Depth of the Crisis

IN THE FIRST years of martial law in Poland, the following joke was popular. It was also plausible. A man is running through the street distributing leaflets. He is chased and eventually caught by the *milicja*, the much reviled police. A milicjaman notices that the leaflets are quite blank, and demands to know why nothing is written on them. The offender replies, "Writing? Who needs writing? Everything's obvious."

And so it often appeared. It was obvious who the bad guys were, obvious who were the good guys, obvious whom to oppose, whom to support. Of course it was never quite that simple. Difficult moral and prudential choices abounded, and some people handled them better, more admirably or sensitively, than others. Still it was obvious who had responsibility for what was going on and going wrong in Poland, and obvious that whatever the good guys did or didn't do, they were spared that responsibility. It is different today.

The new leaders of Poland have been handed a poisoned chalice. Both its donors and its recipients are well aware of that. That knowledge presumably consoled the former in their defeat and disgrace. And the latter accepted, knowing well the conditions under which they had gained power—or at least responsibility, because the military, police, transport, and communications (no small combination) are still kept from them. How will it turn out?

The short answer is that nobody knows. That may always have been so in fact, since there is much in Poland's recent past that no one predicted—from the birth of Solidarity to the imposition of martial law to the holding of semi-democratic elections. Few Poles now venture confident predictions. How could anyone be confident, given not merely the scale of Poland's problems but also the extent to which any paths could be redirected and any particular solutions scuttled by decisive factors beyond the control of all the relevant Polish players?

For assorted reasons—genealogical, political, personal—Poland has come to mean more to me than any other foreign country.[2] But my interest is purely that of an *amateur*, though in the full meaning of that word. So I

[2] I have said something about these reasons in "In Occupied Poland," *Commentary*, March 1986.

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shall merely try to suggest some elements of the mosaic which is forming but which might at any moment be shattered.

First and most obvious is the simple depth of the Polish economic crisis. Where are the experts who can confidently say how to climb out of it? Obviously freeing-up markets is necessary, and apart from the hardest *beton* (concrete) in the Party, who lack any social influence, everyone agrees. But while everyone favors a free market, different people understand the concept in different ways. The last ruling Communist prime minister, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, favored "enfranchisement of the *nomenklatura*," that is, allowing the Party-appointed and anointed managers of state enterprises the legal right to operate privately on the side in various ways, often using state assets. Such stratagems reek of corruption, *nomenklatura* nepotism, and a rigged playing field, but perhaps they might get *someone* interested in the success of the enterprise. The present government is unlikely to manifest much enthusiasm for such cozy Communist devices, however.

Free-market liberals, recently enthused by the Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, favor radical freeing-up of the market. But in an economy driven into the ground by state monopolies, some Polish skeptics ask, "What market?" Fast and massive deregulation will certainly cause a lot of social distress; more limited measures already have. Who will keep the lid on and how tight? Social democrats want social guarantees. But to whom and with what? Whatever distress is caused and whatever mistakes are made there are populists on the left of Solidarity and pseudo-populists in the Party, including the Party unions, ready to exploit them.

Poland's problems are political as well as economic. An obvious one is that Solidarity must rely for its survival as a government on two parties which until this year have been independent of the Communist party only in name—the United Peasants' party and the Democratic party, who prostituted themselves for many years.

The Communist party itself is more adept in taking power than in sharing it, but at the moment it has to settle reluctantly for the latter. There will be many Party members keen to make this unnatural situation short-lived. Shortly before the resignation of the Communist prime minister, General Kiszczak, I asked a distinguished and experienced sociologist whether he thought a Pinochet-style coup—which some people were predicting—was likely. He replied that the possibility could not be excluded: "There is only one decisive argument against it, and that is a bad one. It is that with our experience no one could be fool enough to think that a coup would solve anything. Of course that's true, but it's a bad argument."

STILL my own guess is that the Party is not at the moment a direct and positive threat. It has, after all, lost—lost even the power to intimidate—as a result of every repressive move (such as the murder of the Solidarity martyr, Father Popieluszko) since the imposition of martial law. It will spoil, it will thwart, and it will oppose, but I doubt that it will seek or be able to topple the existing regime—at least for a while.

The Party is now a completely demoralized ragtag collection of factions, often covering—indeed mimicking—much of the natural political spectrum. It has even become fashionable for some Party members to call themselves social democrats, and the Party includes some leading Hayekians. General Jaruzelski has said—and I suspect that he might mean it—that a one-party state is a thing of the past. Since the Party is composed largely of careerists, many of these are likely to see some advantage in appearing decent since indecency hasn't worked. It might become habit-forming. Even if it doesn't, that is less relevant now. The Party is a sinking ship and the rats are leaving.

But other political problems remain and they lie deep. Paradoxically, in this most highly-politicized of countries, there are few people with any experience of normal politics. As one political scientist stressed to me, Poland lacks Western-style political elites

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sustained by well-established political traditions, practices, and procedures of parliamentary politics. One might add that what traditions existed—anti-Semitism apart—have been deliberately extirpated over the last forty years. The Party has sought—fruitlessly as it turned out—to suppress all possibility of politics. It had short-term successes in maintaining what the sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis has called a "state without politics," at ruinous cost to the country. The Party has no skill in running a government, that is plain; and in its only real political contest it was not merely comprehensively trounced but appeared unable even to play the game. The Party used to have at least what Trotsky called "corridor skills"; but these have failed. To what extent they will be enlisted to spoil the chances or exploit the weaknesses of the new government remains to be seen.

Solidarity, on the other hand, is extraordinary. Larger-than-life people involved in larger-than-life events, and remaining clean in the process. Heroic is not too strong a word for their achievements, for their leaders, and for many of their rank-and-file members. Courage was a major currency of the movement and it has paid off spectacularly. One of the brilliant election posters, conceived almost overnight, was not really exaggerating when it had a very large and familiar film shot of Gary Cooper in mid-purposeful stride. Above his head and in smaller format on his badge was *Solidarnosc*. In his gun hand, *Wybory* (elections). At the base of the poster: High Noon 4 June 1989.

What might have helped, however, as things have turned out, is some experience of normal, pragmatic, unheroic politics. But there has not been much room for that and not much of it around. Everything about Solidarity is abnormal, unpredicted. It sprang up, not exactly out of nowhere but where such a growth had never before occurred. It animated a nation to an extent no one imagined and its opponents clearly did not understand. It was beheaded in the one move—auto-invasion—that no one but its perpetrators predicted; beheaded, it seemed, cleanly and comprehensively. But the head re-grew, others were added, and, after a hard and testing period, their jailers and would-be executioners were forced to talk to them, campaign against them, and, at least provisionally, concede defeat to them. And what a defeat! The size of Solidarity's election victory shocked everyone, not least the leaders of Solidarity themselves. They agreed to contest merely 35 percent of seats in the Polish lower house, the *Sejm*, and all the upper house seats, with four years—presumably learning years—before a decisive contest for power. As David Warszawski, a leading Solidarity journalist, put it:

> In a normal country, people go into politics to win power. We went into politics with the goal of becoming only an opposition, legalized and recognized as able to influence and criticize. Perhaps our grandchildren might take over, but nobody among us thought that we ourselves would do it.[3]

Solidarity's victory was so crushing, however, and the Party's humiliation and subsequent disarray so complete that they have now been propelled to run the first free post-Communist government.

Amazing and grand as this triumphal progress has been, it has not been a lesson in normal politics. It has all happened very, very fast and it has not come without price. It is not just that Solidarity has not tasted government before; after all, that is true of many political oppositions. It has had scarcely *any* experience of pragmatic, day-to-day politics, or large-scale administration; it has had no time to learn, and there is no institutional and cultural infrastructure of normal polities around to rely on or learn from. It will have to be a case of learning on the job.

And who will learn? The top leadership of Solidarity—like Walesa, Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and other leading figures such as Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik,

[3] *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 1, 1989.

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and Bronislaw Geremek—are men of outstanding caliber, morally, intellectually, politically. But my friends from Solidarity worry about the unpreparedness of many in what now is the governing party.

First, they say, since no one expected the sort of election victory that ensued, and since Solidarity was so much a moral movement anyway, meritocratic criteria were rarely uppermost in deciding who would stand and, as it turned out, win. Mietek was strong in the underground, Waldek didn't break under questioning, Piotr doesn't lie (I use fictional names). My friends, of course, admire each of these qualities and know how much it has often cost to display them. They fear, however, that such traits will not readily equip their possessors for what lies ahead.

And precisely what sort of movement is Solidarity? It began as a trade union, and speaking for the workers remains an important part of its present role. Quickly it came to voice increasingly political and universal demands. Clearly it was not merely a union, but at the height of its popularity (in 1981) representative of the nation, a nation which—like Isaiah Berlin's hedgehog—knew one big thing: it hated Communists. It was a movement of opposition. Whatever else divided its members, opposition to the government united them. But that, as it were, is no longer interesting. It is now the government.

AS THAT MOMENT approached it became clear that Solidarity had no clear program of reform, particularly economic reform, and that what programs it did have did not all point in the same direction. I was in Poland until the day the former minister of the interior gave up trying to form a government. It was already clear that he would ultimately fail, but it was not clear when or with what consequences. At that stage it was also clear that there was no clear conception within Solidarity of what its role should be. Many people predicted that it would, or argued that it should, split into several normal program- and orientation-based parties, reflecting political differences that hitherto had been sheltered under the great opposition umbrella but were real and marked: populists, social democrats, free-market liberals, Christian democrats. Such parties might have been ready to contest the first truly free elections, scheduled for 1993. But again Poland has been deprived of the time to develop normally. More subtle fears were expressed: that, after all, Solidarity too was a child of the communist system, and what it had not learned from that system it learned from the imperatives of conspiratorial opposition. People complain of "Bolshevik methods," no compliment in People's Poland. The leaders nominated candidates, perhaps inevitable given the short time before the election. But there were also complaints that the leadership had moved with unseemly haste to cut off rivals. It did everything to make the election a choice between its candidates and the Party, and in the campaign advocated that voters for Solidarity cancel not only Party candidates but also independent non-Solidarity candidates. When it became clear that the newly-created Citizens' Committees had done an extraordinary job in the election campaign by tapping roots with which Solidarity had lost touch, the National Executive Committee of the union resolved that the regional committees be disbanded. This demand was much resented and is unlikely to be followed.

Walesa also has caused resentment by his unilateral decision to demand government for Solidarity now. One senses that the leaders of Solidarity have little time for and no experience of the procedural preconditions of normal and civilized politics. As a friend close to the Solidarity leadership put it: "I'd be less worried if someone around here was concerned to have a House Ethics Committee; but no one is."

I don't want to exaggerate these purported deficiencies. Compared to its Communist opponents, Solidarity has been a model of democracy, liberality, and intelligence in conditions which have put each of these qualities to stern tests. Indeed, I don't know, and can hardly conceive, of another move-

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ment that could come from where Solidarity has come, survive the conditions it has survived, surmount the obstacles that have been continually and deliberately put in its way, and yet show the restraint and grace in dealing with its erstwhile tormentors and the courage in assuming its terrifying responsibilities that Solidarity has shown.

Prime Minister Mazowiecki is a man of honesty, depth, and courage. He also has powerful support from the church, which would have been uncomfortable with some of the other prominent figures from the lay Left in Solidarity. Though the attentions of a friend like Cardinal Glemp are a mixed blessing—both morally and intellectually—the support of the church is crucial. Moreover the new government also has the support of Walesa and the Solidarity unions, and that will be important in the hard times to come. It also has two other key advantages. First, it can draw on an immeasurably larger and better pool of talent than its predecessors. For a very long time the *nomenklatura* has been filled by "negative selection": bad people were chosen and good ones refused to serve. That is likely to change dramatically. Second, this government is truly committed to the transformation of a failed system. Its predecessors were committed to its maintenance, and they even failed in doing that.

THESE ADVANTAGES are of incalculable importance. And all of them, and more, will be necessary to cope successfully with the problems Poland faces. One Solidarity activist explained a key problem to me this way, with rather effective oversimplification: "Everyone knows *what* needs to be done. There is a little disagreement over *how* to do it. But there is no agreement at all about *who* should be asked to bear the pain and dislocation that will necessarily be involved. Once we get down to that, agreement falls apart and contingent factors will decide." "Contingent factors" is a euphemism for the balance of forces.

Poland is an ethnically homogeneous society since the Holocaust. But it is not socially homogeneous. Workers' interests are not the same as those of peasants nor of those whose jobs are threatened by reforms; there are millionaires who are expert in milking the existing system, parasites who live off it, paupers who do not, and many who might join or replace the millionaires and parasites if the system allowed them to. There are those in failing industries and those who could prosper if the vast, ramshackle state apparatus could somehow be made to let them breathe. And there are huge *organizations*—the Party, the administration, Solidarity itself, and the extraordinarily influential, if ineptly led, Polish Catholic church—which will demand a slice of the action, and seek to protect their own.

And responsible for carrying out whatever is decided, of course, are the *nomenklatura*, the million or so government servants who owe their jobs to Party approval. The government not only has to look to the future, it also has constantly to watch its back and check the till. If its policies are likely to benefit the health of the nation, they are unlikely to do wonders for the people charged with carrying them out. And these are people not notorious for altruism.

And what of the patient? Ultimately, whatever happens in government, it is Polish society which will register the results, as the Poles say, on their skins. Their skins are tired, stretched, bruised, and sore. And the soreness is not merely physical, it is spiritual. Slovenliness, apathy, and amorality have come to characterize so many areas of productive and distributive work. A Polish shop display—at least in state shops—is close to being an oxymoron. The stuff is usually of low quality, and while many need to buy, no one has much interest in selling. Or look at any public building under construction: the gaping holes between brick and wood, the rubbish or bits of brick stuffed carelessly to plug gaps, the mortar which oozes messily like some sort of congealed pus in every direction but vertical or horizontal. Pilfering is standard practice in dairies, bakeries, building sites, perhaps everywhere but ship-

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yards. While one cannot be other than impressionistic about such things, there are worrying signs of civilizational decay, rot. There is hope in the simple fact that private shops and privately-funded buildings (or church buildings) look different. But not all habits will disappear at once.

Finally, many Poles are very demoralized and depressed. I left, as I have mentioned, before the appointment of the new Solidarity-led government, and it may be—must be—that that, and recent changes elsewhere in the bloc, gave an important lift to morale. But so did the election victory, the round-table discussions between the government and Solidarity before that, and the remarkable televised debate between Walesa and the leader of the Party unions, which Walesa won in dazzling fashion. But given the underlying economic and social conditions, such lifts are a wasting asset. Their consequences had largely evaporated by July, notwithstanding what momentous political events were still occurring daily and that people knew that they were.

What is true and unique about the present moment is that, for the first time in forty years, the Poles have a leadership whose intentions they have reason to trust. That must count for a great deal. Moreover the events of the last ten years have shown that the Poles have the capacity to rally to causes in which they have faith. Nevertheless, euphoria is harder than most things to sustain in Polish conditions. It should be remembered that, notwithstanding the epochal significance of the June elections, a significant 38 percent of potential voters voted for no one. Unless the new government has some quick and evident successes which people can feel, morale will dissipate quickly.

Of course people differ in their reaction to hard times. Some are optimists by character or vocation; some maintain ironic detachment from the realities of everyday life; some are absorbed in politics, and in Poland that is quite something to be absorbed in. But many talented people have left the country, most of those who remain are drained and some are defeated. I have known plenty of sad people in normal countries; but before I visited Poland I had never known a society that was sad.

Whither Poland?

POLAND'S PROBLEMS, then, are awesome. The new government has inherited a system which has destroyed the Polish economy and deeply wounded the society. There is no doubt that this government, unlike all its predecessors, is determined to transform that system. There is equally no doubt that will be extremely difficult to do successfully. And ultimately two key ingredients are simply out of the Poles's control. They cannot decide what the Russians will do, and they cannot decide what we will do.

Everyone in Poland is aware that the breathing space which they have received since 1985 is due to Gorbachev. Everyone knows too that if Gorbachev fails, their future is endangered. Finally everyone knows that there is a good chance that he will fail (and, though few people worry about this, were he *really* to succeed, that might also be uncomfortable in the long term). But there is nothing much—beyond tactful diplomacy—that they or we can do about that.

On the other hand, we can do something about our own response. In the West—though the full extent of Poland's problems are only dimly grasped by Western onlookers—there is general sympathy for the Poles, mixed with admiration for their courage. Both sentiments are justified but neither instructs us on what is to be done. For too long the Bush administration seemed tentative, cautious, and undecided about what and how much to commit to Poland's experiment with democratic reconstruction. It cannot be accused of over-generosity to date. There is concern in some government circles about the new government's capacity to survive. Well of course there is. Yet if this government fails, there won't be a better one.

Poland needs money, skills, infrastructure, which only the West can provide. It

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needs, to give an obvious but important example, a telephone system which allows international calls to be made without one having to give up a few days to do so: that is not merely a matter of convenience, but a precondition for substantial international connection and foreign investment. The country needs training in the development and maintenance of all sorts of microstructures—in civil society, in economic life and practice, in politics. The government also needs help in mitigating the social pain of necessary reforms. Otherwise this first attempt to build democracy from the ruins of communism will fail. And that would not be Poland's failure alone. It would be ours too.

Should Poland falter, the many and powerful forces—within Poland and nearby—who have been convinced all along that democracy and liberalization are only for fools, will be given heart—and perhaps their heads. If the Poles succeed, that will be a triumph. If they fail, that will be a tragedy. Of course they cannot rely on the West to succeed for them. But they will not succeed unaided. We can either determine to help them meaningfully now when they need help—and in the process do ourselves a favor—or we can temporize, wait for sure bets, and fail. That choice is ours.

Shortly after the French Revolution, the French philosopher Joseph de Maistre commented, "For a long time we did not fully understand the revolution of which we were witnesses; for a long time we treated it as an *event*. We were mistaken; it is an *epoch*." The same is true of the Russian Revolution. It has dominated this century. It has bequeathed a technology for seizing and maintaining power which has cost millions of lives and enslaved millions of people. It has reduced once-civilized countries to dilapidated ruins and has threatened still-civilized ones with the same. It may be that this epoch is coming to a close. It is in everyone's interest that it does.

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Will the Soviet Union Survive Until the Year 2000?

John B. Dunlop

MY TITLE, of course, is purloined from the late Andrei Amalrik's *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), a short book written during the spring of 1969. Amalrik, it will be recalled, saw the dismemberment of the Soviet Union occurring as a result of a protracted war between the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC). That conflict, he believed, would release pent-up nationalism in the minority republics which would eventually lead to their splitting off from the Russian Republic (RSFSR). A further effect of the war, according to Amalrik, would be that the "de-Sovietized" countries of Eastern Europe would gradually cast off the communist system, a development that would lead, among other results, to the eventual emergence of a united Germany with "a fairly pronounced anti-Soviet orientation."

Peering into the future, Amalrik was not sure whether the disbanding of the Soviet empire would take place convulsively or fairly smoothly. Power, he speculated, might pass into the hands of extremist elements in the republics which would then produce "anarchy, violence, and intense national hatred." But, "It is also possible that the [Soviet] 'middle class' will prove strong enough to keep control in its own hands. In that case the granting of independence to the various Soviet nationalities will come about peacefully, and some sort of federation will be created, similar to the British Commonwealth or the European Economic Community."

Of one thing Amalrik was certain: "I have no doubt," he wrote, "that this great Eastern Slav empire . . . has entered the last decades of its existence. Just as the adoption of Christianity postponed the fall of the Roman Empire but did not prevent its inevitable end, so Marxist doctrine has delayed the break-up of the Russian Empire . . . but it does not possess the power to prevent it."

We now have the benefit of hindsight. Though Amalrik's predicted war between the two communist giants did not take place, we should not let his failure to predict the future on this one point blind us to the perceptiveness of his insights into possible future political developments in the USSR. To be sure, the odds against this break up happening remain formidable. Since the Bolshevik coup of 1917, communist regimes have shown a remarkable ability to adapt to circumstances and to surmount crises. While authoritarian regimes have crumbled throughout the world—in Spain, Portugal, the Philippines, and now, apparently, in Chile and Paraguay—no Marxist-Leninist regime has yet

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evolved into a Western-style democracy. This is quite a track record, and one must respect it.

It is also clear that Gorbachev and his advisers have no intention of undermining or weakening the Marxist-Leninist legitimacy of the Soviet ideocracy. In fact, the principal aim of perestroika has been to relegitimize Marxism, to cast off outdated Stalinist and Brezhnevite accretions, and return the ideology to the wellsprings of the 1920s and the corrective reforms of the Khrushchev period. Writing in the September 1988 issue of *Encounter*, Milovan Djilas maintains that Gorbachev is a communist "true believer," much more of one than, say, the late Leonid Brezhnev. The purpose behind perestroika, glasnost, *demokratizatsiya*, and "new political thinking" has been to firm up the ideocracy, not destroy it.

Similarly, the intention behind Gorbachev's fostering of detente with the West has been to rescue and reinvigorate the Soviet economy. The Soviet Union needs a "breathing spell" of at least ten to fifteen years to modernize, computerize, and transform an extensive economy into an intensive one. The long-term health of the Soviet armed forces also depends on this modernization process, a point Gorbachev undoubtedly stresses to his generals. The whole system needs huge infusions of Western capital and technology in order to catch up with surging advances in the West. The role of the West, as Gorbachev sees it, is to underwrite the USSR's economic and social recovery. If this plan works, then some time fairly early in the next century the "correlation of forces" may once again shift in favor of the Soviet Union.

Like Khrushchev before him, Gorbachev has attempted to prop up the decaying official ideology of Marxism-Leninism by introducing market incentives into a controlled economy and by injecting elements of Western-style democracy into a one-party political system. In so doing, Gorbachev has followed a time-honored Soviet tradition. Lenin's New Economic Policy was a strategic "compromise with capitalism" which permitted the regime to recover from the economic and social depredations of War Communism. During the Second World War, Stalin mobilized the populace by appealing to Russian nationalist and Russian Orthodox sentiment. The flexible and always reversible coaptation of non-Marxist elements has been a major factor behind the regime's survival over the past seventy years.

While actively leavening Marxist-Leninist ideology with elements of the market and doses of political pluralism, Gorbachev has made it increasingly clear that as long as he remains in power Soviet socialism will not evolve into a market economy or Western-style democracy. As the economist L. Popkova, a radical Soviet reformer, put it in *Novy Mir* (No. 5, 1987): One cannot be slightly pregnant. Either one has a free, Western-style market or one does not. The Soviet Union does not, and Gorbachev does not want it. The same, Milovan Djilas asserts, holds true of democracy: "You either have democracy which means rule by the people and therefore unrestricted pluralism, or no democracy" (*Encounter*, November 1988). The Soviet Union does not, today, have democracy, and Gorbachev does not want it. Professional economists and political scientists will find these pronouncements too sweeping, but the thrust of Popkova's and Djilas's argument is nonetheless persuasive.

The Radical Reformers

GORBACHEV'S unwillingness to seriously consider systemic change has, over the past two years, created a widening gap between him and a group of radical reformers who believe that the Soviet Union's sclerotic economy and daunting social difficulties require radical surgery. The emergence of this group has enabled Gorbachev to portray himself as a sensible Marxist "centrist" fighting the good fight against "extremists" on the left and "conservatives" on the right. On the debit side, the ideas of the radical reformers exert a strong and growing appeal to Gorbachev's most vital constit-

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uency—the intelligentsia. Stressing the unique importance of the Soviet intelligentsia, Gorbachev has described it in his book *Perestroika* as "our great and, perhaps, unique achievement, our inestimable spiritual capital."

The thinking of the radical reformers is typified by the well-known Soviet publicist Anatoly Strelyani. At an October 1988 conference in Barcelona entitled "Where is Perestroika Going?", Strelyani delivered a paper called "Gradualness—An End in Itself?" (later published in the No. 6, 1988 issue of the emigré journal *Strana i Mir*). There, he asserts that the Soviet Union is in a "pre-crisis" condition similar to that observed over the past decade in Poland. To date, Gorbachev's reforms have been carried out "listlessly and superficially." "The condition of the economy," he notes, "is worsening, but it has not yet reached a stage in which reformers will be forced at least to repudiate command-style central planning, which is destructive by its very nature."

Truly radical reforms—"a single leap across the abyss"—and not small hesitant steps, he believes, are needed to resurrect the economy and the country. Glasnost, Strelyani warns, cannot be meted out in minuscule amounts as if it were itself a form of "deficit goods." The democratization of the country is a dynamic process; if the USSR ceases moving forward, it will inevitably move backwards, and a new period of Brezhnev-style "stagnation" will set in.

Fortunately, a "beneficial crisis" may be at hand. "The newspapers," Strelyani notes, "tell us of cases in which *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes* here and there have been secretly leaving the jurisdiction of the government department which directs the agro-industrial complex. There are also industrial plants which refuse to submit to their ministries. . . . " This "rebellion" represents, in Strelyani's view, the authentic creativity of the masses, and it is to be welcomed and applauded.

Looking about for a historical model for the USSR to emulate, Strelyani lights upon the Federal Republic of Germany. "In one of the manuscripts which cannot at present be published in our country," he writes, "I recently read an appeal for us to think seriously about the experience of countries in which a 'stagnant past' was overcome by methods and tempos other than those existing in our country." The author of the manuscript, a young economist, notes that West Germany, devastated by the Second World War, became "the locomotive of Europe" once it had broken forcefully with the ideology, politics, and system of totalitarian power. "The economic miracle of West Germany," he maintains, "was brought about by a decisive change in ideology and by the establishment of economic liberalism. . . . "

CONCLUDING HIS critique of the "gradualists," Strelyani notes that he is considered an extremist by many in the Soviet Union, and that the gradualists deem his views "not only mistaken but censorious, dangerous, and deserving punishment." However, it is his "extremist-marketeer" views, he stresses, which can rescue the country, not the timorous steps advocated by the gradualists (including, presumably, Gorbachev), steps which may in fact bring on the very crisis which they seek at all costs to avoid.

A market economy, a multi-party democracy, a free press—all of this is heady stuff. But how isolated a thinker is Strelyani? It turns out that he is not isolated at all. At the Barcelona conference, publicist Andrei Nuikin observed that "some people in the USSR" are now openly discussing the question of whether the Bolshevik Revolution had been necessary. And in another paper read at the conference, writer Ales Adamovich asserted that the main thing is to repudiate "messianism"—be it Islamic or communist messianism—and maintained that it was "anti-scientific" to hold that socialism would one day triumph over capitalism. It would, he maintained, be a bad thing if socialism triumphed.[1]

[1]On these two papers see Vladimir Tol'ts, "Stoilo li provodit' Oktyabr'skuyu Revoliutsiyu," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RS 105/88, November 10, 1988.

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Such sentiments have been finding their way into the official Soviet press with increasing frequency. Writing in the Leningrad journal *Neva* (No. 1, 1989), oil geologist Sergei Andreev maintains that the Communist party has ignored the interests of the Soviet public to become a powerful new class of managerial bureaucrats. Historically, he notes, the Party has not always served the real interests of the people, but the populace has had no constitutional mechanism by which it could "correct the party apparatus" once it has set out on a wrongful course. Referring to the present economic and social situation in the USSR, Andreev asserts that it is "precisely the party leadership which has brought the country to crisis and moral collapse." He believes that it is a mistake on Gorbachev's part to rule out the existence of opposition parties to compete with the Communist party. The spread of independent unions, popular fronts, and other political organizations is advocated as a way of weakening the Party's monopoly on power.

On one point Andreev is particularly adamant: The posts of Party general secretary and USSR president (both, of course, now occupied by Gorbachev) should not be held by the same man. He writes, "The whole of our history—Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev—teaches us that an excessive concentration of power leads to a restriction of democracy. . . . " The Soviet president, he contends, should be chosen by the entire citizenry through direct elections. Andreev also issues a stern warning to the Party leadership: "If today the people is not permitted to govern itself . . . then it will seize that right by force. . . . "

In a similar vein, writing in the journal *Nauka i Zhizn* (Science and Life, Nos. 11 and 12, 1988; Nos. 1 and 2, 1989), Aleksandr Tsipko of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System has suggested that "the phenomenon of Stalinism is actually a product of flaws in Marxist theory itself." He wonders whether it is actually possible to build democratic socialism on a non-market foundation. The struggle against the market, he notes, always results "in the violation of the rights and dignity of individuals, and in the creation of an omnipotent administrative and bureaucratic apparatus."

It seems clear that the ideas of the radical reformers point in the direction of an economic and political system essentially identical to those of the Western democracies. An implementation of these ideas would, therefore, spell the end of the Marxist-Leninist ideocracy in the Soviet Union and might set forces in motion which would gradually lead to other communist countries abandoning Marxism. For his part, Gorbachev strongly opposes these ideas, but his need for the support of the intelligentsia makes him hesitate to press for a crackdown on the reformers. Moreover, if the radical reformers were to go, his own like-minded supporters, such as Vitali Korotich, editor of *Ogonyok*, Yegor Yakovlev, editor of *Moscow News*, and Albert Belyaev, editor of *Sovetskaya Kultura*, might prove vulnerable to purge-minded Party conservatives.

Yeltsin and Afanasyev

THE VACUUM created by Gorbachev's principled refusal to move to the political Left has been filled by two vigorous and charismatic Soviet politicians: Boris Yeltsin, the former first secretary of the Moscow City Party Organization, and Yuri Afanasyev, a former member of the editorial board of the Party theoretical journal *Kommunist* and presently rector of the Moscow State Historical-Archive Institute. Both Yeltsin and Afanasyev were elected to the Congress of People's Deputies but were then denied membership in the standing parliament, the Supreme Soviet. After demonstrations were held in Moscow and complaints were received from throughout the USSR, Yeltsin was reluctantly given a seat in the Supreme Soviet.

In his election platform, Yeltsin argues that all state, political, and public organizations, including the Communist party, should be made legally accountable to the

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Congress of People's Deputies.[2] The Party should be subordinated to the democratically expressed will of the populace. The Soviet president, as well as all deputies and chairmen of soviets, should be chosen through direct, competitive elections via secret ballot. (In a discussion held at the Higher Komsomol School in Moscow in November 1988, Yeltsin estimated that if free, USSR-wide elections were held, he would stand a good chance of defeating Gorbachev for the position of Soviet president.)

Yeltsin's platform contends that, in view of the USSR's crushing economic problems, major reforms must be instituted immediately. The pressing needs of the populace have to be addressed directly and speedily: food, goods, services, housing. To free the funds necessary to deal with these needs, the exploration of space should be postponed for five to seven years and capital investment should be reduced by 40 percent.

As far as the minority republics are concerned, Yeltsin's platform asserts that they should be given "de facto economic, political, and cultural independence" to run their own affairs. When asked by a reporter from the Estonian newspaper *Sovetskaya Estonia* whether the interests of the USSR or those of the republics should come first, Yeltsin replied unequivocally that those of the republics were "primary."

Yeltsin's populist platform also assails the existence of special privileges and perquisites for the elite. All Soviet officials, he believes, should be required to live off their salaries only. On other occasions, he has criticized Gorbachev for having the state build him a new dacha in the Crimea.

During his visit to Stanford in the fall of 1988, Yuri Afanasyev stated his opinion that the numerous informal organizations which have sprung-up under perestroika, as well as a nationalities policy which encouraged a real federalism, might pave the way for the emergence of a multi-party political system in the Soviet Union. After he and a number of other radical reformers were excluded from membership in the standing Soviet parliament, Afanasyev warned that a "Stalinist-Brezhnevite Supreme Soviet" had been created and that the populace was certain to draw its conclusions.

On July 29 and 30 of this year, at a meeting held at the House of Cinematographers in Moscow, Yeltsin and Afanasyev joined 386 other deputies in forming an organization called the Inter-regional Group of Deputies. "The Inter-Regional Group," Yeltsin declared, "has united that segment of the deputies who are not satisfied with the tempos of perestroika, with half-way measures in politics and economics, as well as in the national question and the social sphere, measures which have brought the country almost to a crisis" (*Moskovskie Novosti*, No. 32, 1989). The five elected co-chairmen of the new organization are Yeltsin, Afanasyev, academician Andrei Sakharov, Estonian academician Victor Palm, and economist Gavriil Popov.

The first issue of the group's newspaper, *The People's Deputy*—issued without permission from the authorities—carried the new organization's program. According to a summary which appeared in the August 4, 1989 issue of the Russian emigré journal *Russkaya mysl*: "Put briefly, this is the program for the transition of the country from totalitarianism to democracy. In the economic sphere, the deputies propose to conduct a radical decentralization of state property and to ensure the economic independence of the republics and the regions. The market must become the main regulator of the economy." In the political sphere, the program advocates "the abolition of the Communist Party's monopoly on power," which would result in the political sovereignty of the elected soviets and "the right of citizens freely to form political, professional, and other organizations. . . . "

During his address to the new organization, Afanasyev said: "All of us have to screw up our courage and admit not only that

[2]For Yeltsin's platform see "Perestroika prineset peremeny," *Moskovskaya Pravda*, March 21, 1989, p. 2.

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socialism is deformed in our country but that, in its Marxist-Leninist pure form, it is incapable of development. We have to dismantle a Marxism-Leninism which calls us back to the nineteenth century while outdoors the twentieth century is coming to an end. . . . " These bold words were followed by a "prolonged ovation" on the part of the gathered deputies.

Turning his attention to the Soviet leader, Afanasyev then pronounced: "Gorbachev has difficulty in accepting the idea that he is no longer the sole leader of perestroika. Other forces are now filling that role: the Baltic states, the miners. . . . The time has passed when Gorbachev could be both the leader of perestroika and the leader of the *nomenklatura*. He has to choose" (*Atmoda*, August 21, 1989).

Gorbachev is aware that Yeltsin and Afanasyev constitute a political threat on his left. He presided over the removal of Yeltsin as head of the Moscow City Party Committee and has recently sharply criticized Afanasyev's view that there has never been socialism in the Soviet Union. An attempt was made, as we have seen, to keep them both out of the Supreme Soviet. The program embraced by Yeltsin and Afanasyev would likely take the USSR most, if not all, of the way toward a pluralist democracy.

A Surge in Popular Discontent

ON JUNE 14 I arrived in the Soviet Union for a 16-day visit, the main purpose of which was to sample popular attitudes toward the changes occurring in the country. It turned out to be a propitious time for such a visit, since the first session of the Congress of People's Deputies, held in late May and early June, had just concluded. The proceedings of the congress had been broadcast live—eight hours a day—on Soviet television and had been watched with rapt attention by a daily audience estimated at 200 million. In *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (June 21, 1989), Andrei Sakharov commented that the "televised debates attracted enormous attention and served further to politicize the populace."

Indeed, as I quickly discovered, the open and at times fiery debates at the congress had served to electrify the country. Glasnost had reached the level of the common people, the *narod*, who were no longer afraid to tell a Russian-speaking foreigner what they thought about Soviet politics. The August 4th issue of the newspaper *Vechernyaya Moskva* (Evening Moscow) published the results of a public opinion poll conducted in Moscow by the Institute of Sociology of the USSR Academy of Sciences during the period following the congress. The results of this poll fully confirm the impressions which I gained during my visit.

Fifty-two percent of those contacted by the poll wanted to strike down Article Six of the Soviet Constitution which terms the Communist party "the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system." Only 11 percent wanted to retain the article in its present language.

Sixty-nine percent of those polled believed that "in the past year the authority of the Party has begun to fall," while only 4 percent thought that it had "grown stronger."

Thirty-six percent wanted a transition to a multi-party political system, while only 10 percent were firm believers in the present one-party system. Forty-four percent said that they believed that "the number of parties does not by itself determine the level of democracy in the country."

Forty-six percent had a "positive" opinion of the newly-formed Inter-regional Group of People's Deputies. Another 17.5 percent admitted "in principle the possibility of creating such factions but do not consider them necessary." Only 13 percent were firmly against permitting "factions" to come into existence.

Forty-five percent of those polled thought that Gorbachev should "immediately" cease combining the posts of Soviet president and Party general secretary, while 43 percent said that he could combine the two, but only temporarily.

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The attitudes reflected in this poll indicate that the nine million citizens of the Soviet capital are moving rapidly in the direction of embracing political pluralism.

One cannot live solely on politics, and glasnost has inevitably focused popular attention upon the wretched conditions in which most Soviet citizens live. Writing in the No. 27, 1989 issue of *Argumenty i Fakty*—which has a circulation of over 22 million—economist A. Zaichenko described the present Soviet "social pyramid" in the following fashion: "the rich" comprise 2.3 percent of all Soviet families; the "middle class" make up 11.2 percent; while "the poor" comprise a whopping 86.5 percent of the total. As I discovered during my June visit, the legions of the Soviet "poor" were incensed by the deteriorating economic condition of the country, for which they blamed the Communist party. In Leningrad, sugar, tea, coffee, soap, and detergent were strictly rationed. In Moscow, only sugar was officially rationed, but Soviet beer, for example, was unavailable in even the best restaurants, and I was told that there were no refrigerators for purchase in the entire capital. My wife, a native speaker of Russian, visited the provincial city of Yaroslavl and found that tea, the national stimulant, was simply unavailable there; not rationed, just unavailable. In the Russian countryside, people were making do on a subsistence diet of eggs, potatoes, vegetables, and semi-decomposed fish. The Soviet press has carried numerous articles with titles like "Why Is There Not Enough Sugar?" (*Pravda*, August 12, 1989) and "Soap, Detergent, and Extraordinary Measures" (*Izvestiya*, September 8, 1989).

Given the charged political atmosphere in the country and the worsening economic position of the populace, the Soviet miners' strike, which erupted in July, represented the first of what may be many outbursts of popular discontent. How starved the people are for basic foodstuffs and commodities is conveyed by the agreement reached between the Western Siberian miners and the regime. According to the *New York Times* (July 21, 1989), the following items were to be made available for purchase in the shops of the coalfield region: 1,500 tons of soap; 6,500 tons of fresh meat; 5,000 tons of canned milk; 10,000 tons of sugar; and 5,000 tons of animal fat.

The economic situation is presently so volatile that few informed observers give Gorbachev much more than a year to effect dramatic improvements. The Soviet economist Nikolai Shmelyov predicted that in two years time the Soviet Union will have universal rationing. The prime minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov, has said that the USSR could not survive another strike like the July walkout by the coal miners, which cost the state three billion rubles. The recent Politburo shakeup, which was announced at the September Central Committee meeting, shows that Gorbachev is aware of how little time he has left to put the Soviet Union's economic house in order.

The Gravest Threat

IF THE RADICAL reformers represented Gorbachev's only problem, that would be serious enough. Unfortunately for him, there is a graver political threat: nationalism. In addition to raising expectations for market and political pluralism, glasnost has unleashed a remarkable surge of nationalism and religio-nationalism in the border republics and—most significantly—in the RSFSR itself. Powerful popular fronts have emerged, first, in the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, then, from May to September 1989, in Moldavia, Georgia, Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, and the Ukraine.

This development has been contrary to Gorbachev's wishes. His intention was that glasnost foster grass-roots informal organizations in the republics which would then champion the economic reforms associated with perestroika and assail his conservative opponents. The Baltic republics, which boast a well-educated and sophisticated intelligentsia, were deemed useful incubators for this

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experiment. Rather than pushing Gorbachev's reforms, however, the Balts have seized upon glasnost as a way to make known their ethnic, religious, cultural, and economic goals.

Future historians of the Gorbachev period will be struck by the path-breaking role played by the Estonians, the smallest major nationality in the USSR. It was the Estonians who were the first to bring back their national flag, the tricolor, and begin waving it at mass meetings. They were also the first to bring back their traditional national songs. In February 1988, the Estonians electrified the entire country by forming an Estonian Popular Front. By 1989 it had become clear that the Estonians desire full autonomy to run their own affairs: They want to regulate their economy, control migration into the republic, and protect the Estonian natural environment. Gorbachev has expressed astonishment at the Estonians's contention that they own the air, waters, forests, and coastlands of the republic. In his view, Estonia's resources belong to the USSR first and to Estonia second.

The extraordinary surge of nationalism in Estonia has helped spark the growth of nationalism throughout the Soviet Union. The effects have been particularly noteworthy in the neighboring republics of Latvia and Lithuania. In May of 1989, the popular fronts of the three Baltic states met in Tallinn and appealed to the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe for help in becoming independent nations "in a neutral and demilitarized zone of Europe." On this occasion, the national anthems of the three states were played publicly for the first time since 1940.

In July, the Supreme Soviet gave preliminary approval to a plan granting considerable economic autonomy to the Baltic republics, which would be given control over their budgets, tax policies, financial markets, and foreign trade. The following month however, the regime was forced to draw the line.

On August 22nd, a commission of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet declared that Lithuania's annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940 had been illegal. The following day an enormous "human chain across the Baltic," numbering perhaps a million demonstrators, was formed stretching from Vilnius to Tallinn. The protestors were marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet-Nazi Nonaggression Pact which contained secret protocols leading to the Soviet Union's absorption of the three Baltic states.

This mass separatist action proved to be too much for Gorbachev and the Politburo. The August 27th issue of *Pravda* carried a "Declaration of the Central Committee Concerning the Situation in the Soviet Baltic Republics" which sharply attacked the commission of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet for its August 22nd declaration and warned that "certain forces" were pushing a "separatist line" in the Baltic. The organizers of the "human chain" were said to have sought to create a "real nationalistic hysteria." It was noted that the demonstrators had carried slogans "filled with enmity toward the Soviet system, toward [ethnic] Russians, toward the Central Committee of the Soviet Union, and toward the Soviet army."

Gorbachev, who was directly involved in the *Pravda* statement, repeated the Party newspaper's stern warning in his speech to the September Central Committee meeting. A considerable degree of economic autonomy will be given to the republics, he said, but political independence—never. However, the regime's commitment even to such limited economic autonomy is called into question by the September 1989 elevation to full membership in the Politburo of Yuri Maslyukov, chairman of the State Planning Committee and a fierce opponent of increased economic independence for the republics.

It is significant that the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet reacted to Gorbachev's threats by resolving on September 23rd, by a vote of 274 to 0, to accept the August 22nd report of its commission, which asserted that the Baltic republics had been forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union. This act of defiance was followed by the publication in Lithuanian Com-

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munist party newspapers of a draft plan to declare the Lithuanian party separate from the Moscow-based Soviet Communist party.

How will Gorbachev and the regime react to such challenges? They have, of course, the option of sending in the troops. But as Peter Reddaway has noted recently in the *Washington Post Weekly Edition* (August 23-September 3, 1989), sending in the troops now entails as many risks for Gorbachev as not sending them in. "Not only does Gorbachev see [such a crackdown] as perhaps fatal to his whole reform program," he writes, "but it would probably also provoke further strikes and disorders in other regions." And this leads Reddaway to conclude: "The most likely prospect for the next year or two is an almost helpless drift toward anarchy, as the authority of government declines and social and ethnic groups go on pressing their claims."

Perhaps the single most important product of glasnost, however, has gone largely unnoticed in the West: the remarkable upsurge of nationalism and religio-nationalism in the Russian Republic. Since ethnic Russians constitute approximately half the Soviet population, their growing disaffection from the Soviet political system has potentially vast political consequences. In such nationalist-minded publications as *Nash Sovremennik* (Our Contemporary), *Moskva* (Moscow), *Molodaya Gvardiya* (Young Guard), and *Literaturnaya Rossiya* (Literary Russia), one encounters calls for the formation of a Russian Party Central Committee (the other Soviet republics have their own Party central committees while the RSFSR does not); for a Russian Academy of Sciences; for programs on Soviet radio and television which reflect the ethnic needs of Russians and of the minority peoples living in the RSFSR; and for a Russian large-format weekly. In *samizdat*, Russian nationalists are pushing for the opening of thousands of Orthodox churches as well as scores of monasteries and new seminaries.

In his speech to the Congress of People's Deputies, later published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (June 14, 1989), the well-known Russian nationalist writer Valentin Rasputin speculated that "perhaps it is Russia which should leave the [Soviet] Union. . . ." Another major nationalist, Vasili Belov, who also spoke at the Congress and whose speech was later published in *Izvestiya* (June 2, 1989), complained that "the unequal political position of the RSFSR in the union of our republics is becoming a source of Russophobia. Since the RSFSR lacks such important organs as a central committee, many state committees, and an academy of sciences, it is assumed that their functions are, as it were, performed by union-wide organs. Is this not the reason that the union-wide organs are perceived as Russian? Their mistakes and miscalculations, all the flaws of our system, are perceived as mistakes of the Russian people."

Responding to such criticism, the regime has agreed to grant the RSFSR some of the structures enjoyed by the other union republics—for example, an academy of sciences, an RSFSR *Komsomol* and trade union organization, a Russian MVD (the regular police)—but has firmly withheld others. There is to be no Russian KGB and no RSFSR Party central committee. Instead of a central committee the RSFSR is to be given a "bureau" or "secretariat" at the USSR Central Committee, the revival of a body which existed during Khrushchev's rule. The refusal to give the Russian republic its own central committee, writes Soviet journalist N. Voronina in the weekly *Literaturnaya Rossiya* (September 8, 1989), puts the RSFSR in the position of "a small boy in short pants."

THIS REMARKABLE growth of Russian nationalist sentiment appears, at least potentially, to be a mass phenomenon and is said to enjoy considerable support among the Soviet military. Interestingly, some of the tendency's adherents have gone on record as advocating the holding of USSR-wide and RSFSR-wide referenda to permit the Soviet populace to resolve the major political questions confronting it. In a

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trenchant *samizdat* article in the emigré journal *Vestnik R.Kh.D.* (Paris, No. 153, 1988), a self-professed Russian patriot, Mikhail Shiroky, has argued that, due to their strong cultural and religious differences, the Christian and Muslim peoples of the USSR should go their separate ways. Each republic, Shiroky writes, should decide its future by means of a referendum. Ethnic Russians should voluntarily withdraw from the border republics, which would then result in the Russian republic's having a population of approximately 150 million. (It should be noted that ethnic Russians are already in the process of withdrawing from the Central Asian republics.) Depending on the sentiments of present-day Ukrainians and Byelorussians, the RSFSR, according to Shiroky, would either go its own way, or form a free federation with its Eastern Slav brethren.

It is this surge in ethnic Russian particularism which, one suspects, may be the key to the future break-up of the Soviet empire. In *The Last Empire* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), Alain Besançon astutely noted that a Russian national state—as opposed to a Marxist-Leninist one—would be unable to hold the minority republics even if it wished to do so. "Once the ideological magic has been destroyed," he observes, "there would be only one source of magic left—the imperial or colonial legitimacy of the Russian people in a world that today is entirely decolonized. This anachronistic legitimacy would immediately stimulate the resistance of the non-Russian nations, who would call forth their own legitimacies, necessitating military occupation. The Russian people is not sufficiently populous for the task." Besançon foresees a forthcoming "implosion" of the Soviet empire, which, he believes, would be in the objective best interests of the Russian people itself. Solzhenitsyn, he recalls in a July 1987 article in *Encounter*, "observed that a post-Soviet Russia would have to permit the Ukraine to determine its own future. . . . [This] represents a break with Russian national thinking, and may well betoken a future Russian state that will be strong, at peace with itself and the world, but will not be an empire."

Referring to this process of decolonization, Milovan Djilas observes: "We are talking about the natural expiry of an unnatural and tyrannical regime which is bound to come, as surely as the British and French empires had to face their demise when the time was ripe." Released from its "burden of empire," Russia, he believes, will become a "self-confident, opened up, democratic Russian state" and ethnic Russians will become "a happier race."

But can this process occur bloodlessly? Paul Kennedy in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* reminds us that "none of the overtaxed, multinational empires. . . ever returned to their [sic] own ethnic base until they had been defeated in a Great Power war, or (as with Britain after 1945) were so weakened by war that an imperial withdrawal was politically unavoidable." The war with China predicted by Andrei Amalrik would doubtlessly have served Kennedy's purposes, but, one suspects, the nine-year embroilment in Afghanistan, which took at least fifteen thousand Soviet lives, as well as a severe toll on the "imperial self-confidence" of the Soviet military and the ruling Party elite, could serve as well. The retreat from Afghanistan may well be seen by future historians as the first step in the disintegration of the Soviet empire.

Four Soviet Futures

IT IS USEFUL to outline four possible futures for the Soviet Union as it enters the last decade of the twentieth century, and to consider what each of them would mean for the West.

If Gorbachev succeeds in holding onto power—and his chances of doing this have been significantly enhanced by his becoming the new president of the Congress of People's Deputies—then we can look for more of what we have been observing over the past two years: an offensive on detente with the West;

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detente with the PRC; and major initiatives in the area of arms control which would permit the Soviet Union (temporarily) to cut back its investment in military hardware. The aim behind this radical detente is to preserve the Marxist ideocracy and to turn the Soviet economy into one which can compete in the twenty-first century. If Gorbachev pulls this off, he will surely be counted as one of history's extraordinary leaders.

But Gorbachev may, instead, turn out to be a transitional leader. If he is demoted or ousted in the near term by conservative opponents, then we may see a reversion to the policies of the late General Secretary Andropov. To draw the populace's attention away from domestic shortcomings the regime might well return to a program of aggressive expansionism. A shocked Western public might then have to shift gears from "Gorbymania" to a new Cold War mentality, such as helped bring Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980. Given the Soviet Union's extraordinary economic and social difficulties, however, the neo-Andropovites would not be able to forestall the need for economic reform indefinitely. A new reformist leader, "a third Khrushchev," might therefore emerge by the beginning of the next century.

The last two possible futures would result in the gradual disassembling of the Soviet empire. If the radical reformers discussed earlier were to become the dominant political force in the USSR, processes would be unleashed which would likely result in a multiparty political system and real autonomy for the republics. Under these conditions, a genuine federal state might emerge. It is also possible that the present Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would break up, with the Muslim and the Baltic republics going their own way.[3] These developments would, of course, result in the countries of Eastern Europe being freed of Soviet troops and liberated from Soviet political influence, which in turn would probably lead to their ceasing to be communist states. If the Soviet Union were to cast off Marxism it would have a radical destabilizing effect on communist regimes throughout the globe.

The implosion of the Soviet empire would also serve to tax the diplomatic resources of the West. While it would be welcomed, certain of its effects would cause concern: a jockeying for territory among Eastern European countries responding to indigenous nationalism; the emergence of a stronger and united Germany; and the emergence of a belt of Muslim states, embracing fifty million people, that would begin to play an important role in world Islamic politics.

The fourth possible future is the rise to power of Russian nationalists who have jettisoned Marxism-Leninism as the state's legitimizing ideology. If this were to happen, the result would be approximately the same as that produced under the radical reformers, though the process might proceed more slowly and perhaps more painfully. Russia would decline from a superpower to a regional power, whose main concern would be internal development and the protection of the new state against China, the Muslim countries to the South, and a united Germany to the West.

To return to the question posed at the beginning: Will the Soviet Union survive until the year 2000? Given the USSR's history the answer should probably be yes. The Soviet regime has surmounted a civil war and foreign intervention, Hitler's invasion, and the political tumult brought about by Khrushchev's reforms; it may well survive the deep crisis it is presently experiencing. But the crisis *is* deep and destructive forces are at work. It therefore is not inappropriate for Western policy-makers to "restructure" themselves and to begin contemplating the previously unimaginable.

[3]It should be stressed that, irrespective of the views of Soviet Muslims concerning separation, a number of Russian nationalists agree with Mikhail Shiroky's contention that Russians should take the initiative in severing their counter-productive ties to the Muslims.

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Mrs. Aquino and the Joe Kapp Syndrome

Alvin H. Bernstein

FORMER MINNESOTA Viking quarterback Joe Kapp, after leading his team to the Super Bowl, forgot that he depended upon the team's talent more than it depended upon his. Accordingly, he demanded a sum of money that made it virtually impossible to renegotiate his contract, signed instead with the Boston Patriots, and, after a lackluster year playing in New England, disappeared below football's horizon, never to be seen on a professional gridiron again.

So now, prominent Filipino politicians, convinced that the U.S. needs its current military facilities at Clark Air and Subic Naval Bases more than the Philippines need the U.S., seem on the brink of falling victim to the Joe Kapp Syndrome. They may well refuse to renew the 1947 agreement which allows the U.S. to maintain on Filipino soil its largest overseas military bases. The result could be a great blow to U.S. Pacific strategy, but an even greater blow to the economy and security of the Philippines.

The Philippine government may allow the base negotiations, scheduled for 1991, to fail because the new leaders, together with the constitution and political structure they have created, make renewal more problematic than before. Preliminary negotiations have begun. In October 1988 the U.S. agreed to provide the Philippines with an assistance package of $962 million over two years, nearly three times the size of past annual aid packages, but less than half the whopping $1.2 billion a year the Philippine government sought. President Corazon Aquino first announced that she intended to give Washington formal notice to terminate in 1990 the agreement governing U.S. military facilities in the Philippines, then equivocated, insisting she was keeping open her country's options on retention of the bases. Meanwhile, the Philippine government refused to credit the U.S. share of the multinational Philippines aid package toward recompense for the use of Clark and Subic.

Such actions might be dismissed as familiar pre-negotiating tactics were it not for the 1986 change of regime. Even before she became president, candidate Aquino created her "Unity Platform" to bring together the non-Communist opposition to the Marcos regime. Article 3.6 of that platform, later published as "A Declaration of Unity," states that "Foreign military bases on Philippine territory must be removed and no foreign military bases shall hereafter be allowed."

Aquino wrote that declaration. Among those who signed it were Jovito Salonga, president of the Philippine Senate, and Representative Ramon Mitra, speaker of the

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House of Representatives. Many of the politicians President Aquino subsequently named to her cabinet also signed, including Aquilino Pimentel, minister of local government, who now serves in the legislature but is still a respected adviser, and Raul Manglapus, secretary of foreign affairs. Thus, President Aquino has declared she is in favor of removing the U.S. forces from her country and has surrounded herself with advisers publicly committed to the same position.

MOREOVER, the officials whom President Aquino commissioned to write the new constitution included a passage (Article 18, Section 25 of the "Temporary Provisions") that declares,

> After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

This document has since become the legal foundation of the present government. The clause insisting that renewal require a treaty may have been included to strengthen Manila's bargaining position and force the U.S. to take the matter more seriously. In fact, it will almost certainly reduce the sum offered by the American negotiating team to what a U.S. Congress, in a budget-cutting mood, is likely to ratify.

The renegotiation of the bases agreement will occur under the aegis of the present members of the new Philippine Senate, who hold office for six years. Most were members of Aquino's original cabinet and the anti-Marcos coalition that swept her into power. Their electoral platform included the anti-bases provision. During its first regular session, this Senate passed a bill banning entry of nuclear weapons into the Philippines. Another senatorial member of the anti-base coalition, movie star-turned-politician Joseph Estrada, played the lead role in an anti-American movie, which placed the attack against the American military presence on the silver screen. From there it has since moved to the pages of Filipino comic books.

The new constitution requires a two-thirds majority vote of the twenty-four member Senate to renew the basing arrangement. Recently, twelve of the existing twenty-three senators signed a resolution stating that they were unalterably opposed to any extension of the basing agreement.

A popular referendum, on the other hand, is possible, but not mandatory. The Congress can choose whether to call one. The outcome of such a vote is difficult to predict. Two recent polls, one by the Asia Research Organization and the other by the Ateneo University Social Weather Station, indicate that a majority of Filipinos favor retention, though more than 20 percent of the respondents were unaware of the issues. These polls suggest that, in a popular referendum, Aquino's position would decide the issue. But the referendum need never take place and she continues to sit on the fence.

Her hesitation is hardly surprising. Many Filipinos obviously dislike the American military presence, especially those in the new coalition forged under Aquino's banner of "People's Power." While most people probably just want the country to get as much as it can for retaining the bases, the new governing coalition includes many groups—radical students, progressive clerics, left-of-center nationalists, and members of the Filipino intelligentsia—for whom the bases are anathema, an unbearable reminder of the colonial past. The support of these people for Aquino's candidacy and the revolution that brought her to power now gives them claims.

On the other side of the issue are powerful interest groups that also have claims: economic groups that benefit from business with the U.S. military; the traditional, familial oligarchy that still controls the economic

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and social structures underlying political power; and, above all, the military, which would see closure of the bases as a victory for the Left and the Communists. The chances that they would subsequently attempt a coup would increase, especially since a potent inhibition—American support for the Aquino regime—would seem to have evaporated.

An American withdrawal from Clark and Subic would indeed undermine U.S. global and Pacific strategy. After the withdrawal of American troops from Indochina in 1973, the levels of U.S. military forces in the Pacific waned. They then waxed again in response to the substantial build-up of Soviet nuclear, naval, and naval air forces in the Far East and Pacific theater of military operations that Moscow created as late as 1979. This build-up included bases in Indochina, which the Soviets acquired after signing a Friendship Treaty with Vietnam in November 1978.

IN AN ERA of glasnost and perestroika, however, are current U.S. force levels in the Far East really necessary? Has not the time arrived when the U.S. can safely reduce its military presence in the Pacific in response to the unprecedented changes taking place throughout the communist world? The military balance between the two Koreas is shifting steadily in favor of the South. Vietnam's disintegrating economy has forced Hanoi to withdraw its army from Cambodia, an uncharacteristic retreat that seems to betoken at least a temporary reduction in Vietnam's hegemonial ambitions. Above all, the severe economic crisis rocking the Soviet Union has induced General Secretary Gorbachev to resort to liberalizing and destabilizing policies. That crisis also promises a contraction of the Soviet Union's military arsenal and its global ambitions. A nice Gorbachevian touch would be an offer to remove Soviet forces from Vietnam just before the base negotiations began in order to undermine the argument for renewal. Some reduction of U.S. forces in the region might be feasible, provided that it resulted from mutual arms limitation talks between the U.S. and the USSR for the entire region. These reductions, however, should be mutual not unilateral, carefully considered not peremptory, and acceptable to all major parties. However serious the economic problems North Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union may now face, no one can predict with confidence how they will resolve their internal problems in the long term, nor what defense and foreign policies will emerge in future.

We cannot even be certain about the limits or the fate of the liberalizing trends in the Soviet Union. We do not know whether they represent a genuine change of policy or merely different tactics. Their architect may not survive and the trends themselves may thereafter be reversed. Best-case planning is a risky way to ensure national security. With events in the communist world in flux, now is a time for cautious, incremental policy reformulations, rather than gambles and actions born of wishful thinking. The Soviet Union, North Korea, and Vietnam are permanent features of the Pacific landscape. The U.S. military presence, once withdrawn, may be difficult, even impossible, to regain.

U.S. bases in the Pacific allow force deployments from positions near the areas of potential conflict. A greater percentage of the ships in the fleet can remain on station and combat-ready. If repair and replenishment facilities are far away from the area of potential conflict, keeping a single ship on station may require three combat vessels: one actively deployed, another returning from duty, a third preparing for deployment. Having ships on the spot can reduce the ratio almost to one-to-one, and deters aggression more effectively by reminding any potential belligerent that it can gain no lasting advantage in the interval before the U.S. responds to its attack. What is more, with such a presence the U.S. could sustain operations in the region should the conflict be protracted.

The facilities at Clark and Subic provide U.S. forces with the support and materiel needed to react quickly and to sustain combat operations throughout Southeast Asia and

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the Western Pacific. As presently constituted, U.S. naval and air forces in the Philippines ensure regional security in a number of ways:

- They safeguard the sea lanes of communication through the South China Sea.
- They reduce the significance of the Soviet military build-up in the Pacific generally, and in Indochina in particular.
- They deter Soviet, North Korean, or Vietnamese support for the Philippines's Communist insurgents, the New People's Army (NPA), and could be used to help interdict such support if necessary.
- They will dampen any regional rivalry that threatens to produce conflict and will balance any future expansion of Chinese, Japanese, or Indian military forces in the region.
- They would join Northeast Asian forces in the event of North Korean aggression.

Above all, U.S. forces in the Philippines have largely checkmated Soviet strategy in the Pacific. Is it any wonder, then, that the



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Soviets' main strategic objective in the region is to ease the U.S. out of Clark and Subic? The only real question for them must be, Who would serve their ends more effectively? The Communist party of the Philippines and its military arm, the New People's Army, or the Aquino administration? The two alternatives are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The Soviets too can "keep their options open," to use a favorite phrase of President Aquino.

THE OUTCOME that would best serve the security interests of the Philippines is a base agreement renewal. This would have to be both long-term, to allow the U.S. to feel secure about its tenure, and financially handsome enough to convince all but the most ardently anti-American Filipinos that their leaders had negotiated in the national interest. National security, however, does not occupy first place in the minds of the new Filipino leadership, and cost-conscious Americans might join them in rendering the best alternative the least likely. The main danger for all involved is that a decision vitally affecting security will be made without due concern for those security implications. What is more, if the Philippines unceremoniously sends the Americans packing in 1991, it will minimize the chances of an amicable divorce between Manila and Washington in which the U.S. would undertake to pay alimony.

Though it now costs the U.S. less to maintain its bases than it would to deploy the same number of assets to the region from great distances, U.S. policy-makers have a third option: a reduction of U.S. commitments. Our friends in Southeast Asia must recognize the unpalatable truth that their part of the world ranks well behind Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia in the hierarchy of U.S. regional concerns. Should the Philippine government ask the American military to leave, there will be great domestic pressure to move assets now deployed in the region north and east, and to readjust our Pacific strategy accordingly. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, a former U.S. chief of Naval Operations, observed that if the U.S. lost its access to the bases in the Philippines, it might contract its defense perimeter to the mid-Pacific: a setback not only for U.S. global strategy but for the long-term security of the regional powers, especially the Philippines.

In a stroke, the fragile Philippine economy will lose all the revenues from employment, construction, personal expenditure, and other direct transactions it currently receives from the U.S. presence. The Filipinos themselves estimate that this will reduce the country's $38 billion GNP by an estimated $1 billion, and cost 300,000 jobs.

They understand also that, without the American umbrella, the Philippine military—hard pressed now even with American aid to meet the financial requirements of its counterinsurgency program—will have to find another $1 billion annually to bring its slender external defense capability to the level of its ASEAN neighbors. Trade with the U.S. will drop too, and Filipinos should expect capital flight, because businessmen—Filipino, American, and foreign—will react to the danger of a rising tide of insurgency in the wake of an American withdrawal. Nor should Filipinos forget that the success of the Aquino government in fighting its 25,000 armed Communist insurgents will depend largely on the state of the economy. Already laboring under a $28 billion foreign debt, the country will suffer a crippling economic blow if it turns its back on one of its most valuable natural resources: its geostrategic location. Geography makes the Philippines important not only to the U.S. but to its regional and Pacific allies, including Japan.

How, then, can all sides avoid an outcome that will increase the expense and reduce the effectiveness of U.S. Pacific strategy, risk jeopardizing the security of the member states of ASEAN and other Pacific allies, comfort and probably strengthen the Communist insurgents in the Philippines, and do irreparable harm to the country's economy? Perhaps they cannot avoid it en-

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tirely. They can minimize the damage, however. The U.S. should acknowledge Philippine political reality. It must not try to coerce a weak Aquino administration into a position that will weaken it still further, possibly even destroy it. The U.S. must also understand that it cannot, even in the best of all possible worlds, retain its bases in the Philippines much past the end of this century. It should therefore try to retain them for as long as is acceptable to its ally.

We must begin by counteracting, as

U.S. Facilities in the Philippines

Subic Bay Naval Base—deep natural harbor, protected anchorage

Ship Repair Facility

- Carrier mooring pier, wharves, and four floating drydocks
- Can handle 27 ships simultaneously; major repairs of vessels up to and including cruisers; minor repairs of carriers

Naval Supply Depot

- Central supply point for Pacific region; largest west of Hawaii; can supply needs of every ship and aircraft in the 7th Fleet
- Includes harbor for container shipping, open spaces, warehouses, refrigerated and hazardous storage facilities

Cubi Point Naval Air Station

- Primary base for 7th Fleet's carrier striking force
- P–3 maritime air patrol/ASW in Pacific and Indian Oceans
- Helicopters and fixed wing aircraft for medical evacuation, search and rescue and carrier
- Hub for all Pacific naval aviation major repair work

Clark Air Force Base—Headquarters of 13th Air Force

Tactical fighter and training for Western Pacific and Indian Oceans

- Tactical fighter wing of F–4 Phantom and F–5 aircraft
- "Cope Thunder" air combat training and use of Crow Valley gunnery and bombing range

Airlift and rescue units

- Staging point for strategic airlifts into the Indian Ocean
- Tactical airlift wing with C-130 aircraft
- Rescue and recovery helicopters

Support facilities

- All-weather runway; space for 800 aircraft; can manage 12,000 flights per month and 3,500 tons of cargo daily
- Regional medical center for U.S. forces in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans

Impact of bases on Philippine economy

- Military assistance and economic support fund (in 1988, $962 million over two years)
- Revenues from direct transactions contribute about $1 billion to the Philippines $38 billion GNP and generate 300,000 jobs
- Directly employs 68,000 Filipinos (second only to Philippine government) government)
- Allows Philippines to concentrate military budget on internal defense

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quickly as possible, the Filipino perception of the U.S. as a resident post-colonial power. In future negotiations, American diplomats should offer to minimize the abrasiveness of the American military presence by conceding that the U.S. does not intend to maintain a military presence in the Philippines indefinitely. They could open negotiations with an offer to close one of the bases or by proposing that the issue before Philippine and American negotiators in 1991 be a timetable for a phased withdrawal, rather than renewal of the Military Basing Agreement.

Such an agenda would have several distinct virtues. First, it would take a great deal of pressure off the Aquino regime. Second, it would reduce the possibility of an abrupt end to American aid and the economic damage that would inevitably result, whatever wishful-thinking nationalists argue to the contrary. Third, it would save Philippine-American friendly relations, so that the country would continue to enjoy American financial support at this crucial juncture in Philippine history. More important, it would preserve the protective umbrella that inhibits outside powers from providing direct military aid to the Communist insurgents. Fourth, such a negotiating position would also deprive the Communists of one of the few remaining issues—removal of the bases—that still make them appear respectable to the non-communist Left, because the Communists use the old Vietnamese Communist ploy of posing as the guardians of nationalism. Above all, the agenda would buy precious time for both sides: time the Filipinos need to get their economic house in order and the Communist insurgency under control; time the U.S. requires to build and negotiate access to new facilities in the U.S. Trust Territories and Southeast Asia that will enable the U.S. to continue to support the security of the region.

The two most frequently mentioned places where the U.S. could build substitute facilities, Guam and Tinian, lie in what has previously been know as the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. There are problems with constructing bases there, but none are insurmountable. Department of Defense cost estimates for such a project fall in the $8 billion to $10 billion range. Those figures, perhaps on the high side, might become less prohibitive if they could be spread out over five or ten annual $300 billion defense budgets. The U.S. would naturally want time to spread the costs of relocation, too, through as many annual budgets as possible, and to negotiate bilateral agreements with some of the regional powers so that it could maintain a presence near or in the South China Sea. For their part, the Filipinos would need to set the duration of the phased withdrawal with an eye on when and how best they could adjust financially to independence from American economic and security assistance.

The recent offer by Singapore to accommodate U.S. ships and aircraft presents an important opportunity. Some ASEAN nations may feel natural inhibitions against such an arrangement but there should be no question of trying to replicate the enormous Philippine facilities. Rather, the U.S. should seek to conclude a series of bilateral agreements that, collectively, would permit enough air and naval forces to remain in the region to preserve an effective deterrent strategy. The aggregate storage facilities for fuel, consumables, and ammunition would have to furnish U.S. forces with the level of support they needed.

Among the ASEAN countries, impressive ship repair facilities exist that could furnish the kinds of services available now at Subic, and that could spare the U.S. the necessity of building them from scratch. Frigates or destroyers with regular access to one of the larger ASEAN harbors, or to Apra Harbor in Guam, would also help keep down the cost of having ships on station in the region. Saipan, which became a commonwealth of the U.S. in 1986, has good airfield sites, and air bases could certainly be built there. There are even airfields in ASEAN that could accommodate U.S. aircraft. Finally, the U.S. would have to find some limited facilities for U.S. per-

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sonnel and their dependents, but the Philippine experience has proved that it is counterproductive for the U.S. to allow an American presence anywhere to overwhelm its host.

Such a program of gradual Philippine withdrawal and dispersed burdens would confer clear economic benefits on all regional participants, in addition to the obvious security benefit of keeping U.S. forces close to the South China Sea, in several locations, rather than in Hawaii, a two-week journey from the strategically valuable straits. The Philippines's economic loss would be others' gain. The Americans would consume more local products and would train and employ local labor.

From the American standpoint, several benefits would offset any reduction in the size of U.S. forces stationed within striking distance of the South China Sea. First, the new facilities would be located in stable nations. Base security has been a problem in the Philippines, where substantial evidence has indicated that Communist insurgents have penetrated the bases as part of the indigenous work force. In the Trust Territories or the other ASEAN nations security would present less of a problem. Finally, the abrasiveness of the relationship between an ex-colonial power and one of its former colonies would disappear. Eventually, in place of Clark and Subic, a network of facilities would stretch from Tinian to the Straits of Malacca. These would provide the support necessary to enable U.S. forces to preserve regional order and stability even if the 1991 base negotiations fall victim to the Joe Kapp Syndrome.

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Losing Control

National Security and the Global Economy

Ethan B. Kapstein

NATIONAL SECURITY planning in the United States has always rested on the foundation of an autarkic defense industrial base. The "Arsenal of Democracy" could ultimately beat any foe by launching more ships, mining more coal, pumping more oil, and forging more steel. Its research laboratories could be relied upon to create superior technology, as exemplified by the Manhattan Project to build the atomic bomb. In times of war and crisis, the American economy has been one of the country's great military assets.

Today, America's defense industrial base is crumbling. General Dynamics and Martin-Marietta may still be in business, but the domestic subcontractors who provide them with hardware are fast disappearing. Increasingly, critical military components are procured from low-cost foreign suppliers. At the same time, the Department of Defense has warned in a recent report that leading-edge technology in many defense-related industries "has moved, or is moving, offshore. . . . "

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Globalization has come to the defense economy. Indeed, the disjunction between U.S. national security policies on the one hand, and the country's defense production on the other, is an ironic legacy of the past decade's military build-up. While the United States hails its jet fighter aircraft and precision-guided munitions as the finest weaponry that money can buy, many of today's systems are about as American as a Ford Escort. They contain optical equipment from West Germany, ball bearings from Sweden, and integrated circuits from Japan. At present, several of the critical inputs used in military hardware are only available overseas. Gallium arsenide substrates and devices, for example, which are found in communications and radar systems, are almost exclusively purchased abroad. Pentagon officials have admitted in congressional testimony that they do not even know the extent to which foreign components are used in American weapons.

It is not just in high technology that America's dependence is growing; the trend is equally apparent in the low-tech end of the defense business. More than one-quarter of the gears used in defense systems are now being purchased from offshore suppliers, and foreign mills are gaining a competitive advantage in the manufacture of certain steel products, like armor plating. Indeed, as in civilian sectors, the United States is least competitive in the production of the Rust Bowl's traditional defense output.

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The international trade in low-tech military components is particularly insidious from a security standpoint. Ironically, since it is difficult for COCOM (the Coordinating Committee of the Western alliance that regulates East-West technology flows) to control trade in items like gears, foreign firms have been known to sell their products to both the Soviet and American armed forces. Of course, it is unlikely that the Kremlin will allow cheap imports to drive domestic defense manufacturers out of business. Instead, they can be expected to use imported goods as models for improving their own military production capabilities, defense spending cuts notwithstanding.

AS FOREIGN technologies and materiel penetrate the defense economy, the United States risks losing perhaps its most vital resource—skilled labor. Employment among domestic precision optics firms fell by 50 percent between 1981 and 1986, as did that in the steel industry. Between 1987 and 1989, aerospace companies, which have been relatively buoyant owing to commercial orders, have shed 41,000 workers. The size of the U.S. machine tool industry has shrunk by 25 percent since 1983, and a period of retrenchment is now upon the defense electronics business, a sector once dominated by American manufacturers. Further, the workers remaining in defense-related industries tend to be old, as young apprentices exit and move into more promising sectors.

Although the defense industry is hardly a model of free-market competition, it is nonetheless embedded in the world economy. A growing number of weapons systems employ "dual-use" technology. Integrated circuits and precision optics are among the items common to both military and civilian gadgetry. The economic and political forces that have promoted the global production of automobiles, computers, and VCRs have also affected defense contractors. In order to obtain the best components at the cheapest price, defense firms have turned to foreign suppliers.

One need not foresee a global conventional war to be concerned by these trends in defense procurement. At stake is Washington's ability to respond to a wide range of contingencies, from support of Israel during a Middle East war to full-scale mobilization in the event of a superpower crisis. While we might like to think that such countries as Japan, West Germany, and Sweden would never deny us or our allies critical components during an emergency, it does not require much imagination to sketch a scenario in which they would embargo shipments. Legitimate questions may be raised about the reliability of foreign military suppliers, especially when many of them are based in countries that have in the past refused landing rights to U.S. supply planes bound for Israel or overflight permission to American war planes. During crises the United States and its allies may have conflicting strategic interests which could prevent them from assisting us.

To be sure, the globalization of the defense industry is not solely a reflection of markets at work. These trends have been exacerbated by U.S. procurement and arms sales policies. In an increasingly competitive defense market, foreign purchasers of American military hardware have demanded "offsets"; that is, they have demanded that the seller agree to use components made by firms located in the buyer's country. The United States has encouraged offsets to help maintain foreign markets for the big defense contractors and to improve alliance relationships.

The offset policy has worked, perhaps beyond expectations. In order to sell the Boeing AWACS system to Great Britain, for example, the United States agreed to offsets worth over 100 percent of the system's price! This offset policy has led to two related outcomes. First, by effectively promoting import substitution for U.S.-made defense components, offset agreements have caused American defense subcontractors in the lower tiers to lose out on foreign sales. The machine tool, optical equipment, ball bearing, and electronics industries are examples

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of those that have suffered at the hands of offset agreements. Second, as American defense subcontractors go out of business, many of the items they once produced must now be imported. Import penetration in precision optics and machine tools has reached 50 percent of defense consumption. In sum, U.S. manufacturers of defense components face shrinking markets at home and closed markets abroad.

The United States has also encouraged co-development and co-production of weaponry with its allies. The FSX jet fighter program, a joint venture between American and Japanese firms, provides only the most recent example of an ambitious "technology sharing" agreement. Academics and congressmen have charged that Washington is "giving away" technological processes that will ultimately allow the Japanese to produce—and perhaps export—advanced military and commercial aircraft.

THE GLOBALIZATION of the defense industry is not some abstract notion or issue for the future, but a contemporary reality. Technological diffusion and military co-production agreements have permitted countries around the world to manufacture and export weapons. Through a growing network of corporate alliances, Western Europe has become heavily involved in the manufacture of all types of armaments, and consequently U.S. weapons are losing market shares within NATO and in third markets. The developing world has also translated its technological prowess into arms production, and important exporters now include Brazil, China, and South Korea. Even Taiwan has produced an indigenous jet fighter, with the help of an American-made engine. Weapons have become just another commodity in world trade.

The question now facing American policy-makers is: How can the United States manage its national security in a global economy? The search for answers will prove complex, since the interests of many actors are involved, and trade-offs must be made between competing economic and security objectives. Once policies are formulated, the task of implementation will remain. Reaching a consensus among Congress, the Pentagon, and the defense contractors will not be easy, especially in an era of budget austerity.

To date, three responses to the problem of globalization have been articulated by public officials. These may be labeled as follows: First, "Fortress America"; second, "coalition mobilization"; and third, "muddling through." A brief review of each exposes their fundamental strengths and weaknesses. Taken together, they demonstrate the difficulty of crafting a satisfactory response.

The first alternative, "Fortress America," has traditionally appealed to those in Congress who like to wrap their protectionism in a national security blanket. Its advocates seek to restore the defense industrial base—and American industry in general—through massive government intervention. Specific policies for achieving this objective include strengthening of the "Buy American" act, increased support for research and development, and widespread subsidization of raw materials producers, subcontractors, and defense firms.

The legislative foundation for such an approach is found in the Defense Production Act of 1950, which gives the President extraordinary economic powers "to promote the national defense." Indeed, one of Fortress America's strongest proponents, Democratic congresswoman Mary Rose Oakar of Ohio, chairs the congressional subcommittee that oversees this act. Oakar has asserted during hearings on restoration of the industrial base that she wants the United States to be "able to produce *all* [emphasis added] of the defense items needed to protect ourselves. . . . "

The obvious problem with a Fortress America strategy is the enormous cost. The price of weaponry would become uncontrollable if all components had to be produced in the United States. Further, once the rebuilding of Fortress America began, it would be hard to know where to stop. During the Korean War, the Defense Production Act

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was exploited for protectionist purposes by everyone from sheep farmers to cotton growers. It is hard to be "just a little bit" protectionist.

Consideration must also be given to the international effects of an autarkic America. Protectionist forces could be unleashed in Western Europe and East Asia. The United States must already contend with the specter of Europe 1992. The prophesy of a Fortress Europe would certainly become self-fulfilling if the U.S. closed its doors to foreign military hardware.

Nonetheless, the protectionists' argument cannot be dismissed out of hand. Governments have always intervened in the marketplace to maintain domestic capabilities for armaments production. The analytical problem is to discern which industries are really critical to national security, and to justify why their output must be produced domestically. The protectionist lobby has failed to deliver this level of analysis.

The second alternative, antithetical to the one described above, has been labeled "coalition mobilization" by some, "NATO arms cooperation" by others. Adherents of this view, such as Senator Sam Nunn, assert that no single country in the Western alliance can afford to provide its defense needs on its own. At the same time, they recognize that governments are unwilling to allow the international marketplace to determine the location and scope of all defense-related production. Under a policy of coalition mobilization, NATO itself would form a virtual free-trade zone. Specialization of weapons production would be encouraged, but only within the NATO cockpit.

A model for this approach is found in the recent protocol signed by Canada and the United States forming the North American Defense Industrial Base (NADIB). Under the NADIB initiative, defense manufacturers in the two countries are treated equally for procurement purposes. They may bid for contracts on a competitive basis, with no preference given to national firms. The objective is to create one North American market for defense products.

Another prominent example is offered by the "Nunn amendment" to the Department of Defense Authorization Act, which requires the Pentagon to earmark a portion of its funds for collaborative projects with Western alliance partners. Already, a number of NATO joint ventures has been launched, in such areas as defense software development, battlefield surveillance, and construction of a new naval frigate. "Side-by-side" testing of European and American weaponry has also progressed in response to the Nunn amendment, at least in the United States.

Supporters of coalition mobilization believe that freer trade and NATO arms collaboration will foster competitive defense procurement, standardization of military equipment, and rationalization of the defense industrial base. They hope that ultimately NATO will be able to procure more weapons at lower cost. The jury is still out, however, on the economics of military joint ventures; in some cases multinational arms projects may be more expensive than national ones.

AN IMPORTANT objective of alliance-wide procurement from the American perspective is to ensure that European military markets remain open to American hardware after 1992, which is now the source of some anxiety among defense firms. As Senator Nunn has asserted, "we are going to have to do more buying off-the-shelf on both sides of the Atlantic." Yet a resurgent Western Europe, guided by independent foreign policies, may be unwilling to see its defense industries fold in response to an expanding alliance division of labor, especially in such sectors as aerospace and electronics. Free trade has always been resisted by states that are nurturing "infant industries," and there is every reason to believe that a united Western Europe would protect vigorously those sectors deemed necessary for continental economic and military security.

Proponents of coalition mobilization have even stressed its historical appeal. The statesmen who signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 were committed to the proposition that

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cooperation must go beyond the military arena, to the economic sphere. Article II of the treaty reads "the Parties. . . will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage collaboration between any or all of them." Accordingly, there have always been NATO boosters promoting one cooperative scheme or another.

To be sure, adherents of coalition mobilization recognize that some of America's allies in East Asia might find the concept troublesome. But they note that little of Japan's overall production in such sectors as electronics goes to military equipment. They also point out that voters in the United States and Canada have little appetite for widespread protectionism; North Americans want to keep importing their consumer goods from Japan. In any event, Japanese companies are now establishing numerous subsidiaries within NATO countries, and these firms are potential contributors to the defense industrial base.

A more serious weakness of coalition mobilization is found at the strategic level. Today, much of the West is mesmerized by Mikhail Gorbachev's peace offensive. In the absence of a Soviet threat, NATO may lack the will to cooperate on procurement matters. The interest in coalition mobilization can be expected to diminish as European strength increases relative to that of both the United States and Russia. The Europeans would probably view an American initiative of this kind as a poorly disguised effort to dominate the continent economically and politically. Further, as stated earlier, a policy of NATO free trade could become unglued during an "out-of-area" crisis which found member states on opposing sides.

The Pentagon's current policy, which has been largely reactive to the congressional initiatives described above and to lobbying by private sector interest groups, may be characterized by the inelegant phrase "muddling through." Rather than be guided by a strategic vision of industrial policy, which would necessitate the specification of critical industries and even particular firms from a security standpoint, the Department of Defense instead has been busy putting out fires. Under pressure from particular sectors, such as semiconductor manufacturers, or in response to the most obvious gaps in our mobilization capacity, such as low ammunition levels, defense planners have promoted specific industries through protection or subsidization. Largely overlooked in the policy process are the second- and third-tier defense subcontractors who lack political or economic clout.

Muddling through should not be confused with doing nothing. Indeed, the United States has apparently done an effective job in recent years of enhancing its nuclear and conventional deterrent, as demonstrated by the bilateral arms control agreements struck with the Soviet Union and the progress made in settling a number of regional disputes. If our defenses have become weakened by foreign dependence, this vulnerability has been hidden from our adversaries.

THE PROBLEM with muddling through is that our policies cannot possibly keep pace with the rapid economic and technological changes ongoing in defense-related industries. Pentagon officials resemble the congressmen whom Secretary of State George Marshall described during the 1947 debate on European recovery when he said "the patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate." If the United States allows its defense industrial base to wither, it may be forced into making rapid and costly mobilization decisions down the road. It is cheaper to maintain defense capabilities than to rebuild them from scratch. By muddling through, the United States risks being unprepared when a crisis occurs that involves surge production of military equipment.

It should be clear from this review of the alternative policy responses that distinct costs and benefits are associated with each paradigm. There are no simple solutions to the problem of ensuring national security in a global economy, and reasonable arguments have been advanced by adherents of each

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policy perspective. Yet while it is healthy to debate important issues, the absence of policies on globalization will ultimately have negative repercussions at home and abroad. This became evident during the controversy over co-development of the FSX jet fighter. The United States appears to be mired in indecision as other countries pursue more clearly-defined national interests.

Despite conflicting views on the management of the defense industrial base, there are points on which representatives of the three approaches all agree. In the best Washington tradition, all parties to the debate have called for more research. But as a first step, they agree that the Department of Defense must assemble a better data base that places the domestic defense industry in an international context. We need to know more about foreign investment in defense-related industries, import penetration in particular sectors, and foreign sourcing of critical components. At present, the policy debate is being waged on a weak foundation of facts.

Second, the parties agree that the Department of Defense must make it easier for American defense contractors to commercialize the "dual-use" technology now being employed in weapons systems and the technologies under development for future utilization. It is a national embarrassment that the world's largest satellite imaging corporation is a foreign concern that uses technology over which American enterprises once held a monopoly. Unfortunately, secrecy restrictions prevent U.S. companies from exploiting their lead in the marketplace. Such barriers to commercialization must be lowered if American firms are to remain competitive in the development of advanced civilian and military technology.

Finally, all the protagonists would agree that U.S. defense contractors must maintain access to allied countries and other markets. In recent years a combination of factors, including arms sales legislation at home and protectionist policies abroad, has severely curtailed exports of American weapons and associated components. The U.S. government must ensure that our defense firms remain globally competitive and able to bid on foreign contracts.

While these recommendations create a modest agenda, it is unlikely that we will soon witness much progress on defense industry issues. The Bush administration appears incapable of appointing key officials in the acquisition area; procurement jobs have apparently become unattractive, thanks in part to congressional micro-management of the acquisition process. Unfortunately, owing to the absence of executive branch leadership and to the polarized nature of the globalization debate in Congress, the best the Pentagon can manage is to muddle through. As long as this remains true, the gradual deterioration of the defense industrial base will continue.

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The World According to Pfaff

Morton Kondracke

WILLIAM PFAFF'S *Barbarian Sentiments: How the American Century Ends** is a very rich and expansive book that peers into the intellectual and cultural history of practically every major country on earth to find the origins of its foreign policy. Pfaff avoids Freudian or Jungian terminology, but in essence he is psychoanalyzing the modern world, examining each country's "sense of itself" to determine what ails the whole.

Based in Paris, a columnist for the *International Herald Tribune* and the *Los Angeles Times*, and also a contributor to the *New Yorker*, Pfaff is clearly a learned man. His chapters—on the "dead ideas" he thinks still govern America's behavior, the challenge of the New Europe, the inevitable disintegration of the Soviet Union, America's confusion about the importance of nationalism (as opposed to ideology) as the driving force of postwar history, and the immaturity of many old and new countries—are each made up of insightful shorter essays which cover religion, the arts, sociology, and anthropology, as well as economics, politics, and diplomatic history. So much is packed into 198 pages that a reader is moved to underline much of every page, intending to go back and read the book again. In the end, though, there is a major flaw which left me deeply unsatisfied. Like many psychoanalysts, Pfaff declines to tell his patient what to do to cure himself.

Diagnosis has its value, however, and Pfaff has three principal findings to render. The first—which perhaps reflects the analyst's own preoccupation as an American living in Paris—is that the United States is losing interest in Europe and shifting its affections to Asia. The second is that the breakup of the Soviet empire will lead to dangerous instability, possibly even revolutionary chaos. And the third is that the United States is profoundly disillusioned by its recent failures in Vietnam, Iran, and Central America—all, he says, born of our inability to understand that Third World countries are not like us and do not want to be—and shortly will return to its historic posture of isolationism, or worse, will become "nihilist."

"A central argument of this book," Pfaff writes, "is that Europe is crucially important and even rather dangerous. It can't be counted out, as Americans have been inclined to do since the 1940s. It is more important to the American future than Asia or the Soviet Union or Latin America." The twelve-nation European Community will become a powerful trade rival of the United States, he says, the disintegration of the Soviet threat will produce a loosening of U.S.-European ties,

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and Western Europe inevitably will attract Eastern Europe unto itself, making an economic juggernaut of the whole.

And then, he says, unacknowledged cultural differences between the United States and Europe, when combined with economic rivalry, could produce alienation. "European thoughts are not American thoughts," he writes. "European assumptions, imaginings and ambitions are not American." For example, Europe is a collection of semi-socialist states still governed by their elites. Meantime, the United States is "the only truly non-socialist society on earth" and is not governed any longer by an elite class with a sense of duty and obligation. Instead, those in charge are "morally-neutral" achievers whose only values are money-making, "success in the climb," and the ability to perform. The last true American statesman, he suggests, was George Marshall, who refused a million-dollar offer for his memoirs because he believed that one does not enrich oneself from public service. (This smacks of Europhile snobbery to me. Pfaff must not have ever met Dean Rusk or Cyrus Vance.)

DESPITE THE WIDER cultural difficulties involved, Pfaff fears the United States is about to divorce Europe and marry Asia. He hears pundits say that the American Century is giving way to the Pacific Century. He seems to think that America's success-seekers believe there is more money to be made in Asia than in Europe. He thinks there is a resurgence of America's long-standing fascination with the mysterious East and of the mistaken belief that China is finally about to emerge as the super-market and super-power that American merchants have always hoped for and American strategists have long expected. Pfaff argues, more convincingly, that for years to come there will be only one true Asian superpower—Japan. Writing months prior to the massacre in Tiananmen Square, he predicted that China's internal contradictions would prevent its modernization. And, he points out, the combined 1987 GDP of Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan (as estimated by the Institute for Strategic Studies in London) was $260 billion, not much larger than that of the Netherlands.

Pfaff's second major concern is that the Soviet Union, in terminal social and spiritual decay, will collapse violently and that Europe will be endangered in the process—partly because the United States, out of pique with Europe, will not stay around to engineer the right kind of transition to stability. Pfaff argues as convincingly as I've read anywhere that Mikhail Gorbachev simply cannot succeed in reforming the Soviet Union in the name of Leninism and keeping the Communist party in power, while at the same time letting the Soviet people know what horrors Leninism and the Communist party visited upon them.

"The question not asked, but which has to be asked," Pfaff writes, "is what will become of the Soviet Union and the Soviet system if it acknowledges its intellectual and moral foundations to be untrue? The forces set at work by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. . . are revolutionary forces. . . . [Gorbachev] may himself prove the Kerensky of this revolution." The end, he fears, could be chaotic and violent, "though the hypothesis of continued relative decline seems more plausible."

The third of Pfaff's major concerns is, in a way, the most interesting of all. Putting the United States under deep psychoanalysis, he argues that the era of postwar internationalism is over, killed off by the disappointments of the 1960s and 1970s. Americans have always believed, he writes, that this country represented the fulfillment of mankind's destiny. The old isolationism was based on the idea that contact with the rest of the world would soil us. Internationalism, beginning with Wilson, was based on the idea that the world was eager to become like America and that America had a mission to make it so. But, Pfaff argues, much of the Third World never wanted to be like America—certainly, Iran did not—and much of the rest of it—

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Central America, for example—is not ready. So, he says, we Americans were bound to be frustrated trying to remake the world in our image. When we failed, he says, we stopped believing in ourselves.

"The political rhetoric of the United States," he writes, "has continued to employ the old vocabulary of American exceptionalism, national mission, American pre-eminence. Yet there is no longer an intellectually responsible ruling idea of Americanism, a fully acceptable formulation of this justificatory national purpose—to say nothing of a national policy to advance it." Needless to say, Pfaff has little use for Ronald Reagan's attempts to define America's purpose. He contends that Reagan's patriotic blustering only proved that Americans had no shared sense of mission.

"Americans are at an axial point in the national relationship to the world, unwilling to admit that the United States is not a unique nation. We are ready to despise the world again, as we did in the past, our friends and clients perhaps more than our official Soviet enemies," he writes. Or even worse, America might fall into "nihilism" and become cynically nationalistic, holding to no ideal whatsoever in the belief that ideals do not apply in international relations. He ends up saying that a period of isolationism might be good for America, giving it time to regroup. But he wonders whether it has the will.

Dr. Pfaff, the psychoanalyst, manages to scare me into thinking that his patient, the world, may be very neurotic. My own inclination is to quarrel with him about America's position in it. A debate surely is underway, as the Cold War seems to be ending, about the long-term purpose of American policy. Neo-isolationists abound, and budgets are tight. But America is now an international trading nation. Its students travel the world in high school, and the television networks increasingly pay attention to foreign news (and not out of a sense of public service; what's going on in the Soviet bloc, China, and the Middle East is exciting). If Pfaff is right in saying that Asia will never match Europe in economic potential, then he needn't worry that this country's money-seekers will abandon Europe—so long as Europe does not go protectionist and close itself off from America.

Fascinating and harrowing though his analysis is, Pfaff has few prescriptions for America or the world. The closest he comes is to say that the United States should help negotiate a deal whereby the Soviet Union lets its Eastern European satellites drift peaceably Westward. He is short on specifics about how, except to say that the U.S. should ensure that Germany remains divided. Implicitly, he seems to be encouraging the new isolationism by saying that Asia doesn't matter and that trying to spread democracy in the Third World is just a hopeless case. Pfaff ends up like many brilliant analysts (Freud, for instance) and strategists, unaware of how much his own milieu affects his thinking. Still, this book is an attempt to look into the psyche of nations to understand their international behavior, and an excellent try it is.

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Jaw-Jaw about War-War

Kenneth M. Jensen

WAR IS EITHER the dullest or most interesting topic, depending on how you look at it. It is most interesting when looked at empirically, that is, through the experience of the statesmen, strategists, and soldiers who have started, fought, and ended actual conflicts.

Since World War II, the study of war in much of the West has moved steadily away from the real and toward the theoretical. In post-Vietnam America, especially, war has been made into a nightmare: It has been turned from something "fearsomely real" into something unthinkable. The 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a frenzied search by social scientists and political and social theorists for new and better theories of "objective"—i.e., irrational, nonvolitional—causes of war. Meanwhile, changes in the communist world in the second half of the 1980s have brought forth a spate of theoretical analyses that would put war as we have known it largely behind us. These include, most notably, John Mueller's recent book, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War.*

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We therefore arrive at the beginning of the 1990s in a curious condition. War—whether because it is outside our immediate experience or regarded as a thing of the past or as something to be avoided at all costs—has been pushed far away from us. We are asked not to be interested in war, except in its dullest form—in the abstract. This, in spite of the fact that the world is as volatile and violent as it has ever been.

Depending on whom you ask, there are twenty to thirty wars going on right now. The 160-odd states of the world—irrespective of whether most of them can afford it—are meanwhile armed to the teeth. Little Syria has as many tanks as West Germany and two-and-a-half times as many as France; Vietnam has 2.8 million men under arms. The period since World War II is now characterized as a long peace or as a time of neither peace nor war. Nonetheless, about as many human beings—some 17 million—have been the victims of war since V-J Day 1945, as died between 1900 and that date.

All this would seem to suggest that war ought to continue to command our attention and that we ought to demand to know more about it. On the whole, of course, we are neither interested nor demanding. We go on wishing that peace were really breaking out all over, as our pundits tell us, and blithely ignoring facts such as the more than one million deaths in the Iran-Iraq War. It is therefore heartening that someone has found

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this condition troubling enough to try to do something about it.

Berkeley political scientist Paul Seabury and Hoover Institution policy analyst Angelo Codevilla have put together what might well become just the book we need to get back to war as it is and must be studied. *War: Ends and Means** is intended as a primer. As the authors say, it is not written for strategists or military professionals or theoreticians of organized violence, but for young, educated Americans

> whom the absence of the military draft has trained to live as if military matters were a spectator sport, whose popular culture gives the impression that violence belongs exclusively to the past or to lower forms of life, and whose university curricula make it well-nigh impossible to put one's self in the shoes of history's protagonists—or of those caught in the middle.

Keeping the inexperience of this audience in mind, Seabury and Codevilla have produced a text that is absorbing and easily handled. They avoid complex analytical structures, and they do not trouble themselves with detailed discussions of the merits of past commentators on the subject. *War*, therefore, is not an onerous theoretical undertaking. Rather it is a loosely organized, extended essay full of humanity's experience with war; that is, replete with useful history. The result is a book that is both interesting and, surprisingly, interestingly *theoretical.*

A great part of the success of *War* is due to its straightforward approach. Consider one of its several explanations of why war exists. Asserting that human intercourse naturally produces circumstances that lead rational men to regard killing as "the best option available," Seabury and Codevilla go on to prove this fairly conclusively. They do this not by the long labor of examining human nature philosophically, but by demonstrating their point that if war is hell, then "peace is no picnic."

In this century, as they show, the victims of "peace" have outnumbered the victims of war. Since 1900, some 35 million people have died as the direct consequence of military operations, while at least 100 million have been killed by "police forces or their equivalent," that is, by their own governments and outside of war. Lest anyone quibble that struggles inside states ought to be regarded as wars, Seabury and Codevilla suggest that where the victims were unarmed or were not allowed to live to surrender, and "could not . . . make war on their own behalf, the killers did their killing in peace." Thus history seems to bear out the theory that a great deal of war might be conducted out of the fear that the alternative of "peace" might prove bloodier still. In such a calculation, war obviously can become the more rational choice.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE of the book's effectiveness can be seen in its brief chapter on the causes of war. All theories about the causes of war, the authors argue, are really of only two sorts: the generic and the volitional. Without denying that wars might on occasion be precipitated by accident and miscalculation, or that impersonal forces surely affect their origins, Seabury and Codevilla turn to the one argument that most quickly and surely does the generic theorists in. No one proceeding on the assumption that wars are in some sense "accidental," they note, has *ever*

> succeeded in predicting any war or any peace. Even when modern social science finds objective correlations between any one event or condition and the onset of war, for instance, an increase in armament levels, it cannot make the intellectual leap that separates correlation from cause.

Seabury and Codevilla complete their case against the generic theorists by proving that it does not even help to know which regimes and cultures are more "bellicose" or "peaceloving" than others. As the authors show, such facts still do not explain why any particular war occurs. Indeed, the cultural

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disposition of a people may keep them out of war one moment and get them into it the next:

> Ironically, peaceable kingdoms, being nice, may tempt to devour them, while nations armed to the teeth, whether they are nice like Switzerland or nasty like Afghanistan, may live undisturbed for generations. Thus an inclination to peace is no guarantee of maintaining it. However, peaceful nations, having taken up the sword, may fight with greater vigor and perhaps with less reasonable restraint than ones known for their martial spirit. All of this uncertainty exists because the disposition to fight arises from truly important contests of purpose and will between nations in concrete circumstances. It is impossible to predict what such contests may bring about.

Turning to volitional theories of the causes of war, Seabury and Codevilla make a convincing case that, although such theories are not appreciably better predictors of actual conflicts, they are better than the generic choices at explaining how wars actually develop. History shows us, as the authors demonstrate, that war has been made by clear choices and for rational purposes in both "benign and malevolent guises":

> despoliation, enrichment, and conquest; revenge, and retribution; establishing or unifying nations and empires; instituting a just order of things for one nation or among all nations; subjugating and punishing evil; carrying civilization and secular or religious faiths to other peoples and places; and, of course, the defense of the realm against foreign and domestic enemies.

War makes the case that whatever the "objective" forces at work, no state ever went to war without its leaders making a purposeful choice from a list very like the one above. In sum, "most if not all wars are deliberately caused and waged over important causes." Inasmuch as war is a test of "how much and how wisely peoples love the things for which their regimes stand," it cannot be made without a choice calculated against the rational purposes for which regimes exist.

Seabury and Codevilla conclude their discussion of cause by cautioning against historical analogy. Analogies, they write, ought to be taken "as warnings, as solace" only. Otherwise, they might obscure the very particularities that make each war unique. "In circumstances of novelty and uncertainty where no guideposts exist, strategic thought about purposive action must take over. The very notion that the world is run by the contrasting wills of men leaves us on our own, but sober." *War* itself leaves the reader sober after its chapter on the causes of war: He knows how little he is likely to know about why particular wars start.

THE MOST instructive part of the book is devoted to what actually happens as war begins, continues, and ends. Its middle portion is titled, "How Wars are Fought," and contains such chapters as "The Material Conditions of Battle," "Winning the Battle: Land, Sea, and Air," and "Intelligence." As Clausewitz noted in speaking of "the fog of war," military practice is immensely complex, and, of course, the progress of each war has been unique. To the extent that they can in so short a book (306 pages), Seabury and Codevilla do a superb job of acquainting the reader with actual military practice. By so doing, they show how our contemporaries who understand war—statesmen, strategists, and soldiers—would generally proceed in its event. And the authors also succeed in suggesting how nations might both prosecute and prevent war itself.

If one were to read any single chapter in *War: Ends and Means*, it ought to be the one on military operations in the nuclear age. It is most instructive to see how the military doctrines of East and West have come to grips with nuclear weapons, their delivery systems, and defense against them as practical problems. Like it or not, military doctrine is real; as the authors show, it is far more likely to be acted upon than "millenialist fear and hope" regarding the bomb. Because of this, their book succeeds in bringing the reader to

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the realization of what is *most likely* to happen in the event of a war employing nuclear means. Here too, the reality is sobering, for U.S. nuclear doctrine as it stands is impractical.

A book this short cannot but suffer from omissions. Happily, most of them are minor. If pressed to find fault with it, I would focus on its lack of discussion of the wars underway today. This was perhaps deliberate on Seabury and Codevilla's part: The book seeks to demonstrate that the essence of war remains unchanged. Nonetheless, international conflict today seems to me unusual enough to suggest that there might be something new under the sun. As noted, the world is more extensively armed than ever before; even the smallest, silliest of wars can thus bring hideous casualties and breed enormous new hatreds. Much violence goes on without declarations of war or even admissions of involvement. In addition, most armed conflicts proceed more slowly and with considerably less intensity than, say, War World II. Parties to many conflicts are several times removed, often proceeding by means of proxies. All this suggests that the volitional causes of contemporary war are more difficult to discern today then past practice would suggest. In dealing with the wars of today, one needs to understand the "why" as well as the "way" of undeclared, low-intensity, and proxy war.

One might hope that Seabury and Codevilla, who know the ground of contemporary international violence very well, would move on to a second volume on war, this time on its contemporary prosecution. As their discussion of the volitional theories of cause shows, the authors of *War: Ends and Means* display a thorough-going understanding of war as part of politics in the past. Were they to produce a volume dealing with the contemporary situation, they may be able to revive that understanding once again—this time, with application to a world in which war has become even foggier than it was for Clausewitz.

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But We Follow the Worse...

Jean-François Revel

I THINK THAT, while Francis Fukuyama is quite right to proclaim the victory of the ideology of liberal democracy, we should bear in mind that this is still a moral and potential victory rather than a concrete reality. He pays too little attention to the role of retrogression and retarded development in history. He reminds us, quite correctly, that the explanatory models developed during the past one hundred and fifty years have tended to overvalue economics and that we should now redress the balance by bringing ideological, psychological, and cultural factors to the fore, as historians did as a matter of course until the end of the nineteenth century. But this does not go far enough to redress the balance. What must be added is that history is composed not merely of developments and events, but also and especially of *decisions* taken and carried out by individual and collective *actors* who have the capacity, utterly and quite illogically, to change the direction in which we seem irreversibly to be headed.

It is all very well to dismiss a residual or recrudescent totalitarianism as a "rear-guard action," but we should not forget that our lives are lived from one rear-guard action to another. Indeed, entire generations have consumed their existence in these allegedly marginal battles. Laid end to end, both in space and time, they have involved the majority of the planet's population and most of this century. After all, bearing in mind the general state of things around 1900 with respect to democracy and democratic aspirations, the market economy and its achievements, the state of science and culture, one might well argue that it was communism, fascism, and nazism that constituted rear-guard actions. They nonetheless managed to poison the entire twentieth century. And this, for several billion human beings, is what history has meant. They have known no other. Nor will many ever know any other. For them, "the striking victory of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" has simply never meant anything real. Indeed, they have been a good deal worse off in their modern totalitarian societies than their parents were in their traditional premodern ones. The latter were not democratic, but neither were they oppressive or systematically destructive of man and his freedoms.

What needs to be explained is why these modern aberrations occurred in a period so enlightened and on a continent so informed by liberal Western civilization. Why did modern Europe become the birthplace of totalitarianism? As long as we have not really understood the genesis of this phenomenon, who can say that we are safe and immunized against new outbreaks of madness—ones

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Jean-François Revel, the eminent French political commentator, is author of *The Totalitarian Temptation*. This is a translated and revised version of an article written for *Commentaire*.

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which will perhaps adduce quite different ideological pretexts and yet turn out to be quite as mysteriously ruinous and bloody as those we have known? There were no more compelling reasons for such things to happen in the civilized Europe of our grandparents than there are today or will be tomorrow in a world which genuflects at the altar of human rights. To say that such phenomena are now historically finished, that they are lost causes, can only be true in a purely theoretical sense. In real life, a cause which we know to be lost, but which still rules over two billion people, has lasted seventy years and will doubtless go on for several more decades before it is finally liquidated.

A POLITICAL pundit may be able to marshal strong arguments in pointing out to a condemned man, on whose neck the blade of the guillotine is about to fall, that history is on his side: "You can be sure that this execution is anachronistic. It corresponds to a moment of history that we've quite put behind us." Thus he merely confirms, unfortunately, that nine-tenths of what happens to us is the result of historical moments that we've entirely left behind. Even in a completely democratic and in no sense sanguinary context, what could have been more "behind us" than the economic program put into effect by the French Socialists from June 1981 to March 1983? Every single measure they adopted with such happy resolution was tried and true—long known as certain to produce disastrous effects on employment, growth, the financial situation, and foreign trade. Even the newspapers least hostile to the left-wing government, such as *Le Monde*, as early as the summer of 1981 expressed their concern about the ineluctable damage this policy was bound to inflict. But there was nothing for it: We had to experience the quasi-bankruptcy of March 1983 before the Socialists would change their course. So it is quite wrong to say that history "offers no second helpings": It does just that all the time, and one might even say that the specialty of history is reheating leftovers—or something from the deep freeze.

Such tendencies cannot simply be reduced to a natural interval between the triumph of liberal principles and the laborious process required to put them into effect throughout the world. Such a scenario (from idea to action) would make sense if we were witnessing a linear progression in which premodern societies were being gradually drawn towards liberal democracy. We would then have a single and homogeneous graph on which different societies would be situated at different stages of their progression from archaic to modern forms of organization. But what we have been experiencing for the past two hundred years is rather a series of original inventions in the anti-democratic domain. *These new and previously unknown anti-democratic systems are quite as modern as the liberalism they seek to destroy.* If we had only to cope with traditional societies, more or less attached to their folkways—and a few of these still exist—the problems of democratizing the world would be relatively easy to conceive, if not resolve. But since the end of the eighteenth century, since 1793 and the Terror, we keep running into something quite different: authentically original anti-democratic systems, social inventions that lay claim to the future. And it must be admitted that these are inspired not by a naive adoration of the past but rather by a cold and clear-sighted hatred of liberty itself. Not that these two motivations need exclude one another, be it noted; indeed they can work together as in the case of the Iranian revolution, which occurred in a country considered—around about 1975—to be one of the most promising experimental stations for the modernization and liberalization of a traditional society, under the leadership of a despotism perhaps only dimly enlightened but incomparably preferable to what was soon to follow: the dark night of the ayatollahs.

All that is real is not rational, and all that is rational is not real.

In this connection, I cannot quite subscribe to the comparison Fukuyama makes

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between the Hegelian dialectic and John Maynard Keynes's famous remark to the effect that politicians are frequently in thrall to "the ideas of a defunct economist." Keynes simply meant that what the politician had learned or half-learned in his faraway youth would ordinarily no longer meet the needs of the situation he was likely to obtain when he came to power. Indeed, a good example of this is Keynesism itself as it was practiced by so many governments during the years of strong economic growth, strong consumption, and strong inflation after World War II. The Hegelian dialectic is far more than a simple chronological disjunction or phasing between ideas and realities. It is a passage from the implicit to the explicit, in which a "moment" of consciousness at once destroys and realizes the preceding moment (the famous *Aufhebung*). Furthermore, this moment, and movement, of consciousness is also and indissolubly a moment and movement of reality.

Keynes's remark, on the other hand, remains quite explicable to most generations of intellectuals. The latter tend to outlive their learning, such as it is, and they continue to think in habitual terms even when they believe that these have been discarded. For example, the "bankruptcy of Marxist ideology" *in general* is patent, but it continues to be used in *particular cases*, as when the Socialist International and, in the United States, much of the press, academics, Congress, and public opinion decree that the Sandinista junta is "progressive," or "leftist," whereas the liberals who have been demanding elections since 1979 are said to be "reactionary" and "right-wing." Similarly, in Lebanon, the Syrians and their collaborators are said to be "progressive," while the Christians whose program calls for the independence of their country and a return to the liberal pluralism of the pre-Syrian-occupation period are said to be "rightists" (or, as the BBC constantly says, "right-wing militias"). One has only to take a quick mental world tour to confirm my point: Practical reason quite frequently turns its back on pure reason.

It is this melancholy observation that makes it difficult for me to subscribe wholeheartedly to the rehabilitation of the Hegelian dialectic of history. One sees little true coincidence, it seems to me, between moments of consciousness and moments of reality, between the rational and the real. To be sure, Francis Fukuyama is quite right to stress the fact that the democratic capitalist model, the Western cultural model, has won universal recognition and represents the universally-desired form of social organization. But this is precisely where we are confronted with a new set of problems, for we are a long way from a situation in which this theoretical option is incorporated into deeds and facts.

DESPITE THE ideological collapse of the totalitarian Left, the liberal model of society is still widely and cordially hated, both within our Western culture and outside. Have we not seen Stanford University modify its introductory survey courses and reduce the role of certain allegedly "reactionary classics"—Dante, Shakespeare, Montaigne, or Cervantes, for example—in favor of Franz Fanon, Che Guevara, and similar "revolutionary" trash, stuff not only puerile but increasingly dated? So it goes when you prefer the modish to the eternal: you wind up with the dusty and merely old. But the fact remains that this is the choice that was made.

Far more serious, tragic in fact, is the experience of numerous peoples in Africa and the Near East, where the increasing regression into poverty, mass extermination, religious fanaticism, political despotism, and cultural barbarism hardly seems to suggest that the liberal social model is within reach or being approached with all deliberate speed, although these people have also broken with the far less cruel universe of the traditional cultures. Mengistu and Khomeini are "modern" figures. They are products of the twentieth century, and even of the end of the twentieth century. They may well be "ideologically discredited," indeed there seems to be little doubt about it. But they are no less

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powerful for that. Mengistu, who in proportion to the available population has as many cadavers on his conscience as Stalin, is gloriously enthroned in the Organization of African Unity. He has in no sense been condemned, let alone outlawed, by the international community which is far too busy disciplining cricket or rugby players who might be tempted to participate in South African tournaments.

One can hardly dismiss the existence of such regimes as minor nuisances caused by a "few isolated believers." Speaking demographically, these "isolated believers" rule over two-thirds of the human race. I fully understand and share Fukuyama's inclination to make light of the "strange thoughts [that] may occur to people in Albania or Burkina Faso." But the inhabitants of these countries, one imagines, are less amused.

It would be quite relevant but all too easy, at this point, to recall the Chinese crackdown of June 1989 and how Beijing's return to repressive methods has belied the analyses of the situation which assumed that the democratization process was now and henceforth an accomplished fact. What is perhaps more interesting is the eagerness with which so many commentators on both sides of the Atlantic have made a point of refusing to see this huge step backwards toward totalitarian barbarism as a serious matter. Nothing is really proven by all this, they say, nothing definitive at any rate. Liberalization will surely begin again sooner or later; and one day the students will raise their heads again. But they will not be the *same* students. Of course, *in the long run*, it is indeed likely that China will take the liberal road once more, perhaps in ten or twenty years. But in politics I don't much care about the long run; it's the short one that counts, after all, since human life is short.

What we witnessed in China during the spring of 1989 was the *failure of an action*, that of the liberals, and the success of another action, that of the Communist party. It is this that actually constitutes the historical truth. Solidarity's action failed in 1981 and succeeded in 1989. But the freedom-seeking Poles who died between those two dates, surely, failed. The future, *even if it actually comes to pass*, will not bring back the people killed on Tiananmen Square; they will remain defeated forever. History concerns specific individuals—people, not abstract processes.

HISTORY CONSISTS more frequently of relapses, it seems to me, than it does of progress. Without becoming totalitarian again, the Soviet Union might well move towards a vast anarchy, a chaotic late-medievalism, rather than towards an advanced democratic capitalism. And without venturing to conjecture about an uncertain future, simply limiting ourselves to a present that is very much with us and a very recent past, on what grounds can we simply dismiss as unrepresentative of our historical epoch such people as Ceaucescu and Kim Il Sung, Burma's Ne Win and Madagascar's Ratairaka, Idi Amin and Sekou Toure, Sadam Hussein (so ingenious as an exterminator of Kurds with chemical weapons), Hafez El Assad and Khomeini, Fidel Castro (now eagerly emulating the Moscow Trials in Havana) and Mengistu (with his deliberately induced famines)? They, and others like them, make up quite a crowd. By virtue of what criteria are we to decide that they are not to be seen as incarnations of our historical epoch? They take up more historical room than liberal democracy does, and far from being mere survivors, most have appeared on the scene quite recently.

Why should terrorism, which destroyed democracy in Argentina and Uruguay during the early seventies and which could well do the same in Peru and Colombia before the end of this year, be considered a phenomenon of no historical importance? It was a veritable storm of terrorism that put an end to Turkish democracy in 1980, thus creating a formidable problem for NATO and the Council of Europe. International state terrorism, especially, being very well organized, has proved itself a remarkably effective and precise politico-strategic instrument, and highly cost-

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effective. Given its scope and novelty, it cannot be considered a marginal phenomenon. Indeed it seems to me to have taken on a central role during the past twenty years—and rather more meaningful a part of our history than, say, the conventions and conferences of our political parties or certain electoral ceremonies which citizens tend increasingly to neglect. If one takes a purely statistical view, and distinguishes rigorously between value judgments and simple facts, it seems quite impossible to consider democracies as constituting some sort of norm in our time, while other regimes and activities which have had so much to do with fashioning the actual world we live in are held to be deviant and atypical.

Let me repeat, however, that I am quite in agreement with Francis Fukuyama's thesis: namely, that economic and political freedom has emerged as the best principle of social organization available to modern man, and that the entire world has now taken cognizance of this fact. Does this mean that the world will now proceed to act on this awareness if the existing democracies fail to act decisively to bring such an outcome to pass? I do not believe so. I do not believe in the inevitability of democratization, or in the existence of some sort of "dialectic process" which would accomplish the work that men must do themselves. Matters can always regress. Matters have indeed often regressed. Ovid's *video meliora proboque; deteriora sequor*—I see the better way, and approve it; I follow the worse—would still seem to be the maxim that people most assiduously apply.

To change this state of affairs, we would have to develop a deliberate *democratic policy*, an activist policy, world-wide. But judging from the passivity with which the West witnessed China's recent retreat into the darkness, we seem to be far from any such notion. More and more the chief talent of our statesmen seems to consist in "knowing how to wait" and piously hoping that things will straighten themselves out and that "time will do its work." But time by itself does no more work than space does. In politics, as in the sciences, the arts and letters, only man works. And history, unless it be hypostatized to History, is merely the record of man's works, never their motor.

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Congress for Cultural Freedom

I appreciate your granting me space in which to comment on Irving Kristol's review of Peter Coleman's history of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (Fall 1989). Central to Mr. Kristol's review is his discussion of the relation between the Congress for Cultural Freedom and its affiliate in this country, the American Committee for Cultural Freedom. We are reminded by Mr. Kristol that he had an early association with the Congress as a founding editor of *Encounter*, one of the several magazines published by the Congress. Mine was a different connection, largely adversary: from, I think, 1953 until 1961 I was a member of the Executive Committee of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, the unloved and unloving offspring of the Congress, and from 1955 to 1957 I was its chairman. My predecessor in this office was Norman Thomas, head of the American Socialist Party. I mention him here not only to suggest the range of political opinion among those who guided the policies of the American Committee but also to propose a counterweight to Mr. Kristol's strangely-approving statement that the Congress based much of its practice on the example of the British Labour Party.

Unlike Mr. Coleman's book which, despite its author's own association with the Congress and his need to produce a sustained dramatic narrative, makes its way almost wholly by means of documentary evidence, Mr. Kristol's review offers us summary overviews and judgments in place of the kind of information which we require if we are properly to adjudicate the long-standing conflict between the Congress and the American Committee. He neglects the important fact that the American Committee was unique among the affiliates of the Congress in being self-supporting. (Mr. Kristol would surely agree that nothing so much liberates the mind as financial independence.) He also fails to mention that a chief activity of the Congress and the occupation for which it was best known among the people whom it undertook to win to the anti-Communist side in the battle of ideas was the organization of conferences and "confrontations," panels, seminars, festivals. It sent artists and intellectuals all over the world for these costly gatherings. This was a sizeable patronage which the Congress had at its disposal and there were those of us who accused it of being a "gravy train." At least once, the train invited me aboard. At a meeting of the American Executive Committee I found myself in strong opposition to Sidney Hook; our subject was the relation of the Congress to Indonesia—Hook was also a member of the Executive Board of the Congress. At the conclusion of the meeting Hook chided me on my ignorance of that distant land and asked me if I wouldn't like to visit it. The Congress, he assured me, would be glad to send me. Had I accepted, could I have comfortably held to my dissidence?

But the most significant omission in Mr. Kristol's review and my primary reason for writing in response to it is his failure to tell us anything of what led to the final rupture between the American Committee and the parent organization—the story is fully and fairly reported by Mr. Coleman and it could not more clearly define the nature of our longtime conflict. In March 1956, Bertrand Russell, an honorary chairman of the international body, published a letter in the *Manchester Guardian* in which he referred to "atrocities committed by the FBI" and compared America with "other police states such as Nazi Germany and Stalin's Russia." In a communication to the Congress, the American Committee called for Russell's resignation; it protested that his statement was "a major disservice to the cause of freedom and democracy and a major service to the enemy we had supposed you engaged in combat." The Congress refused to ask for Russell's resignation. "You don't seem to realize," Michael Josselson, the CIA's man in the Con-

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gress, wrote angrily to Hook, "what Russell's name on our masthead has meant to our international reputation, nor how severely the loss of his name will affect the Congress and our friends who work for the Congress in non-committed areas where his name has helped offset some of the initial reluctance of people to associate with us." At this point the American Committee severed its tie with the Congress. I addressed the Paris office on our behalf: "Russell published a fierce and totally ungrounded attack upon American institutions and freedom. And this attack constituted, we believe, an act of intellectual violence of a kind which puts it well outside the common realm of persuasive discourse. . . . How untruthful about America may a man be and still be useful to an organization which is pledged to truth and which numbers among its affiliates an American branch?. . . . Surely those who are won to the support of the Congress by Russell's present-day opinions and activities may turn out to be very uncertain friends of what the Congress stands for tomorrow."

I have sometimes had occasion to try to account for the CIA's sponsorship of an organization as alien as the Congress to its usual principles and practices. It is not easy to explain. No doubt correctly, Mr. Kristol, following Mr. Coleman, traces its inspiration to such liberals in the CIA as Tom Braden and Cord Meyer, Jr. who believed that it was only from a non-Communist but left-wing position that one could successfully counteract the powerful propaganda apparatus of the Soviet Union. But what boggles the mind is Mr. Kristol's conviction that theirs was the right view. He tells us that even in the early Fifties he was already edging towards his now well-known neo-conservatism; yet he was able to accept then and still accepts an attitude which the diversified American Committee found unacceptable. He states that even today, as he looks back upon the policies of the Congress, he sees no reason to fault them. This is disorienting: why is Mr. Kristol at such pains to approve a position this much at variance with his stated political preferences? The Congress believed that we in America who wanted to engage the propaganda efforts of the Soviet Union more openly and directly were "provincial" and Mr. Kristol concurs in this opinion, too.

Of course, as things have worked out in the Soviet Union, history has bypassed all of us, Mr. Kristol on his high ground of political pragmatism, me and those in my camp on our high ground of political intransigence. But this does not alter the fact that there were important issues in dispute between the Congress and the American Committee, issues of strategy and principle which outlive the immediate circumstances in which they arose.

Diana Trilling
New York

Kristol Responds

Though I was not a member of the Executive Committee of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, I did attend, as an observer, the Paris meeting at which the Bertrand Russell case was discussed. Raymond Aron, Michael Polanyi, Ignazio Silone, Minoo Masani, and others thought that the Congress, as an international organization, simply could not afford at that moment a public break with Russell. Their "pragmatic" argument carried the day. Mrs. Trilling thought then, and still thinks, that such pragmatism is wrong and that "intransigence" is the superior option. Her assembled peers in Paris regarded this point of view as understandable but nevertheless provincially New York-American. At the time, I felt they were probably right. Today, I still feel they were probably right.

But why on earth, after thirty-five years, revive this argument? In retrospect, the Congress can be seen as an interesting ripple, of modest dimensions, on the post-World War II cultural scene. The American Committee—whose finances, incidentally, at least for several years, came from the same source as the Congress'—was a ripple on this ripple. I see no urgency in "adjudicating" the ancient quarrel between them.

Irving Kristol
Washington, D.C.

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
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

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Chicken George?

Gary J. Schmitt

DRUGS ARE NOT the only addiction that seems to be plaguing Washington in this first year of the Bush presidency. Pundits and politicians alike appear to be suffering another kind of withdrawal pain—one brought on by a lack of that great stimulant, "visionary" presidential politics. Cut off from their normal supply of grand rhetoric and grand schemes, Washington's addicts are lashing out at the President and his administration for its "timidity" and unwillingness to feed a seemingly insatiable appetite for acts of aggressive presidential behavior.

In a town where bipartisanship is frequently called for but rarely present, it is interesting to note that a consensus has congealed around the charge that the Bush administration has been sorely deficient in policy-making verve. As David Broder put the matter in the *Washington Post*, "From Panama to the Potomac this White House looks 'chicken'."

At one time or another, the Bush administration has been censured for being overly cautious toward: the changes underway in Moscow; the crackdown in China; the Middle East "peace process"; and the omnipresent arms negotiations in Geneva and wherever else. But it is Bush's handling of events in Poland and Panama that the administration has incurred the loudest and most insistent public criticism.

For a year, and like the Reagan administration before them, the President and his chief advisers have made it clear that ousting the head of the Panamanian Defense Forces is an important goal of U.S. foreign policy. But when the opportunity arose in October in the form of a revolt within those same forces, the Bush administration found a host of reasons why it could not, or should not, go beyond a few half-hearted measures in support of it. Confining its participation to the minimum, the administration appeared to be only "somewhat" pregnant. In the end, the affair had been all-too-brief, while evidence of the administration's compromised position was there for all to see.

How the administration found itself in this situation has been attributed to a number of factors, ranging from the systemic paralysis in the governing institutions to the more modest bureaucratic problems of the administration's "crisis management" machinery. In the end, however, the judgment that has stuck is that U.S. actions (or lack thereof) during the attempted coup amounted to a "significant defeat for U.S. policy." More broadly, those actions have been taken to confirm the judgment that, in the words of Charles Krauthammer, "Decisiveness. . . is not the Bush style." The problem, in Krauthammer's view, is "the gap—the Bush gap—between ends and means, between the presi-

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dent's proclaimed goals and what he is willing to expend to achieve them."

This would be a serious indictment if it were an accurate portrayal of the administration's goals with regard to Panama and a fair assessment of the tools that it had at its disposal for carrying out those same goals. But is it?

Major Giroldi and his pals in the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) were pretty poor horses on which to place any bets. The end (in this case getting rid of Noriega) may justify the means, but the means still have to be effective. It is not decisiveness, but foolishness, to toss caution to the wind and jump into a fray with "allies" whose expressed goals are not the same as one's own. Moreover, this basic incompatibility of goals would not have been solved, as some have suggested, even if the administration had been more aggressive in making explicit that any U.S. help was conditioned on the willingness of the conspirators to turn over Noriega. These "Monday morning" analysts have obviously not taken to heart Machiavelli's warning about the weakness of depending on the arms (and intentions) of others. Given the major's history, and his known ties to the general, no amount of pre-coup posturing would have solved the uncertainty regarding his basic reliability.

This is not to say that certainty is a prerequisite for getting involved. To look, in Secretary of State Baker's words, for a time of "maximum opportunity and advantage" before one acts is to set a standard never quite in practice attainable. The real question is whether the risks associated with the means at one's disposal are proportionate to the importance of the gains sought.

Here clarity is critical. The only overriding interest the U.S. has in connection with Panama concerns the canal; getting rid of Noriega and promoting democracy there are important, but decidedly secondary goals. Only by a bit of Washington-style word inflation can it be said that Bush's repeated calls for the Panamanians to oust Noriega implied some firm commitment on the part of the U.S. to aid in that activity. Given the relative priority for the U.S. of removing Noriega from power, the administration's stated position was straightforward and consistent. It was primarily in the interest of Panama and the PDF to get rid of the general; depending on "who" and "when," it might also have been in Washington's as well.

IN GENERAL, the administration's decision to involve itself cautiously in the coup attempt, but not to commit itself beyond a certain point, reflects a reasonable assessment of the relative merits of those leading the coup, the risks involved, Washington's prerogatives under the canal treaty, and the administration's policy priorities. Being "half-in, half-out" in Panama may be a sign of the administration's terminal irresoluteness, but it also may represent a fair weighing of the administration's ends with its means.

In terms of long-term, substantive policy, the most prominent effort to hang the charge of "timidity" around the administration's neck during its first year came from Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell. Like many of the President's critics, Mitchell has accused the administration of having failed to respond adequately to the historic changes underway in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Unlike most, Mitchell has even gone so far as to suggest that a kind of nostalgia for the certainties of the Cold War has inhibited the administration's ability to come up with the appropriately bold plan of action for the region. When faced with the unprecedented events taking place in Poland and elsewhere in the East bloc, he has charged that "the administration [has] barely blinked in response." "Now," according to the senator from Maine, "is not the time for small steps or timid measures."

But big steps require firm footing. Given the large uncertainties surrounding the events in Eastern Europe, a bit of modesty in one's policy-making seems quite in order. As historic as the changes in Poland and elsewhere have been, they hardly reflect some obvious

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logic of history. As Senator Mitchell himself has noted, until it had in fact happened, the "prospect of a non-Communist government in Warsaw seemed remote." In such a case, it is surely reasonable to eschew the bold in favor of a calibrated—and therefore more flexible—policy.

Even in the case of Poland, caution is still appropriate. It is not true, as Senator Mitchell and others seem to believe, that with the appointment of Tadeusz Mazowiecki as Poland's prime minister "the Communist Party's dominance of Poland officially ended." It *has* been seriously weakened. But the Party still controls the country's military and police, and General Jaruzelski is still Poland's president, with the power to reimpose martial law; and Poland's intelligence service has presumably not ended its alliance with the KGB. While the ties that bind the Polish state to Moscow have been loosened, Poland's "mixed regime" is still a member in good standing in the Warsaw Pact.

Putting aside this and other unpleasant realities (such as the U.S. budget), Senate Democrats took the President's original program and sought to increase the aid planned for Poland and Hungary by a factor of eight. If the Bush administration can be accused of being nostalgic for the "certainties" connected to the Cold War, it seems fair to say that the Democrats have yet to abandon the proposition that, with foreign aid, more is better. But even the Senate's largesse is small potatoes when compared with Poland's true fiscal requirements. With a debt of nearly $40 billion, only huge new loans from the West could be expected to have any substantive impact. Yet even here, such an infusion of capital would not touch those countries' more fundamental, structural problems. Until reforms which address these problems are in place, large capital transfers may (à la the 1970s) be good for the soul (and domestic politics) but they will not magically extract Poland from a mire of some forty years' standing.

At bottom, the debate between the administration and its critics revolves around the question of how best to cement U.S. gains in Poland and Hungary. The administration's critics simply do not understand (or want to acknowledge) the delicate character of the game of strategic chicken now being played out in Poland. Both Moscow and the Communist party in Warsaw have been forced by Poland's abysmal internal situation to allow an unprecedented degree of political and economic reforms. But there is no evidence as yet to lead one to believe that the Soviets are willing to see Poland's ultimate control slip from its and the Party's hands. Their bet is that they can loosen up internally to meet the current crisis, but not lose the country altogether. The administration's bet is that this cannot be done. Allowed to play out, Poland's reforms will at some point make the question of control, as a Marxist might say, "objectively" a mute issue.

YET PUSH too fast and one invites a Soviet reaction—if not by Gorbachev, then his successor; jump in too soon with too much aid and the reform process stalls, as the necessity for it becomes far less pressing. On balance, the Bush administration's studied caution appears largely sound. At a minimum, it is a reasoned position and hardly reflects a knee-jerk attachment to the certainties of old.

It is not as though the administration's efforts with regard to Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe have resulted in a major policy failure. While it can hardly claim credit for what has happened there, the administration can sensibly argue that it has done nothing that would disrupt a process that is moving along lines and at a pace quite favorable to the West. The President and his advisers have every right to ask their critics why they should now change an approach that appears by any rational standard to have been successful.

Obviously, the administration cannot make the same kind of case with regard to Panama and Noriega. Two years after his indictment in the United States the PDF general still rules his country. Nevertheless, two

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coup attempts in a nineteen-month period indicate that all is not well within the PDF and that Noriega would be unwise to buy term life insurance anytime soon. While not happening as quickly as the Reagan and Bush administrations might have liked, the policy of isolating Panama militarily and economically does appear to have created a dynamic within the country (and particularly in the military) that suggests the petty tyrant's grip is far from absolute or permanent.

NEITHER THE administration's handling of the coup attempt in Panama nor its position toward Eastern Europe is beyond dispute. As the saying goes, reasonable men can and will differ. But more is going on in the debate over "timidity" than is dreamed of by reasonable men. A bit of evidence of what that might be is suggested by Senator Mitchell's statement that "there must be two principles guiding the American approach to Poland. . . leadership and urgency." This is an odd, but revealing, formulation. It implies a certain preeminence of form over substance, of style as policy. Likewise in the case of Panama, where criticism was rife about the way in which the White House went about its business during the day of the attempted coup. In both instances, what we might call the "aesthetics" of the administration's crisis management came in for some stern review.

It appears that, to be serious, one has to appear serious. And one cannot *appear* serious when exercising restraint or patiently allowing events to unfold.

The U.S. has become habituated to forward and assertive presidential behavior. In the domestic arena this has been engendered by the increased reliance on "crisis" politics—this week's "war on. . . "—to generate or stiffen a popular mandate. In foreign affairs, its roots lie with American foreign policy's tendency toward "idealism" of one sort or another—that is, a willful application of some idea on recalcitrant foreign matters, states, and peoples. Combined, the two have acclimated Washington to a "hot-house" form of presidential leadership in which leadership can be said to exist only when bold, and foreign policy is a policy only when it is pro-active. A policy of allowing things to take their course is, by definition, no policy at all.

There exists, in brief, a bias toward action. So much is now taken for granted about a President's ability to shape and order international affairs that letting well enough alone seems almost heretical.

But this orthodoxy has its costs, least of them a heightened public expectation about what in fact is possible. For this reason, the Bush administration's cautious approach to East-West relations should not be so lightly dismissed. By keeping their attitude low-key, and giving voice to a fair share of skepticism about the Soviet reform process, Bush and his advisers have done a relatively good job of keeping in check the euphoria that might otherwise run rampant as the Cold War seems to draw to a close. Indeed, given the domestic and international political credit to be gained for moving even faster on this front, the Bush administration has exhibited a fair amount of self-restraint—something that should not be lightly dismissed, as Reykjavik and the last years of the Reagan administration might remind us.

Until late, the administration's policy toward the Soviet Union during its first year was characterized by a willingness to allow events to play out and trends there to solidify. The administration seemed confident that given the severity of the problems facing Moscow a reform program that did not greatly reduce the "soviet" in Soviet Union was not likely to succeed, and a program that proposed to do precisely that, not likely to be carried out. In either case, the result was not totally to Washington's disadvantage: creating, on the one hand, a potentially less hostile opponent, or on the other, an even more stagnant one. A policy of sitting tight, letting the Soviets stew in their own juices, and seeing what unilateral concessions they might be willing to make, made sense.

Yet even a policy of restraint still needs defending, especially by the President. A

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President must articulate, if not with vision, at least clearly and repeatedly, the principles that guide its actions and the judgments as to when and how those principles are to be applied. Failing that, an administration will as a practical matter lose sight of the end-game, drift into department-driven factional politics, and find itself unable to weather the criticisms of its opponents and the nervous chattering of its allies.

One senses, however, that this is an administration whose first instincts are to see presidential rhetoric as a means for winning elections, rather than for governing. It is hardly surprising then that it would react to the opposition's rhetoric the same way. After Senator Mitchell attacked the administration for its "timidity" in moving beyond the Cold War, the secretary of state responded by denigrating the criticism as partisan and connected to the President's "rocking along with a 70 percent approval rating on his handling of foreign policy."

The President's response was not to respond. He was content to sit out the debate knowing he held in his hand the wild card of an unscheduled summit with Mikhail Gorbachev. Played with considerable political skill, the surprise announcement effectively made the charge that the President was too cautious in his handling of East-West relations suddenly ring hollow. With one decisive gesture, the administration seemed to satiate the critics' addiction to the aesthetics of presidential leadership.

Given the largely vacuous nature of this addiction, concerned as it is with form rather than substance, it is fitting that the administration could silence the timidity refrain with what was originally billed as a "non-summit" summit. But feeding an addiction—even when done moderately—is a dangerous business, and certainly is no cure. To the contrary, whetted, the appetite tends to grow. In the aftermath of the "non-summit," the Bush administration will only find it harder to sustain a policy whose strategic insight is to leave well enough alone.

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

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

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